


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31 AUGUST 1989



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## **Soviet Union**

***KOMMUNIST***

No 9, June 1989

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31 AUGUST 1989

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## KOMMUNIST

No 9, June 1989

[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

### Without Hesitation. Notes From the Congress of USSR People's Deputies

18020015a Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 9, Jun 89 (signed to press 2 Jun 89) pp 3-9

[Article by Ye. Gaydar and O. Latsis]

[Text] Twenty years of stagnation is an unaffordable luxury in our dynamic century. Now, when we must catch up we have no spare time for testing, we have no reserve of resistance to errors. Perestroika, which was initiated with some delay, must be hastened. It is no accident that the Congress of People's Deputies applauded periodically repeated appeals of seemingly conflicting meaning. Let us not hasten, let us think out everything calmly, some said. Enough discussions, let us get on with the work faster, others demanded. Both demands were accurate.

In this situation, the congress did the only possible thing: it moved ahead, feeling its way as it made innovative decisions and necessary compromises, and as it coordinated conflicting interests. It may have seemed to the television viewers that occasionally the deputies were sluggish, painstakingly unraveling seemingly insignificant tangles. A future historian, however, would be proudly amazed at the headlong pace of political progress recorded in the congress' materials.

This is not a question of new political structures created in a matter of hours, replacing the traditional machinery which took decades to develop. This is also a question of a new standard of political intercourse which cannot be introduced by decree and which, in terms of its purpose in our lives, is superior to many decrees.

Some changes, which would have amazed us no more than 5 years ago, remained these days virtually unnoticed against the background of more significant events. Let us recall that less than 1 year ago, in that same hall, the 19th All-Union Party Conference was held, a conference which astounded the country with its unparalleled flexibility, openness and critical thoughts. However, even the conference had not rejected the old habit: after each intermission the members of this high party forum stood up to welcome with applause the members of the presidium as they entered. Here, at the congress, this was abandoned naturally and apparently unnoticeably.

Also noteworthy was the fact that at the congress there were no obstacles to criticism or debates. This is a standard of democratic work in a civilized country. However, it took us a long time and great difficulty to return to this standard after decades of abnormality, for

which reason we can now justifiably point out that this stage has been covered, that this is behind us and that we can move on.

At the congress events developed so fast that the latest one pushed the previous ones out of the mind, preventing their full interpretation. Clearly, in order to make better use of the experience we have acquired it would be useful repeatedly to recall all the events of those days. We must not simply recall them but think them out, analyze them. An attempt to do this was made at the congress itself when, at the beginning of its 3rd day, suddenly a sharp debate broke out on how to assess the results of the first 2 days of work and how to go on working: it was a spontaneous debate which was no less important than the resolutions stipulated in the agenda. However, the participants in this emotional dialogue did not set themselves the task of systematically analyzing the entire proceedings, for a great deal remained outside their scope. Yet every single event deserves a close study, for the congress, which was elected on a new basis, became a true mirror of the country and its thoughts and moods. It reflected not only the achievements of a developing political standard of democracy but also its weaknesses, immaturity and even biases.

Let us perhaps recall the discussion of a single topic which unexpectedly appeared in electing the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The candidate for this position was asked the following: Would he resign his position as CPSU Central Committee general secretary? Let us follow the reaction of the deputies. The same question had been already discussed at the 19th Party Conference where people talked themselves hoarse on the subject of combining these positions and where the vote was not unanimous. All those who were against it stipulated that there were no objections to combining high positions in the party and the state. At the congress, unexpectedly there was an array of statements bringing quoting most unexpected arguments.

There were references to Lenin, who was not the general secretary of the Central Committee, but no one objected by stating that at that time the general secretary was not the leader of the party. Lenin chaired the Politburo and delivered the featured speeches at the congresses. There was no question in anyone's mind that the Sovnarkom chairman was the party's leader.

It was categorically stated that in a rule of law state jobs cannot be combined, but no one recalled that the leader of the ruling party holds the position of head of state or government in Great Britain, Canada, Japan, Sweden, the FRG and many other bourgeois democracies. Such a combination is frequently practiced in the socialist countries as well.

The chair at that session had reasons to combine democracy with greater activeness. He could put to a vote a motion on answering a question, as had been done at many an electoral meeting, when a candidate would be asked a question incorrectly or not to the point. Actually,

are there elsewhere in the world examples in which the parliament has interfered in internal party life and dictated to parties personnel their decisions? In any other country such an effort would be rejected as the grossest possible violation of democracy, for state authorities, including the highest ones, could demand of the party one thing only: to obey the laws. Something else, however, is also clear: our country's historical experience makes questions of the interaction between the party and the state particularly touchy. Therefore, it is a good thing for that discussion to have been held: the deputies had to become accustomed to wearing the unaccustomed clothing of the new political system.

The symptoms of this process of mastery and initial familiarity were noted in other speeches as well. The still extant romantic concepts of the laws governing social life reflect, for example, a kind of "instrumental" view of democracy, which was sounded in a number of speeches. The dream of finding some kind of most reliable instrument, allegedly capable once and for all to protect our democracy from all dangers, appeared to some to be that of direct national elections for head of state and, to others, referenda on all matters. So, let us ask the following: Fifty years ago, had there been direct elections for the head of the country, who would have won? Naturally, democratic instruments are necessary. Nonetheless, global experience confirms that there is no miraculous way of replacing the complex set of knowledge and customs, laws and procedures known as the political standard of a society. They cannot be developed easily and quickly. However, this is the only guarantee of democracy.

The congress made a tremendous contribution to our political standards also because the entire people were able to see immediately what it is that we lack the most in this area. A Lithuanian deputy called for abandoning the method of electing representatives of the republics to the Supreme Soviet by the entire congress and the overwhelming majority immediately realized the unacceptability of this idea. But then a discussion was started on the quotas for the individual oblasts and krais and even cities, and the majority accepted this as something necessary. The few suggestions of electing deputies to the supreme authority above all on the basis of personal qualities and not their place of residence met with no response.

Some deputies failed to master the new range of concepts and legal standards defining their work. Several speakers, for example, called for alternate elections for the first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which was clearly impossible, since the candidate must be nominated by the Supreme Soviet chairman, for he cannot have two different views of a candidate. Others demanded materials on the candidacies of ministers even before N.I. Ryzhkov's report, although such nominations could be made only by the approved head of government. Periodically, suggestions were made to change the Constitution the moment it was established (or so it seemed) that a constitutional rule hinders the

quick adoption of the latest resolution. Yet a deputy query, expressed in the general form of an idea, is something distinct from a legislative initiative.

All of this could be understood, particularly the persistent desire of holding alternate elections in all cases, whenever possible. Most such democratic demands were just. However, exigency and pressure are no substitute for knowledge. They cannot be the main argument of a debate. Clearly, the duty of a deputy is not reduced to being daring and persistent. Obviously, attention should be paid to the experience of the Komsomol deputies who, in the interval of 2 months between the elections and the opening of the congress, used that time, in particular, to study the problems which were awaiting them. There is nothing shameful for people coming from different popular strata, brought to the political arena by the democratic wave of perestroika, possessing practical knowledge and entrusted with the confidence of their voters but ignorant in legal matters, to fill gaps in their knowledge. Democratic political structures and efficient procedures cannot be created without relying on a stock of political and legal knowledge.

Naturally, however, the most important event was not mastering a certain political standard but the creation of a new one. In the heat of the arguments of the first days, it so happened that B.N. Yeltsin was not made member of the Supreme Soviet. The accomplishment of the 4th day of the congress was the fact that a way to solve this problem was found. On that day something else happened as well: the deputies began to listen to one another more attentively.

Let us particularly note one topic: relations among nationalities and, above all, problems and rights of republics. The deputies brought into the Kremlin Hall the heavy legacy of past decades: the problem of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, the tragedy of the Aral, the consequences of the population's disorderly migrations, the fact that so far rights of ethnic groups, repressed by Stalin, had not been restored, the threatened existence of many languages, and the dying of the Nonchernozem countryside, the cradle of Russian culture. Added to this were bursts of stress which arose during the time of perestroika, caused by the wrong reaction to such problems. This applied above all to the Tbilisi tragedy. No, the discussion of this topic at the congress was not gentle, in the spirit of the traditional speeches about friendship among the peoples, secured forever. Not everyone was conciliatory. Not everyone displayed an accurate understanding of political realities. Nonetheless, it would have been unusual to expect this from the very first steps of the discussion of such sensitive problems. One thing instilled hope: the predominant wish to listen, to understand and to learn how to respect different viewpoints.

The spontaneous discussion which broke out on the 3rd and 4th days of the sessions, which could be described as "the congress on itself," indicated that 4 years of perestroika had not gone without a trace for our society. The



Congress was able to separate the wheat from the chaff in the speeches which marked the start of this discussion. Irritation and sharpness did not prevent from seeing the great share of truth in the criticism of the work already done. The very readiness of the congress to engage in practical self-criticism turned unexpected speeches into part of the useful work.

Nonetheless, the most important thing which the country expected of the congress was a discussion of constructive suggestions on forthcoming activities and urgent practical steps which would help to improve the situation in the country.

What was heard repeatedly and persistently at the congress was that the roots of the aggravation of the political situation rested in the economy. Society had become tired of empty store shelves, the lack of basic goods in daily demand and the worsening rationing system. Unless the situation could be corrected in the immediate future and unless the living standard could improve, this could lead to an increase in the social tension. Naturally, it was precisely turning the economy toward the individual, analyzing the reasons for difficulties in economic development and seeking ways which made it possible to surmount negative trends that were the focal point of M.S. Gorbachev's speech.

On the surface, its most effective aspect was the fact that for the first time information was revealed on the real cost of defense and on suggestions on reducing it. Naturally, this is merely the first step in the establishment of an efficient mechanism of public control over defense policy. The deputies will have to learn how to weigh the expediency of outlays for specific defense programs and to master the art which would make it possible to keep defense appropriations down to a minimum and yet on a level adequate for reliably ensuring the country's safety.

The significance of the new step in eliminating unjustified secrecy goes far beyond the limits of strictly defense problems. One more obstacle to normalizing relations between the state and society was removed. The solemn officiating of the state, which could grant benefits to multi-million strong social groups or dispense disgrace, is being replaced by a democracy mechanism within which the people, using the governmental institutions, can decide how to use their own money.

Now, when the screen hiding the mystery of the making and use of the state budget has been lifted, there is no need to explain in detail what actually occurred in recent years on the consumer market or what led to the drastic worsening of the situation. The tempestuously growing state budget deficit, the intensification of inflationary processes and the undermined confidence in the ruble could not fail to trigger consumer panic. One could have spoken of an economic miracle had the financial policy exercised in recent years yielded different results. No miracles happened and the laws of economics once again convincingly proved the need to respect them.

We must abandon a policy which ignores the real possibilities of the country and radically revise our priorities. Priority is being given to decisive steps aimed at improving our finances and monetary circulation and to drawing up an exceptionally tight budget. Here is a capitalistic feature in the political report: the discussion of the most important social problems, the solution of which requires the procurement of funds is being closely related to the study of the possibilities for thrift and ways of harnessing resources.

The interconnection between improving the financial health and the development of the economic reform is a key problem in economic policy. Since the end of last year there have been clear indications of a retreat in a number of key positions and the dismantling of economic instruments. The position formulated in the report is extremely clear: the systematic intensification of reform is the high road leading to the development of the national economy. We must not postpone but, conversely, accelerate the formulation and implementation of interrelated steps aimed at the restructuring of the economic mechanism and the organization of a full socialist market. We must not wait for the end of the current 5-year period. No steps taken to promote financial health can replace the reform. They can merely create minimally acceptable conditions for its development.

Historical experience makes entirely clear the fear that statements concerning exceptional measures and financial improvements must not turn in practice to the silent abandoning of the reform. Hence the appeal for immediately dismantling of the administrative-command system and the elimination of anything which obstructs the economic initiative of enterprises.

However, a market economy does not mean exclusively wholesale trade and autonomy in formulating a production program. It also means prices which balance supply with demand. Such prices can be controlled but not ordered. The dynamics of balanced prices is based on the correlation between voluntary savings and investments, budget revenue and expenditures and the growth rates of the money in circulation. Any knowledgeable economist knows that, given the contemporary financial situation, decisive measures to unfreeze prices would inevitably result in a rate of inflation reaching tens or hundreds of percentage points a year in just a few months. Only incorrigible optimists could believe that in such a situation prices of basic consumer goods could remain stable. The statement made in the report to the effect that such a choice would create an explosive social situation in the country emphasizes the entire complexity of the problem.

There is no mystery whatsoever as to what should be done for the radical measures aimed at intensifying the reform and developing market control not to have such destructive consequences. The answer to this question has long been known: we must exercise a strict credit-monetary policy. We must drastically curtail the growth

rates of loans and the money in circulation and, under our specific conditions in which the budget is the biggest user of credit resources, make the expenditures of the state consistent with harnessed financial resources on a noninflationary basis. The problem of the budget is always political. The debates on M.S. Gorbachev's speech indicate the difficulty of solving it.

The state budget is a mechanism for the large-scale redistribution of funds, in which the interests of different social groups become most closely intertwined. The paradox of the present situation is that the distribution processes in which the state performs the function of middleman are perceived in the public mind precisely in terms of the relationship with the authorities. With a feeling of reciprocal solidarity, those who are dissatisfied with the inadequacy of budget appropriations and those who cannot agree to excessive taxation frequently formulate claims to the central authorities based on totally opposite reasons. All possible interregional, intersectorial and intergroup conflicts are viewed as a conflict with the state.

Whereas in the past the state was humbly asked to increase allocations now, under the conditions of democracy, the situation has changed radically. Regions and sectors have now learned how loudly and confidently to demand the redistribution of financial resources in their favor. Meanwhile, society has not realized as yet that it is a question of its own pocket and of expenditures which, whatever the case, will have to be paid for through higher taxes, price increases, and empty shelves in the stores.

A responsible decision was made on substantially reducing defense expenditures. Real opportunities appear for using the thus released resources in making financial improvements, strengthening the ruble and fighting inflation. However, the number of immediately formulated categorical requirements concerning the use of such unavailable funds is so great that there is real danger of further worsening of the financial situation of the state as a result of such savings.

The study of the appeal submitted by 417 agrarian deputies for consideration by the congress on the 6th day of its work provides the clearest possible idea of how difficult it is to make progress in solving vitally important financial problems. The views it expresses are extremely clear. The town owes a great deal to the country. Any reduction of capital investments in the agrarian sector of the economy is inadmissible. Conversely, after reducing the state's expenditures for industrial construction, defense and space, the thus released funds must be channeled into the countryside. It is not the peasant who must finance such outlays. They must come from the budget. Purchase prices must be raised and the debts of agricultural enterprises must be written off.

The deputies quoted examples of unacceptable policy toward the countryside. Under the banner of financial

improvements, efforts are being made to curtail promised capital investments. The cost of loans is being increased and, furthermore, interest is being demanded on uncollectable loans, the payment of which has been rescheduled. This situation is intolerable and unacceptable!

This is such a serious problem of key importance to the fate of the country, that it should be analyzed calmly, without emotions. Yes, the countryside bore the tremendous and unbearable burden during the period of industrialization, the war and the postwar restoration. Hardly anyone would dispute the fact that social conditions in the countryside are unsatisfactory and that food shortages are the gravest possible problem. However, the suggested prescriptions have already been used for several decades. The share of capital investments channeled into the development of agriculture for several 5-year periods are unprecedented for an industrialized country and has been much higher than in other socialist countries which manage to feed themselves. It is also difficult to find in world practices examples of such strikingly low returns on funds invested in this area. Our experience indicates that it has been possible to invest tens of billions of rubles in poor equipment for the countryside, sink such equipment in concrete and bury it in the ground. This neither corrects the food situation nor eliminates the intolerable disparity between the living standard in town and country. The bare shelves of stores, and not food stores alone, is a huge monument of an endless waste of billions of rubles, stretching throughout the country.

In the countryside the administrative-command system has become irreparably compromised. The appeal of the agrarian deputies states that we must advance toward broad economic autonomy of the rural working people, mutually profitable state orders, and a plurality of forms of ownership. The trouble is that all of this cannot be combined with an inflationary economic policy of "easy" money and an increase in budget-based capital investments, unbearable to the country. There is no more reliable way of strengthening the power of the administrative structure, which is today in charge of the agrarian area, than increasing the flow of free government allocations. In such a case the market will be unable to operate and, consequently, without the allocation of scarce resources and without orders as to what to sow and where to sow it work becomes simply impossible.

The fact that the social organization of the countryside is in an inadmissibly neglected condition is unquestionable, as is the fact that today the state cannot postpone a reform in pensions, increasing the assistance given to low income earners, developing health care and education and solving the most pressing ecological problems discussed at the congress. The solution of all such problems requires resources. However, these must be real resources, based on solid financial grounds and not pious wishes and a rising flow of paper money totally without backing.

The financial laws are strict. The difficult situation with the budget cannot be corrected either by quoting past errors or expressing rosy hopes about any future income. Inflationary pressure is determined by the ability today to correlate expenditures with resources. The fact that the delegates to the congress discussed not only the suitable areas into which to channel funds but also their sources is proof that democratic experience is being acquired.

For the time being, the financial improvement of the economy is not an insoluble problem. The possibility of lowering industrial capital investments has been used extremely poorly. The steps taken in this area were described in the report as merely the first. Significant reserves may be developed by increasing the financial efficiency with which foreign exchange is used. The conversion of defense industries makes it possible not only to reduce straight defense expenditures but also to organize the production of highly profitable goods and to lighten the burden of raw material sectors. There are other ways as well. However, substantial results can be achieved only by radically rechanneling the entire economic policy and subordinating it in the next few years to the objective of stabilizing the financial situation.

Many grave economic errors were made in the course of perestroika. The tonality, the main ideas of the report and the course of the debates prove that lessons from them are being learned and, in our view, the only line to be followed in economic policy, substantiated considering the existing circumstances, is that of combining strict anti-inflationary fiscal measures with intensification of the reform and the development of market controls. The pursuit of this policy today is possible only on the basis of broad democratic support and social consensus and the ability of the social groups and the deputies representing their interests to realize the inseparable connection between regional and sectorial interests and the interests of the country, and their responsibility for them. Despite the specific nature of regional problems, a stable financial system and a firm ruble are equally necessary as the foundations for the healthy economic development of the Baltic area, the Russian Nonchernozem and Central Asia. This means that objective grounds for the implementation of a policy aimed at their strengthening exists.

Another most important prerequisite for the success of the planned course, the significance of which we realized most fully in the course of perestroika, is the ability of our government to implement it through practical, specific and considered economic decisions.

The deadline of signing this journal issue to press does not allow us to analyze the discussions which took place on this and many other problems. They confirm that regardless of the topic—politics, economics, national relations and even procedures—it is essentially a question of the status of the individual in our society and his dignity, civic-mindedness and responsibility. "Attaining the truth by all of us together and by everyone of us

individually," M.S. Gorbachev said, "is a difficult process. However, comrade deputies, this is a vital need for us." The very first days of the work of the congress were a major step in this difficult project.

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## PERESTROYKA: THEORY AND PRACTICE

### Social Dialogues

#### The Center of Russia: Man and Land

18020015b Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 9, Jun 89 (signed to press 2 Jun 89) pp 10-20

[Dialogue between Ivan Afanasyevich Vasilyev and Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Nikonov]

[Text] Two USSR people's deputies, two natives of Pskov Oblast, met at the request of the editors, to share their thoughts on the Russian Nonchernozem. This is a complex and sensitive problem which is sharply perceived by the country at large and personally by the two deputies: Ivan Afanasyevich Vasilyev, writer and Lenin Prize Winner, and Academician Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Nikonov, VASKHNIL president. What are the primary questions and solutions here? What is their contemporary context? Following is a transcript of their dialogue.

A. Nikonov. I believe, Ivan Afanasyevich, that however we may start of our discussion, it must be focused on that which essentially guided the work of the Congress of People's Deputies: the purpose, self-confidence and activity of the individual.

I. Vasilyev. I agree. If we speak seriously of the problems of the center of Russia, naturally we should discuss the state of the individual, the society and the economy. They are interrelated.

We may listen to a speech on the economic situation and which includes serious plans. But what about the people who will implement them? I live among these people and I do not always see the desire to do something differently. Why? Perhaps because of the level of their skills. How many people do we have who are familiar with peasant skills, who have been trained in dealing with land and livestock? Those with auxiliary farms still remember and are able to do something. Most of them, however, are daily laborers who go to work as assigned. But what about their social maturity? How energetic are they, how strongly do they wish changes, to what extent are they unwilling to tolerate their denigrated status, abuse and, frequently, caddishness? Frequently offices blame each other for inability to understand the concern of the countryside, not building what they should, poorly reclaiming the land, badly liming the soil, and so on. But about the character of today's peasant, what are his thoughts and feelings? Sociological services have been

established, we have our own scientists in the agricultural and pedagogical institutes and at the university in Kalinin. So, let us then give us an accurate psychological and social picture. Such a picture should be clear to the party and soviet personnel (considering that today the soviets are being given substantial power). I believe that many of our plans have failed because they were oriented toward some kind of **average statistical man**. He was given a way to follow, based on our forecasts. However, he did not follow it.

**A. Nikonov.** And, furthermore, he abandoned the countryside. The entire difficulty of the problem of restructuring Nonchernozem agriculture lies, above all, in the fact that both foundations of agrarian production—man and land—became undermined.

The natural-biological potential of this area has been assessed as being quite high: it is an area with adequate moisture and, essentially, does not experience severe droughts and provides conditions for stable farming. The significance of this area in the development of food resources will increase even further in connection with the expected (and already initiated) global warming of the climate. Droughts in the steppes will worsen and, consequently, the role of the areas with adequate moisture will increase.

We are regretfully forced to note that the natural-economic potential of this area, which accounts for about 13 percent of our territory and for over 46 million hectares of farmland, nearly 32 million of which arable, is used very partially. Steady negative trends have developed which could not be surmounted even by the major steps which were taken and by additional capital investments. So far the deep intensive factors have not been activated in most farms. To a certain extent migration in some areas has declined. Frequently not only in scientific circles but also in high-level administrative agencies such dynamics is assessed as the result of the positive social changes in the countryside. However, I believe that such assessment implies confusing our wishes with reality. The absolute and relative decline in migration is a confirmation of the extremely negative sociodemographic situation and not of positive changes in the social area. Today in many areas simply no one remains to migrate.

Yes, we are relying on capital investments. Computations indicate that in the Nonchernozem Zone additional capital assets worth no less than 20,000 rubles are needed to compensate for each working person who leaves the countryside. However, this is possible only up to a point beyond which no increase in assets can replace man.

**I. Vasilyev.** Let me add, not every man. There neither is nor could there be any progress without enhancing the morality and the spiritual nature of man. Otherwise we have no progress but the development of science and technology. Naturally, economics is the foundation of the entire way of life. It is obvious, however, that an

economic breakdown has led to the breakdown in the spiritual sphere, in the culture of Central Russia.

**A. Nikonov.** Yet it was here that it was born, it was here that it blossomed, it was here that the giants did their creative work. Probably it would be useful to recall that by virtue of geographic location and other objective factors, the Russian Nonchernozem became the country's historical center. It was here that the Soviet system was born. It was from here that economic, cultural and scientific aid went to the other areas. This land raised scientists, writers, artists, actors, state leaders and military commanders famous throughout the world.

Actually, let us consider any oblast or city, not to mention Moscow and Leningrad. Pskov means Pushkin, Musorgskiy, Rimskiy-Korsakov and Sofya Kovalevskaya; Novgorod means Suvorov and Dostoyevskiy; Smolensk means Glinka, Engelgardt, Przhevalskiy, Konenkov, Tvardovskiy, Admiral Nakhimov, Marshal Tukhachevskiy and Yuriy Gagarin; Arkhangelsk means Lomonosov; Kalinin means Afanasiy Nikitin, Tupolev and Fadeyev; Kaluga means Tsiolkovskiy and Marshal Zhukov; Tula means Tolstoy, Bolotov and the Demidovs; Orel means Turgenev, Leskov and Fet; Kirov means the brothers Vasnetsov, Bekhterev, Aleksandr Grin, Stepan Khalturin, Kirov and Marshal Konev; Yaroslavl means Nekrasov and Marshal Blyukher. This list could be extended on and on.

**I. Vasilyev.** Recently in Karevo a monument was dedicated to Musorgskiy. Five or 6 years ago we only barely remembered this giant of the Russian spirit.

**A. Nikonov.** Or give him his due.

**I. Vasilyev.** Yes, or give him his due. Karevo found its place on the "map" of our spiritual life.... What do I notice? I notice the high morality and spirituality which was inherent in our people and which began to disappear precisely as a result of the fact that the true peasant was converted into day laborer, into a hired worker. By separating him from ownership and forbidding him to plan, think and decide, his feeling of ownership was killed and his energy and spirit were dampened, for if a person does nothing but go to work he unwittingly withers away within himself. What does the day worker need? All he needs is "entertainment." We replaced tremendous spiritual culture with "cultural education work." We said: here is a little club and some kind of third-rate motion picture, here is a small library for you, costing 200 rubles annually, and this is your culture. What else do you need? Now, unwittingly, when we say "culture" we understand "entertainment." And look at the kind of people who go to the club (even if such people are smart, even if they have seen cultural centers and works of art worth a million of rubles). Who comes here? As a rule, young people "who need nourishment," who need, if you wish, to absorb whatever they are offered. This is a consumerist attitude toward culture: they

consume motion pictures, they consume television but personally they do not participate in anything. They do not create anything.

You see, in the past everyone created something, wanted to be singled out, to leave his mark. He had a source, a "generator" which led him, one way or another, to improve himself, to become better. Today competitions have disappeared even in gatherings, parties or sports events.

Look at the way the process developed: all talented people from the countryside went to the city; for example, the young people from Pskov have always gone to Leningrad to study and work. Recently, only 3 years ago, we created an association of native sons. It numbered about 30 noted and already established painters and even the rector of the Repin Institute, from the Pskov area, from Velikiye Luki. Naturally, they wanted to show what they could do, to open exhibits, and so on. I told them: the people from whom you come, do they know you? They do not. Nor is this necessary. You are opening a museum-gallery in the countryside and then the question is who will come to look at your paintings? Such is the view of the "muzhik," who cannot understand art. Forgive me, but religion, when the church built a temple, this was a collection of all types of art. The rural people went to that temple and found both paintings, architecture and music.

On the other hand, how does the fact that singers, painters and musicians who had reached the peak in their art were virtually not "allowed" to visit the countryside for fear that they may settle there contribute to any exposure to culture? They were denied the right even to buy a little house and have the opportunity to visit their native places. We cut off of the countryside by all possible means and various prohibitions anything creative, even the countryside's children. In turn, they became people who had "flown off." They went to the city, they changed their life style, they forgot the village. All that was left to the village was a club and sometimes even that was not built. According to the architects, the club should have 200 or 300 seats and a lobby. But who would go there? Who would use this club? Was it to be used for gatherings?.... We forgot that man has a soul.

I am particularly concerned about the children, for I have spent half my life teaching rural children. We say that in order to keep manpower in the countryside we need schools. I settled in a village with a secondary school and what I heard was the following: this is an ordinary school, and I want my child to attend a music and art school, as in the city.... So, I struggled hard for a branch of the city art school and music school classes to be opened in our village! Nonetheless, all of this is being neglected, no one cares or needs it. It is believed that the rural child should be a tractor driver or a milkmaid. This child must learn how to sit behind the wheel.

Can you see what this leads to? It is a reproduction of lack of spirituality in the young, in ever new generations.

I see now a modern boy behind the tractor wheel, with an empty look in his eyes, indifferently handling a huge machine in forests and fields, killing all life.... This could make a television script: a huge concentration of machines and an argument whether to go on or not in digging a canal. Then, a complacent face shows up out of an excavator: "I earn 500 rubles and if you want me to rake up the moon I will do it too..."

Such is the result of a scorn for the soul, for the inner culture of man! This is the man who is destroying our economy. Whatever concepts or plans we may be having, a cold-hearted man will wreck with indifference the entire economy and all of our mental elaborations.

**A. Nikonov.** Ivan Afanasyevich, allow me to take up this subject. We find ourselves in some kind of magic circle. Whereas for the country at large the strongest possible blow at the peasantry was dealt by the Stalinist collectivization, in the Nonchernozem the exhaustion of forces in the countryside began substantially earlier. This is an area of the highest possible urbanization. It was on the shoulders of the muzhik from Pskov, Smolensk, Sverdlovsk, Yaroslavl, Orel, Tula and Arkhangelsk that industry was created. The outflow which kept increasing began a long time ago, in the 19th century. And then there was the war, and a considerable part of the Nonchernozem was occupied.

**I. Vasilyev.** Look at the Pskov area: Three years of intensive guerrilla warfare.

**A. Nikonov.** Yes, the people resisted and those same peasants joined the partisan brigades and detachments. The occupation forces dealt with them mercilessly, burning the villages to the ground. This was followed by the postwar restoration and the siphoning off of manpower—the best—continued and is continuing to this day.

Today, under the conditions of perestroyka, we are taking a different look at many aspects of our old and more recent history. The development of the virgin land as well is now seen in a somewhat different light. The question is not whether it was necessary or not, in general, to develop this land. Obviously, it had to be done but on a lesser scale and on a sensible basis, taking all natural and economic factors and rich global practices into consideration. At the same time, we should have used alternate ways for increasing food resources, above all through the Nonchernozem. The development of the virgin land required huge resources, as a result of which other areas were deprived of them, the Nonchernozem Zone above all. It was precisely then that the negative processes intensified.

I am not discussing the fact that output was taken away for free or for almost free, for such was the case throughout the country. It was because of this economic plunder that a spiritual impoverishment took place, as you accurately pointed out. **And a spiritual impoverishment does not nurture economic growth.**

Such is the magic circle. How to break it? In my view, this is not a hopeless venture.

**I. Vasilyev.** I have lived to see the time when, finally, we can tell the peasant openly, from high up: look we were very stupid to act thus.... No, this source, Russia, has still not dried out. Despite the entire catastrophic condition of our Russian countryside, the genetic code, if you wish, remains. There are young people, there are people with conscience, people with a great deal of morality. The point is that there are all too few of them and that they are now suppressed by the "lumpen-countryside." We threw masses of young people into that same virgin land, the BAM and the Tyumen petroleum. We rushed everywhere! Millions of people, hundreds of thousands, threw themselves there: above all the children of those oppressed peasants, who are now roaming around the country. They have no roots. Their mentality has changed. They do not wish to draw from the memory of the people and are totally indifferent to their history and culture. Now, having roamed around the world, they are trying to come back, to settle on the land. How will they adjust?

**A. Nikonov.** As you pointed out, and you know this better than I do, Ivan Afanasyevich, it is the conscientious people or, in any case, a considerable percentage of them, who became lessees. Naturally, there are also those who became lessees strictly for the sake of money. The first lessees I am familiar with in our oblast, however, are people with high civic-mindedness.

**I. Vasilyev.** This is correct. This applies to those who were fed up with working under threat of a stick, who wanted to be men. Why did they lease livestock farms and went to the little villages? To work for themselves. Today's peasant considers collective work normal. For the principle of the cooperative—think of Engelgardt and what he said about them—is an amazing invention of the Russian people, the most democratic invention, which indicates respect for skill. The peasant is not against the collective. On the contrary. However, this collective become infinitely large, and then people started giving orders to the peasants, forgetting to give them any independence whatsoever.

Now we are being blamed for the billions of rubles invested in our land. How numerous arguments we had at the beginning of this "mass development" of the Nonchernozem: Why was this project started, was it for the peat? Land reclamation units were set up, they were given plans and money and they drained the swamps. They turned the swamps inside-out, they loaded the peat, they took off and went straight to the bank. All the agronomists had to do was sign the papers. I, the peasant, did not ask you to come to this field. If I needed you I would have found you and asked you: come here and I will buy the peat from you. At that point I would also ask you what you have contributed and how to this field. As it were... "uncle" worked the land, "uncle" built, "uncle" reclaimed the land and then plowed it and that was all. Meanwhile, no one took care of it.

I now look at our first lessees and I think of the role of the party authorities who must single out such people, who must work with them closely and with concern, who must lift up their spirit and provide for them the necessary conditions, like shoots which have survived a harsh winter, so that they can grow and create new offspring. For the time being, however, what we come across most frequently is the opposite: any brigade leader, agronomist or director has the right to kick a man out. Lots of people come to me and I see recurring situations: the moment someone raises his voice he is being dealt with. The others are indifferent. Such is now the peasant society, for which reason I mentioned the term "lumpen-countryside." There is jealousy and malice. The moment the lessee develops a farm someone cuts him down to size.

Meanwhile, we show up at meetings and start to preach: you must, you have to, this must be done, that must be done.... But let us listen to the people, let them speak out, let them pour their hearts out! It is as though we have forgotten what is a spiritual condition, the mood of the individual. What kind of mood is that? Go work as ordered and be cheerful about it. But go visit a rural office: who is involved, who is interested in the condition of the individuals? The party and the trade union organizers are the contemporary confessors. What do they say? Let us say that an aggravated woman comes to see them: "What is it with you, why have you come? Speak faster, I have no time."

The initial experience of the lessees must be analyzed, like any new movement, like any change. And since this affects above all the people, we must gather information in communicating with the individual and not merely analyze figures. But one of our traditions or whatever we may call it, has become part of our flesh and blood: let us say that a leasing movement has developed in the rayon; immediately an official comes up: "Listen, why are you not showing any increase, any percentages," and so on? We do not seem to be looking beyond the present. We demand instant results. But has this official shown any interest in visiting the lessee, looking, let us say, even at the way he stores his hay? His hay may be stacked, covered with tarpaulin or under a roof. Is this not an indicator? Later, this will add to the results. He has already invested something in that land. The person wants to farm. Look at the type of cows he has taken over and look at the neglected land on which no one has stepped for so many years. But then, comes this official and kills the enthusiasm. Meanwhile, the rayon or sovkhos managers are already concluding: "As you can see, nothing is coming out of such leases, let us go back to what was." And then the confusion starts.

In my memory, how often the feeling of proprietorship has been beaten out of a person! I still recall the fierce opposition of the muzhiks when, let us say, a chairman hired from the outside was imposed on them. The party members would be summoned three to four times and pressured into voting for that person. Now, when the people are regaining some trust, they should not be

hindered. Once the ukase on leasing has been adopted, do not interfere. It would be nice if you helped.

**A. Nikonov.** Recently I toured the Pskov area where I heard the lessees complain that they can buy nothing. Today the lessee works with a written-off tractor, for the farm will not give him a better one. He would like to buy a tractor but it is impossible, there are no tractors. This too works to the detriment of leasing. There is not only jealousy, restrictions or the still existing legal rightlessness but also a lack of means of production.

That which we are doing now on the organizational-economic level is, essentially, streamlining production relations. This will free the people's initiative. However, human forces have their limit. We must parallel their efforts with the development of contemporary production forces and this must be accomplished by both urban and rural industry. We must set up our own socialist market and include in it a market in means of production. This thoughtless rationing system can bring nothing good.

**I. Vasilyev.** If small tractors and minor mechanization facilities would show up on the market now the peasant would be more willing to lease. He needs the equipment for his private plot as well. I recall what was said at the March Central Committee Plenum: the development of the leasing movement will encourage industry, it will demand of new equipment, new sets of machines, and so on. But we know our industry. It pays no attention to such requirements. It is a monopoly which says, if you do not like it do not take it. Under the present system technical supply system the lessee has little to work with. If there is nothing to work with, how much can a man earn by himself? Today people who like to do such work in order to earn more or build themselves a house, are few.

It is not enough to call upon the people and to raise a slogan. I am an old soldier. Let us say that we are told, come on boys, let us attack. The political instructor, however, would check whether there are enough cartridges and how far is the field kitchen and what kind of food can be served. Only then would an attack be launched....

**A. Nikonov.** If we speak of returning the people to the countryside, the importance on relying on those who stayed behind, who remained loyal to the land is obvious. It is precisely they who must be supported above all. We know that in a number of areas in the country there is a surplus of people and efforts are being made to draw them to the Nonchernozem. In such cases everything must be taken into consideration: labor skills, national traditions, and adaptability to the conditions of the area. Practical experience indicates that simply transferring the native population of southern Union republics is inefficient.

**I. Vasilyev.** I agree with this conclusion. According to some sociologists and demographers, since there is surplus manpower in those areas, let us resettle some of this

manpower here. But what is accomplished with such a solution? It is a question of traditions, of a national way of life. I know of many Uzbek families and even entire tribes and clans which moved from the steppe to our zone. It is a problem for them to go to the forest and procure wood. They fear frost and cold. They somehow try to survive, to adapt and, naturally, they are helped. Perhaps the situation has developed in such a way that they will be unable to adapt. A number of examples of this could be cited. What matter are not only the working but also the living conditions. If a person does not adapt to this environment nothing can be accomplished. This is always a most difficult problem.

How do I see the development of my area? Above all, we must build and, at the same time, seriously promote the return of the people and their training.

**A. Nikonov.** Today we speak a great deal about construction and, above all about roads, housing and social amenities. The situation in the Nonchernozem Zone is truly alarming. Approximately 60 to 75 percent of villages and hamlets have no schools, medical centers, hospitals, service establishments and children's pre-school institutions; 40 to 45 percent have no trade centers and either stationary or mobile facilities for cultural services. Whereas there we average about 29 physicians per 10,000 rural residents in the country at large, there are only 7 in the Nonchernozem Zone including 3.6 in Pskov Oblast, and 4.2-4.5 in Ivanovo, Tula, Ryazan and Bryansk oblasts.

Many stereotypes which essentially perpetuate the discrimination against the countryside and its population must be eliminated as we solve problems related to the restructuring of the countryside. Here is an ordinary example: a branch of a gas pipeline may be laid next to a farm but however hard the local managers may be trying, "it is impossible" to lay a connection. No more than 6 percent of the villages have centralized gas. How is this different from the practice according to which, until recently, it was forbidden to connect a village to an electric power cable strung in the vicinity? As a rule we realize this later. Frequently, however, by then it is too late.

**I. Vasilyev.** And what about the hardship experienced by the people because of the lack of roads!...

**A. Nikonov.** For decades, it seems, this problem has been on the agenda. Simply by moving the cattle along poor roads we lose 10 percent of the meat we produce. Furthermore, how much land along the roads has been spoiled, as though tanks have rolled over it! As you know, a program has now been drafted for the building and reconstruction of roads in the Nonchernozem Zone more than 35 billion rubles will be appropriated to this effect. Each settlement and each economic center should have an outlet to a paved road.

I share the view that in the social restructuring of the countryside we must make better use of the possibilities



of agroindustrial integration. The targets of social infrastructure are shared by workers in agriculture and other sectors. It is important to combine their resources and forces. That is where the local soviets could and should play their role.

I also consider the following question important: the migration of the people from the Nonchernozem villages was greatly encouraged by extensive and not always justified industrial construction. Usually, the Gosplan and the oblast leadership initiate such projects. Obviously, the time has come radically to change this policy and put an end to new industrial construction over large areas and the opening of jobs in the cities, which draw rural human resources. Furthermore, enterprises and organizations in the Nonchernozem cities should be rated, in order to determine the expediency of their further activities. It may be more sensible to transfer to the rural areas some of them as auxiliary enterprises or shops of kolkhozes and sovkhozes.

In my view, attention should be paid to suggestions on introducing for industrial enterprises increased payments for manpower drawn from the villages. We could obviously consider other steps which would ease the scarcity of labor resources in the cities themselves and lower demand for manpower. In this case our economists and sociologists could make a real contribution. Unfortunately, we have not dealt adequately with this matter.

It would also be worth it to allocate more efficiently resources for housing construction and social development in the towns and countries of this area, giving the rural areas priority.

I am convinced that in order to ensure the upsurge of the Nonchernozem Zone it is necessary, above all, to make fuller use of its internal resources and potentials. Given the present situation, however, they remain quite limited. We must also attract here people from the cities or from other rayons. Mere appeals would be of little help. As it were, we have frequently abused the enthusiasm of the people. It is obvious that good living conditions must be provided in the villages. Possibly, we should allow those who move here to retain their right of urban residence. This would eliminate the risk and uncertainty related to moving to the countryside, which today constitute insurmountable obstacles for many people. Unquestionably, we must make more extensive use of long-term land leases on a cost accounting basis. Abandoned homes should be sold to urban residents who would like to farm.

**I. Vasilyev.** I hear you, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, and I can think of some of our women who, to this day, are virtually pushing their daughters to go to the cities. The Nonchernozem is short of thousands of marriageable women! Did they find happiness in the city? Frequently it is the opposite. But I can understand the mothers. We have distorted the very concept of rural life and work to such an extent that they can think of their daughters as being even nannies or house maids but in the city. They

have experienced the gloom of the countryside, wearing their quilted jackets and heavy boots their entire life. And they have dreamed of an easy and beautiful life, perhaps for their children. This has been an old and permanent peasant dream....

**A. Nikonov.** Conditions worthy of man must be created in the countryside. They should be better than in the city. Let the citizen who comes here yearn for what he lacks in the city....

I would like to return to the start of our discussion on the foundations of agrarian production. Man and the land. Unfortunately, the question of the land in the Nonchernozem is quite pressing. This problem was the special topic of one of the sessions of a general VASKHNIL meeting. We believe that the interest of preserving and ensuring the efficient utilization of land resources must prevail over the economic mechanism and, I would say, exert a moral and psychological influence. We must take into consideration in assessing the work of enterprises, rayons and oblasts and the activities of managers, the condition of the land and changes to which it is subjected. Today we take into consideration a large number of separate and intermediary indicators except for one: What happened to the land resources and the way they changed quantitatively and qualitatively. This, however, is the main thing.

A new aspect of the problem of the Nonchernozem, as I already said, calls for a decisive rejection of many existing approaches. This applies, perhaps even most of all, to the structure of agricultural production. We know that the structure in any area depends on the sum of weather, economic, democratic and other objectives and factors. If conditions change the structure must be changed as well. These basic concepts were comprehensively substantiated by the Chayanov school of agricultural economics. In his works, Aleksandr Vasilyevich convincingly proved the way the structure changes, based on family size and other conditions. Aleksandr Nikolayevich Chelintsev established the dynamics of the system of farming and changing of structures in time for the basic areas of the country. A great deal has changed since then. As we already said, the number of people in the Nonchernozem countryside has declined and this has had, above all, a negative impact on the development of labor intensive sectors, such as the growing of flax, potatoes, vegetables, and dairy farming.

Let us go back to Chayanov. As early as 1918, in his work "The Organization of the Northern Peasant Farm" he wrote that the primary and most profitable occupation is dairy farming, selling the milk or the butter through the cooperatives. This should be followed by properly organized hog breeding, coordinated with raising cattle. In order to raise cattle, plentiful fodder is needed and a proper clover crop rotation must be organized. Without clover there can be no milk and without milk there can be no income. Furthermore, the greatest possible attention should be paid to flax and potato crops. They must be increased and the processing and marketing of these



products must be organized through cooperatives. Truck gardening must be developed and the produce must be processed at cooperative plants. Finally, cottage industries must be developed, organized in cooperatives.

One can easily notice how topical all of this sounds, although it was said more than 70 years ago.

The fertility of this land must be restored. Everything available to science and practical experience today must be subordinated to this end. A great deal of knowledge has been acquired, a great deal of research has been done, and numerous experiments have been made. Mastering within each farm systems of efficient cultivation and crop rotation is of prime significance. In themselves, these problems are not new. They have been formulated by scientists and practical workers for several decades. However, this must be mentioned again and again, for to this day frequent efforts are made by superior authorities to impose a structure of crops, totally unsuitable for and violating crop rotation. It is only through crop rotation that the effect of fertilizers and the potential productivity of new strains are manifested to their fullest extent. Only a crop rotation system can justify intensive technologies. Furthermore, the entire system must be of a soil-protecting nature. Specific ways and means must be defined locally, taking specifically into consideration the characteristics of the farms and the fields.

**I. Vasilyev.** Still, I ask again: Who will do all this? And would he be able to do it? We build a complex and tell a woman, you are no longer a milkmaid, you are a machine operator. So, the woman stands in that concrete-lined pit and runs the machinery. She knows nothing other than her work. Nor can she know, for she does not have any incentive to learn. She does not have to know anything about the cow. We encouraged this type of labor through wages. It may have seemed that we encouraged the leading workers but they led in what? In earnings. We praise a milkmaid but that does not make her a livestock breeder. She is like someone standing by a machine in a meat combine, stuffing sausages. The milkmaid generates the end product. A livestock breeder is an entirely different person. To handle cattle means not simply to milk or shear. It is an extensive and most complex skill.

Or else consider the tractor driver, the cultivator. We called him the "plow man." However, this is merely a single operation—plowing. One must also sow, harvest, improve the land and understand it. In that case one is a peasant. Our assessment was based on "self-plowed hectare." If you have plowed 2,000 such hectares you are a frontranker and your name is on the honor board. Meanwhile, there is no grain. There are frontrankers but no grain. That is what came out of it. Like the livestock, the field does not tolerate such handling. It is a living organism.

**A. Nikonov.** It seems to me that we do not have an entirely accurate understanding of the term "industrialization of agriculture" itself. This term implies not only

its saturation with equipment and modern production facilities. We are trying to apply industrial methods to a **rural way of life**. We apply this even to the objects of our work—plants and animals. It is thus that we seem to be rejecting the specific nature of rural work.

**I. Vasilyev.** Man does not come into this world to master one operation only. It is important to feel, to understand this world. Otherwise man would become self-destructive, he already has begun to do so. Today a great deal is being said about ecology. Specifically, we would like to develop rural clubs for ecological education. We believe that we should begin precisely with the countryside. The urban resident struggles for ecology but as an isolated entity he can do little. The rural residents, everyone there, deal with nature. Every step they take is related to nature. They either harm or protect it. What matter here are both knowledge and intuition. That is why today we need true peasants so urgently, people who have perfectly mastered their skill.

Lessees have appeared in our country, members of cooperatives. Does anyone give them any kind of publication, even a single journal? I am speaking not of appeals but knowledge. Dozens of sectorial journals are being published. What about a journal for the individual? The young must be taught how to farm. They must learn how to understand nature and the animal world. At one of the conferences a tractor driver-lessee took the floor. He had taken over a group of cows: I, he said, try to read everything published on animal husbandry and seek such publications. You see, he has started something and he needs knowledge. Are we providing such knowledge today? We should write above all about popular experience. Had I had the power, I would have taken one of the rural journals, let us say SELSKAYA NOV and would reorganize it to serve the individual, the new peasant. Call it the journal ARENDATOR, KOOPERATOR, etc., and publish the best of what the people remember, the best created through practical experience. Let us organize the publication of series of useful pamphlets. Special courses should be taught at agricultural institutes but for the time being no one seems to be in a hurry to organize them. Farmers are being trained throughout the world.

**A. Nikonov.** The usefulness of such training is quite real. I particularly support your idea about forgotten experience, about traditional knowledge and skills for which the Russian Nonchernozem was famous.

Here is an example. Before the war, in 1940, the Nonchernozem had 14.2 million sheep; it had 9.3 million in 1965 and has some 6 million today. The size of the herds has shrunk by a factor of 2.5 in Kostroma Oblast and 4.5 in Vologda Oblast. Soon the Romanov breed of sheep will have to be classified an endangered species. For the sake of comparison let us point out that Great Britain is smaller than the Russian Nonchernozem by a factor of 12 yet the British herd totals 27.8 million sheep. In our zone today there are more than 8 hectares of farmland per sheep.

Our efforts to introduce the Romanov sheep breeding on the basis of large complexes with a high concentration of animals were unsuccessful. It would make sense to convert this project entirely to family contracting and leasing. Furthermore, the processing of the produce could be organized on a cooperative basis. There may be kolkhoz and sovkhoz shops or separate cooperatives in which tanners, fur-dressers, felters and knitters could work together. Such cooperatives could manufacture excellent felt boots, tanned leather, hats and other goods in demand by the people.

Another forgotten sector is that of raising geese. Before the revolution we raised more than 100 million geese. A considerable percentage of them were exported. Today we have reduced their number by a factor of 3 although geese are grass-eating birds which can transform green and fresh feed into most valuable products. Geese use pasture land efficiently. This sector would not require major investments. It could be developed on the basis of family and lease contracting or in small farms.

Let us also bear in mind clover, which is a valuable fodder. In order properly to grow it, we must have 22 million bee families in the Nonchernozem. Currently there are no more than 540,000. Apiculture must be converted entirely to family and leasing contracts. Initial experiments, incidentally, proved promising.

Should we mention that the Nonchernozem has been, since ancient times, an area of truck gardens? People here have gardened since the time of the Vladimir-Suzdal Principality. The Vladimir cherry is famous throughout the country. Rostov Uyezd in Yaroslavl Guberniya was famous throughout Russia for its onions, fresh peas and chicory. Moscow was surrounded by a mass of truck gardening farms in the Serpukhovo, Kolomna, Varaysk and Vereya areas. There was the unique experience of the Klin truck gardeners who managed to supply fresh cucumbers and other vegetables at Christmas and the new year. A greenhouse industry based on cooperative principles had existed here since the 1860s. At the start of the 1930s, however, this cooperative was closed down and the highly skilled masters scattered. Is it not our concern to restore these traditions?

We suffer from a shortage of containers, and we import furniture. It would be difficult to qualify as other than shameful. All of this could be manufactured not only at large combines but also in cooperative workshops. For example, woven furniture made of twigs, reeds and various types of waste products has totally disappeared. Why not set up in the forest areas cooperatives engaged in the production of consumer goods made of timber and wood waste, as is being done in all civilized countries? We have many kolkhoz forests and, obviously, here as well we need leasing and cooperatives.

You and I participated in the work of the March Plenum which dealt with problems of agriculture. Unquestionably, our First Congress of People's Deputies will

become a major event. I believe that we are on the right track. What we must do is advance step by step, making our contribution and assuming our share of responsibility without shifting it to other.

**I. Vasilyev.** You know, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, I too am an optimist. We see occasionally the way some people, precisely those who have "flown away," who keep looking from the outside, panic. It hurts me when the standard Russian farm is shown on television and the correspondent displays his feeling of horror for the entire country to see: my God, what dirt, one cannot go through, it is impossible to work here! But then people are working. And where was society in the past? Or else during the "rural hour" I once relished—no other word would fit—looking at a lonely 80-year old woman, living in her own hovel, who was going to draw water and this was on television, just look. Yes, that hits a nerve. It is the same as showing a wounded soldier, see what happened to him! We need tactfulness, we need a spiritual sensitivity and compassion, if you wish. Yet what we see is this accursed snobbery and behind the apparent "compassion" we see disrespect for the peasant.

Why am I an optimist? For more than 60 years I have lived the life of the people and I can see how great is its vitality, its life forces. Once an old man, a blacksmith, told me: listen, what are you getting excited about, we shall survive.... Yes, he will survive but what kind of life will he have, what will he become and what will become of his children, what outlook will they have? We must not allow all of this to turn into hostility toward the Soviet system. We must not allow it!

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### What Kind of Energy Program Do We Need?

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[Article by Aleksandr Arkadyevich Arbatov, doctor of economic sciences, deputy chairman, USSR Academy of Sciences Commission for the Study of Production Forces and Natural Resources]

[Text] Today it is entirely clear that radical changes in structural-investment policy, and for the economy to address the real needs of society has become urgently needed. However, the experience of recent years indicates that such restructuring is encountering a great deal of subjective and objective obstacles. The most serious among them is probably the sectorial management structure of the national economy with the aspiration of each sector to expand and to invest funds wherever the it is possible to achieve this simply and without the need either to use new equipment or modern technology. That is precisely why we hold so securely the leading position in the world in terms of petroleum, natural gas and iron ore extraction, the extraction of many other minerals, the production of cement, steel and chemical fertilizers

and the manufacturing of obsolete tractors, grain harvesting combines and metal cutting machine tools.

A great deal has been written about the results of ministerial activities. In addition to low efficiency and, in a number of cases, working at a loss, such activities entail an entire series of negative consequences and "secondary" losses. They may be secondary sequentially but not in size. Even a rough assessment indicates that losses from increased outlays for maintaining the levels reached and increasing the extraction of minerals, and the compensation for losses of land, water and timber, are the full equivalent of the growth in output. In other words, a significant percentage of the output, given the present economic management system, must be used to compensate for such negative phenomena. Our economy could be likened to an overnourished person with a disturbed metabolism, in which most of the food is used not for serving the vital activities of the body but for the feeding of unnecessary fatty cells.

This outlay principle was shown particularly clearly in the latest edition of the USSR Energy Program or, rather, in its basic parameters as published in the press. Drafted under conditions of the strictest possible secrecy, finally and albeit partially it has been made public. Naturally, the changes which have become pressing have not been ignored. The faster growth of electric power has been stipulated. Energy conservation is considered one of the most important trends in the development of our economy. To this effect the implementation of an entire array of measures is being suggested. However, the power intensiveness of the economy and the planned growth rates are so high that this will in no case be reflected in the volumes of output of energy or hinder departmental aspirations to accelerate its development. Furthermore, they can thus reach their targeted levels protected by a document which has the force of law. Although the figures have been somewhat lowered in the latest draft, which has still not been made public, by no means has this meet motivated by the desire to make the volumes of output consistent with real needs but by the economic, technical and ecological impossibility of attaining such levels.

According to the Energy Program, with tremendous efforts, the gap in the power intensiveness of the GNP, compared with the United States and other industrially developed countries, will be reduced by no more than one-third only, and not before the year 2010. However, achieving a power intensiveness equal to that of those countries is a realistic task for the reason alone that they were able to cross that stage in less than 10 years. It is true that this required a structural reorganization of the economy. Is this way less reliable than that of tremendously increasing the production of energy, which involves a number of unsolved technical, economic and social problems, such as the development of the Yamal, the safety risk presented by nuclear power plants, the struggle against emissions of electric power plants operating on coal, the use of Caspian gas, which is under tremendous pressure and has high toxic and corrosive

features, the increased strictness of environmental protection legislation, the spreading social movement for the protection of the environment and, finally, the severe shortage of funds needed for the solution of social problems.

Why are such risks and difficulties necessary? It is for the sake of securing the energy future of the country! This is reported in one of the publications which rises the curtain of secrecy concealing the USSR Energy Program. From the population's standpoint, such a future seems unenviable, for in order to maintain this entire power machinery we must produce ever more metal from ever leaner ores; we must build new plants, and so on. This is a familiar picture of production for the sake of production, under the guise that, God forbid, our economy could remain without energy. Naturally, the heart of the matter is elsewhere: if we seriously undertake to conserve energy, the energy producers and the related sectors would be deprived of substantial funds, which is hardly in their interest.

But let us go back to the question of structural perestroika and the way it could influence power consumption. According to the Energy Program, its influence will be truly felt not before the year 2000. By then, the Concept for the Socioeconomic Development of the USSR Until the Year 2005 stipulates a growth of the national income by a factor of 1.9-2. The breakdown of this income, considering the suggested level of energy output, is of interest. Taking into consideration the more than doubled production outlays in the fuel sector (starting with 1990, in order to maintain petroleum extraction at the present level, 10 percent of all capital investments will have to go into that sector) and a natural price increase, a considerable share in it will be that of fuel and production in related sectors: metal, cement, and equipment for raw material extraction and processing. Nuclear and electric power machine building, industrial, housing and road construction, related to power projects, will make a contribution. If we take all such production into consideration, the hope for a radical change in the structure of the national economy in favor of high technology sectors, consumer goods, services and social benefits will be zero. Meanwhile, the power sectors will blossom, managing an increasing share of our resources. The results will be that whatever is good for the TEK sectors will have to be good enough for the country.

The latest confirmation of this fact is seen in the increased share of power consumption for the communal and residential sector by no more than 1 percent, as stipulated in the Energy Program, although it is lagging behind the industrially developed countries by a factor of more than 1.5. Industry consumes more than one-half of the entire energy output. The Energy Program calls for a reduction by no more than 2-3 percent. Power consumption in agriculture will be increased by 1 percent. Today, however, we are already using several hundred percent more diesel fuel per unit of agricultural output than the industrially developed countries. The United

States and many Western European countries use about one-third of the entire energy they generate for the combined needs of industry, agriculture and transportation. In our country, meanwhile, that same third is equally distributed among losses and outlays for house needs of the fuel extraction sectors, on the one hand, and exports, on the other. Clearly, the structure of energy production and consumption cannot be described in the least as aiming at the acceleration of socioeconomic development, upgrading public production efficiency and meeting the needs of the people.

This is acknowledged also by the authors of the Energy Program, who assume that structural reorganizations, similar to those which took place in the industrially developed capitalist countries, would be difficult to accomplish, for our society is at a stage of industrial development characterized by a fast increase in the consumption of energy and materials. The bigger their output, the fewer goods we consume. This is a strange stage which so far has not been experienced by anyone else. For some reason, it is believed in this case that perestroika will take place unassisted, as we accumulate national wealth and reduce the specific consumption of resources. Was this the way the process developed in the West as well? Realizing the vulnerability of such analogies, let us, nonetheless, try to determine what is specific and what is general and, without drawing hasty conclusions from the latter, present our own view on the ways of making economic changes.

As early as the 1960s the United States began actively to develop new science- and technological-intensive sectors. However, this process advanced without curtailing the previously strong traditional sectors, the prosperity of which largely depended on inexpensive power. It was only starting with the mid-1970s that they were forced to surrender their priority status in the economy. However, this was paralleled by updating their production potential, largely based on the achievements in the new sectors.

Clearly, the sharp acceleration of structural reorganization did not accidentally coincide in time with the 1973-1974 oil crisis. The sharp increase in petroleum prices, which led to the increased cost of other types of energy, brought about radical changes in energy consumption and thus made prerequisites for economic development stricter. Huge funds were shifted from traditional power-intensive to new high-technology sectors. The share of science-intensive output in U.S. exports rose by a factor of 6.3 between 1970 and 1984. The share of consumption of the most important types of raw and other materials declined substantially.

The structural changes in the American economy had both their supporters and detractors. The main role among the former was played by the heads of the high-technology sectors and financial capital, which sought to apply forces and funds in dynamic fast-recovery production facilities which produced a large quantity of essentially new goods which could be sold at

monopoly prices. The restructuring was opposed by companies representing the traditional sectors, which retained a considerable amount of power in both the economy and the government.

Studies of the petroleum crisis frequently denoted the interests of influential U.S. circles. The statement found in an authoritative French publication was typical: "...Possibilities of price increases in the Middle East appeared desirable and possible to White House strategists.... The power of the pressure applied by consuming countries in favor of lower prices was greater than that of producing countries. However, naturally everything changed when the green light or, better said, the stimulation for higher prices came straight out of the White House."

Why pay such attention to events which occurred more than 15 years ago? It is in order to emphasize the idea that if the U.S. government, saddled with the confrontation among a number of most influential groups within the country, and forced to settle international disputes, was able to implement steps which most seriously affected the structural reorganization of the economy, the leadership of a country with a centralized planned economy and a great variety of sources of energy and still not practicing energy conservation would be totally incapable of implementing such a task. However the basic indicators of the USSR Energy Program, which were made public, indicate the lack of such an intention, above all as a result of the "adaptation" of the program to the existing structure of the economy and the rejection of the possibility of its radical transformation.

Essentially, what took place was a substitution of concepts. Energy, which is an intermediary product needed to meet the specific requirements of society, is presented as the final result, the reaching of which would solve all of our development problems. This is past history. Many people will clearly remember the levels of petroleum and coal extraction and steel smelting which, in Stalin's opinion, would protect us "in all eventualities." These levels have been repeatedly exceeded for quite some time.

Let us give the compilers of the Energy Program their due: the prime indicators are based on computed options but... the point is that none of them exceed the parameters of our miserable although sometimes improved economic reality. Understandably, the drafters of such a responsible document must be realists and avoid risky options which would be difficult to model. On the other hand, however, in determining the qualitative and quantitative parameters of our development, a consideration of the unique nature of the current situation should be a decisive factor. It rests, above all, on the fact that we have no alternative to perestroika, for the alternative is economic collapse with all deriving consequences. The suggested program precisely proceeds from the option of a sluggishly developing crisis, for it leaves the main reasons for the current economic situation unchanged.

If we want to achieve the objectives of perestroika, such documents must take into consideration the means for the implementation of its ideas. This would be the most important aspect and not only in terms of the power industry. One of them is a radical change of military doctrine, based on the principle of sensible defense sufficiency, with the consequent possibility of significantly reducing the armed forces. The reduction and elimination of many types of military hardware offers extensive opportunities for reducing power consumption. It is not even a matter of reducing the current consumption of the armed forces and defense industry enterprises, although such consumption as well is substantial. The main energy conserving factor will be a reduction in the size of the reproduction cycles related to the manufacturing of weapons but also which are largely located outside the military industry area. We could substantially reduce the extraction of ores, their concentration, the smelting of metal from such ores and its processing. As we know, these are exceptionally power-intensive sectors. The use of the facilities of restructured defense enterprises to produce civilian goods, which are significantly less energy intensive, would reduce construction needs. In turn, this would make it possible to reduce demand for cement and other construction materials which also require substantial power consumption.

A systematic study of all opportunities for energy conservation, related to a reduction in armament production, would indicate that the result could be entirely commensurate with the volume of power savings as indicated in the Energy Program. Another consequence of the implementation of the ideas of perestroika, important in terms of the power industry, is the priority development of machine building, and upgrading the quality of highly finished goods, energetically exported on the world markets, and making the ruble a freely convertible currency. All of this would entail not only a reduction but, possibly, an end to exporting power resources to the West but, given favorable circumstances, will also create conditions for importing them.

In this connection, we must reject the myth of the important defense significance of self-sufficiency in fuels and raw materials and the danger of depending on their supplies from the outside. For some reason, no such fears are voiced as far as food supplies or high technology are concerned. Nor is someone asking whether the strengthening of the defense power is helped by the inefficient use of state funds spent in increasing and supporting the ever rising cost of raw material extraction at the expense of developing progressive high technology sectors which today determine the economic and, therefore, the military potential of any country. Also not considered is the extended period of stable situation on the world fuel and raw materials market, beneficial to the consumer, and the active efforts of the Soviet Union to participate in an advantageous international division of labor, as well as the progressing improvement in the international situation thanks to the peace initiatives taken by our country. In short, this is yet another substitution: departmental interests hiding behind defense needs.

One of the "sacred cows" of our energy and foreign policy is maintaining the high level of export of energy resources to the socialist countries, the implication being that we are thus assisting them. We believe that the most important consequence of perestroika should be the creation of a socialist society which would be economically independent and would not need the artificial support of foreign aid injections. Hence the establishment of mutually profitable economic relations among socialist countries. Considering the existing accelerated increase in the cost of raw material extraction and the low world prices, such relations call for a substantial reduction in the level of procurements (petroleum above all).

The objection may be that all that we have said so far could be taken into consideration after it has become reality: after a reduction in armaments, emerging on the world market with the goods produced by the processing sectors, with a convertible ruble and other achievements of perestroika. The point, however, is that the present Energy Program does not allow the implementation of many of them. Nor can it encourage the desire to change anything, for in an almost legislative manner the sectors are issued their volumes of output until the year 2010 down to the third digit. All that is left for them is to procure the necessary funds.

Finally, perestroika loses all meaning unless we achieve the most important objective, which is improving the well-being of the Soviet people. For that reason, we urgently need to make revolutionary changes in the correlation between social needs and their energy and material support. We must eliminate the primacy of the latter and make it entirely dependent on the end needs of society.

What is most alarming is that the self-seeking purpose of energy production has such great structure-shaping power that the implementation of the objectives of the Energy Program will steadily guide the economy along the path of a resource-wasteful economic management, inefficient in terms of end results. The influence of such a power industry on the economic structure is incomparably stronger than the activities of the Minvudkhov, although in terms of their nature they are similar: extensive and selfishly departmental.

Nonetheless, for the time being everything seems to indicate that switching to a sensible economic management is no simple matter. Even the objective conditions which are developing in favor of intensification occasionally yield the opposite results. It may have appeared that a drop in world petroleum prices and our resulting losses should encourage us to reduce our imports sharply, above all by developing hitherto unused means of production or those used inefficiently, and enhancing the full agricultural potential. What is occurring is the exact opposite: "In order not to disrupt the foreign trade balance, additional fuel extraction was needed" (from the report "On the State Plan for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1989 and On the

Course of the Implementation of the Plan in 1988"). It took almost 6 months to revise this policy and even after that there is no certainty that the currently undertaken reduction in petroleum exports has been dictated by strategic considerations order rather than an essential lack of funds needed to secure the planned volumes of export.

Currently our departments are in a state of natural gas euphoria, in the same manner that, quite recently, they were enjoying the petroleum one. The lessons from this disease, as it were, were not learned. Natural gas resources appear unlimited and it is claimed that all problems can be solved with their help. No one remembers that the initial alarming symptoms in petroleum extraction began to be felt as early as the second half of the 1970s. A similar situation may develop with natural gas, particularly if we take into consideration future difficulties in its extraction in the new areas (Yamal and the Caspian), and the unjustifiably high losses in natural gas in transportation (already now it approximately equals the total volume of exports), and the faster increase in energy outlays in the gas extracting and related sectors which, as we increase the volumes of output, reduce and, according to some computations, totally absorb the net increase of gas energy available to the national economy. The so-called "gas breathing spell" could turn into a spasmodic sigh preceding the advent of a gas shortage.

Nor should we expect any significant results from the increased prices of energy. Given existing regulations on enterprise outlays and the lack of competitive investments, such a step could only increase production costs, although a radical reorganization of economic relations could, in the future, also activate this instrument for reducing the appetite for energy.

We believe that the most important instrument to this effect could be yet another "new" energy program. The program should be formulated on an essentially different methodological base. The sum total of the end requirements of society must become the base in determining the required amount of energy, terminating the production of goods for which there is no real demand and the volume of which, according to specialists, accounts today for no less than 25 percent of the overall volume of output. In the case of periods in excess of 5 years we should avoid the physical quantitative indicators and compute only the correlation among the different sources of energy and their consumers, for the specific volumes included in such important documents, bearing in mind the changing conditions determining the production and consumption of energy, could be used as an argument in favor of unsubstantiated increases in output.

This would minimize the centralized production of energy and release substantial funds which had been planned for the energy complex and related sectors. In other words, there will be less energy available for potential production facilities. Such quantitative

changes should lead to quality changes, above all to reducing the share of power intensive production facilities and making maximal use of internal energy sources. The expansion of a number of enterprises could be made dependent on energy imports. This would stimulate the increased efficiency of output and the quality and competitiveness of produced goods. This method would be much more expedient and prestigious in terms of a developed country, compared to wasting hundreds of rubles per ton of extracted petroleum which is then sold and the earnings used to import food.

Similar changes should take place in the production of metal, cement, mineral fertilizers, timber and other goods of natural origin, which are the material foundations for virtually all reproduction cycles. Problems, the solution of which, for the time being at least, is difficult to anticipate, will inevitably appear in the course of the implementation of such programs. One can only say that they should be sought, above all, in the consumption area: in the quality and variety of end products, their functional purpose and specific resource intensiveness, and way of life and only as a last resort in increasing the production of energy and materials.

In initiating the discussion on the USSR Energy Program, we must determine above all the objectives for which such a program is formulated and implemented: Is it for ensuring an impeccable energy supply to a stagnating economy based on outlays or to be used as an efficient instrument for its structural reorganization. These are mutually exclusive objectives.

Should we choose the former, the consequences are obvious. They include uncontrolled growth of outlays in the basic sectors in which the Energy Program is concealed behind claims about the need to reduce the growth of capital investments. We would be interested to know the reason. Is it for the sake of reducing the cost of safety installations at nuclear power plants, reducing the cost of fuel extraction in the Extreme North and the Arctic Shelf or in the most difficult conditions of the Caspian area? Could it be for the sake of scientific and technical progress? But how can it be achieved, if more funds are invested in energy production? Could it be that we are hoping for miraculous technologies purchased from the West and once more paid for with that same petroleum and natural gas? Whatever good intentions may have guided the authors of the Energy Program, this path leads to social and ecological degradation, both because of the lack of funds and the very nature of material production which is based on the distorted reproduction of the existing economic structure.

The second gives us a chance to break this vicious circle and to take the path of a considered and socially oriented public production. We must abandon the illusion that in 10 to 15 years, if we simply work well, without changing anything substantial, everything will gradually fall in place: there will be plenty of energy and we will live well.

Nothing but the deliberate rejection of the existing mental and practical stereotype would allow us to profit from this opportunity.

Let me conclude with the thought expressed by John Stuart in the 18th century: "It appears, and it actually is in fact, that the initial products of the land, which are in limited supply and which exist entirely independently of man, are given by nature in precisely the same way that a young person is given a small sum of money to enable him to take the path of useful work and success."

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### Let Us Be Realistic!

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[Article by Leonid Izrailevich Kropp, doctor of technical sciences, department head, All-Union Thermoengineering Scientific Research Institute imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskiy]

[Text] The problem of the pollution of the air and water basins is not recent and efforts to solve it were not started only yesterday. Nonetheless, the painful rash of "hot spots," such as Kemerovo, Ufa, Zaporozhye, Ust-Kamenogorsk, Narva, and others, is continuing to spread. It is no secret that, as a rule, this is the result of the work of chemical plants, ferrous and nonferrous metallurgical enterprises, fuel and energy complexes, and millions of motor vehicles. They were and remain the "main pollutants." Furthermore, the most intensive growth of ecological problems in our industry has occurred over the past 20 years. If we assess the volume of basic harmful emissions in the atmosphere and in water reservoirs per unit of GNP, the results would make it clear that in our country this indicator is significantly worse than in a number of other industrially developed nations. Furthermore, the gap is widening.

Today the strategy of environmental protection must be based on three interrelated components which can conventionally be described as "aggregates," "standards" and "rubles." In other words, we need, first of all, the creation of the respective production-technical structures which would ensure the availability of the necessary equipment. Second, we must develop and apply a more advanced legislation which would specifically describe the entire variety of influences which enterprises have on the environment. Finally, there must be official methods for economically substantiating enterprise expenditures on environmental protection measures and a system of penalties combined with a system of advantages and subsidies; the latter is particularly important in undertaking the implementation of capital-intensive projects.

Nonetheless, little is being done currently to ensure the organization and development of the production and technical base for the manufacturing of environmental

protection equipment. This insufficiency is emphasized also by the role played by economic aspects of the development of industrial ecology. Meanwhile, a number of publications keep emphasizing the controlling, disciplinary and punitive functions of the State Committee for Nature. Making a fetish of the role of the control and management apparatus, which is considered the main instrument for the solution of aggravated ecological problems, involves the risk of bureaucratizing environmental protection. Such fears, nurtured by both domestic and foreign practical experience, are not all that groundless; for according to still very durable concepts, all of our ecological troubles stem from the fact that the managers of a number of sectors, associations and enterprises fail to understand the importance of environmental protection tasks. All that is needed is to call them to order, bring them on the carpet and put a controller to supervise each source of emissions, and matters would improve quickly. The present situation indicates how far all this is from the truth.

### Recommended by Global Experience

The scale of influence of the enterprises mentioned at the beginning of this article on the environment is greatly predetermined by the ecological standard of the equipment at their disposal. For example, the volume of emissions of nitrogen oxide in the atmosphere at thermoelectric power plants is determined above all by the design of the boilers and the degree of perfection of the units in which the fuel is burned. Why conceal it: in the overwhelming majority of cases power boilers of domestic origin, using fuel oil and natural gas, release in the atmosphere approximately double the volume of nitrogen oxides per unit capacity compared to similar boilers produced by foreign companies.

The situation with motor vehicles is even worse: for the time being, here all that is being done consists of efforts to improve control over the toxicity of exhaust gases. Abroad, meanwhile, many companies are equipping serially produced automotive vehicles with compact gas treatment devices, thanks to which their toxicity is several hundred percent lower than it is in our country.

In the Soviet Union, in commissioning basic equipment, consistency among several dozen parameters is checked but, as a rule, ecological indicators are not included. Usually suppliers bear no responsibility for this and individual efforts on the part of the most active enterprise managers to exercise their "ecological rights" with the machine building sectors remain, for the time being, futile. In the final account, the operators must undertake an endless and not always successful redesigning in order somewhat to reduce harmful emissions.

The brief description of the pivotal aspect of environmental protection in the national economy is from ecologically clean equipment to a clean enterprise, sector, region and state. Its fast development could play an important role in increasing the export possibilities of



our machine building, for under contemporary conditions the value of technological equipment on the foreign market will be greatly determined by its ecological standard.

In the implementation of these principle it is exceptionally important creatively to interpret and make maximal use of the experience of other countries which have achieved impressive results in a number of environmental protection areas. In the United States, for example, the production of environmental protection equipment, which ensures the required reduction in harmful emissions and toxic effluents, is the work of some 100 large companies. Essentially, over the past 15 to 20 years a new major industrial sector has developed in that country. Curiously enough, it has not experienced declines which are a standard feature in the United States; it has a portfolio of orders which will take it virtually to the year 2000 and the scale of its turnover is comparable to that of the automotive industry. The current volume of annual governmental appropriations for environmental protection measures and developments in basic sectors, including long-term projects, is in excess of \$60 billion.

The FRG is allocating specific funds in excess of 20 billion marks for the successfully implemented current program for equipping thermoelectric power plants with devices which will remove sulfurous compounds from gasses and utilize tapped sulfur by-products. Incidentally, this will make it possible for the FRG to lower the emission of sulfur dioxide in the atmosphere by a factor of 5 by 1995.

In those countries organizing the comprehensive delivery of equipment such as converters, furnaces, power turbines, and so on, with all the necessary means for technologically reducing emissions, gas treatment systems, dust tapping equipment and instruments for the automatic operational control of harmful emissions is of major significance. The main role in such complete sets is increasingly being played by the manufacturer of the basic equipment, who thus submits "ready-made" complete technological processes guaranteeing their indicators on a comprehensive basis. The companies which develop and supply comprehensive environmental protection equipment are acquiring significant advantages compared to their colleagues who are unable to provide such features.

Such progressive principles could also be applied in the Soviet economy. Today it urgently needs a specialized machine building sector for the production of environmental protection devices. It would be expedient to develop it in the guise of several powerful intersectorial associations which, if possible, would compete among each other and would mandatorily work in close contact or in cooperation with the best foreign companies. All of this would give us, in the final account, the possibility of putting an end to the numerous "curators" in charge of environmental protection and provide the enterprises

with a real opportunity for reducing harmful emissions, treating sewer waters and making use of waste products.

The development of an industrial ecology in a number of countries would have been impossible without legislative improvements. Improvements in the legislation become truly efficient if we abandon the launching of general appeals and convert to specific actions, including the application of standards governing specific emission of harmful substances. Practical experience indicates that even large enterprises, including coal powered electric power plants become clean producers from the viewpoint of industrial ecology if such standards are observed.

It would be expedient to take into consideration the useful aspects of this experience in improving our environmental protection legislation. Such legislation was drafted at a time when it was considered that the laws should include only the basic principles of protection of specific biospherical elements, for the quantitative parameters and standards and other such specific features should be assigned to the individual departments. This has led, for example, to the drafting of the following recommendation: if the enterprise would increase the height of its smokestack shall we say from 100 to 200 meters, i.e., should it double this height, in frequent cases the amount of permissible volumes of release of harmful substances into the atmosphere can be multiplied by a factor of 4.

The legislative reform requires not only to concretize and improve the system of environmental protection standards but also to resolve a wide range of legal problems. For example, we must clearly regulate the legal aspects of inevitably arising regional ecological conflicts, and problems of the roles of local soviets and various public organizations. Such legislation cannot ignore the health standards of environmental cleanliness. In applying some, albeit entirely justified, stricter health rules, it is important not only zealously to emphasize how progressive our standards are but also soberly to evaluate the actual possibility of meeting the requirements within a specific foreseeable time. In the opposite case there would inevitably develop a gap between environmental protection standards and industrial practices. Thus, for example, we have quite strict requirements concerning the aggregate harmful effect of a number of substances in the atmosphere, not used in any industrially developed country and essentially inapplicable. Health standards alienated from life develop disrespect for the law.

### Total Illusions

Wherever reality is forgotten myths inevitably appear. That is probably why we like so much the concept of wasteless technology, which is considered the most efficient means of solving all problems of industrial ecology and which became very popular in the past 10 to 15 years. Nonetheless, wasteless technology cannot be, strictly speaking, considered a scientific and technical



concept, for it is not based on universally accepted scientific theoretical foundations and does not include basic recommended formulas or equations.

There are all indications that in their time the initiators of the concept of wasteless technology proceeded from the possibility of achieving it essentially in a few types of chemical production facilities. This idea was initially aimed primarily at the creation of water recycling systems. The groundless generalization of this concept, which was developed through command-administrative methods, was of poor service to the initiators of the idea, for it converted wasteless technology from an idea, albeit controversial and isolated, into a comprehensive political slogan. Consequently, a number of departments developed an administrative machinery in charge of wasteless technology, with numerous branches, and impressive accountability, coordination and control systems.

The convenience of the slogan of wasteless technology is that the people who traditionally trust science begin to believe that the most complex problems of improvements of, shall we say, the atmosphere, which require a great deal of effort could be resolved relatively simply. The need for painstaking work on resource conservation, use of means to reduce emissions, developing gas treatment systems and the requirement, in frequent cases, for major outlays and serious organizational measures are replaced by a mystical faith in a miracle technology and isolated results achieved in one or two industrial areas are promoted almost to the rank of a new natural law. Furthermore, this mystical faith becomes strictly mandatory and is based on the strict requirements of the state authorities and brooks no dissidence.

It is indicative that as early as 1976, when a symposium of CEMA members and Yugoslavia on wasteless and low-waste technology was taking place in Dresden, the Western European scientific public did not support the generalization of this trend. It was repeatedly pointed out that in terms of a number of practical applications, particularly in the atmospheric protection area, the idea of wasteless technology is essentially groundless. For example, in the thermoelectric power industry this would conflict with the second law of thermodynamics. A cosmetic refining of titles by adding the words "and low waste" does not change the essence of the matter but confuses this idea even further. Furthermore, in the majority of cases, as both foreign and domestic experience indicates, reducing the number of emissions to a minimum cannot be efficiently achieved within the framework of a specific technology, a given enterprise or even sector. It requires intersectorial or national economic cooperation.

In the recent past the "atomic myths" also played a negative role in environmental protection by creating the appearance of a quick solution of many problems, particularly ecological, with the extensive application of nuclear processes in the production of electric power and

in metallurgy, heat supplies, various types of transportation and several other areas. One of the standing postulates of the "nuclear people" was that of the limited stock of fuel. In other words, unless we rapidly develop the use of nuclear fuel in these areas, resources of organic fuel will become exhausted quite rapidly. This typical semi-truth is being voiced in a country in which, according to some estimates, the Kamsko-Achinsk Fuel-Energy Complex alone can yield hundreds of millions of tons of coal annually for the next 300 to 400 years. Substantial deposits of all varieties of fuel exist in other places as well although, naturally, their location is by no means optimal. Meanwhile, nuclear fuel resources used at nuclear power plants with water-water reactors using uranium-235 are, as we know, limited and the development of reactors using fast neutrons has essentially not left the stage of industrial experimentation.

Another argument is that a thermoelectric power plant is allegedly bound to be a pollutant. Such dark prophecies were still being voiced while Japan built and commissioned a large electric power plant using coal and fuel oil with model ecologically clean production. It is indicative that this station is located in one of its big national parks.

Clearly these examples indicate that the sooner the public can cleanse its mind from the continuing influence of a number of stereotypes, the more chances will appear for the successful development of an industrial ecology.

The aggravation of the problems of industrial ecology in our country is not a chain of annoying accidents. These problems are inseparably and dialectically related to the difficult conditions governing the development of the entire industry. They depend on the prospects of scientific and technical progress, particularly in machine building. Their solution requires a realistic and comprehensive approach based on the new ecological thinking.

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### **School for Commissars (On the Occasion of the 70th Anniversary of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy)**

*18020015e Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 9, Jun 89 (signed to press 2 Jun 89) pp 32-38*

[Article by Aleksandr Iosifovich Leshchevskiy, KOMMUNIST special correspondent]

[Text] A low gray building on the Sadovoye Ring, by Mayakovskiy Square, is hardly one of the sites of the capital. Nonetheless, it is familiar to many people to whom the words "army" and "political worker" have a specific, a personal meaning. This is the premise of the Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin.

In 70 years of life, the once modest courses have developed into a major modern training center. Here skilled political workers are being trained for the Army and

Navy, teachers in military VUZs, journalists, psychologists, sociologists, propagandists, etc. Officers with 26 different skills graduate from this school.

The changes which were initiated in our society, the enhancement of the civic activeness of the people and the comprehensive social changes have affected the Armed Forces as well. They are being joined by people of different mood. To work with them the way we worked 5 years ago, let us say, is no longer possible. This requires a radical restructuring in the activities of the entire political structure of the Army and different, more refined, flexible and varied ways and means of education. Skill is required to indicate how better to use the released human energy and where precisely are participation, support and aid especially necessary. In the words of Major General V. Dudnik, chief of the Party-Political Work Department in the Soviet Armed Forces, of the Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin, the political worker must not manage the people but influence the processes which take place in their hearts. That is precisely what the "school for commissars" is trying above all to teach its alumni.

"The academy graduate must be distinguished today by his ability to expose contradictions in military collectives, forecast the development of moral-political and psychological processes and phenomena in units and formations, and model long-term ideological and organizational work, taking changes in the situation into consideration...."

(From the theses of the Concept of the Restructuring of Activities of the Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin)

Such is the concept. What do the academy students think of it? How do they accept and assess their new tasks?

"It was the lack of such a skill that led us into the academy," says Major V. Novikov. "Some people have 8 or 10 years of service. Experience has been gained, but we sharply felt the lack of knowledge which would let us interpret it. Naturally, there is also the question of career advancement.... People come here as deputy political officers of a battalion and leave as deputy regimental commanders for political affairs. There is new knowledge and new standards for the application of the acquired skills."

"Actually, why should such considerations be considered shameful?" said Major P. Petrov, supporting him. "We should not avoid the word 'career.' It is natural for a normal person to want to grow both professionally and in his service. It is the lack of such a desire that should be surprising."

"My colleague is right as far as the ability to analyze: it is quite necessary," Major S. Makarov added. "Look at the phenomena we come across. The views concerning the Army have changed in society and so has the attitude of the soldier toward military service. We are working with people who have come to 'serve' 2 years. Now, most

frequently people are not 'going into the Army,' but 'taken' into it. The passive contemplation of events has become widespread."

That is how our talk with some 10 academy students began. All of them were Army political workers and most of them served in Afghanistan. They were familiar with political work both in peacetimes and in combat. They called things by their names.

Later I found confirmation of their statements in the results of the studies conducted by academy personnel. Moscow alone annually "fails to deliver" hundreds and hundreds of soldiers. A considerable number of draftees are exempted from military service because of poor health. And although the standards are being gradually reduced, the "debt" of the capital is not diminishing and the number of people who are avoiding to register for the draft is increasing.

"To paint an accurate picture of what is taking place is in itself important," noted Lieutenant General V. Serebryannikov, deputy chief of the academy in charge of training and scientific work. "Naturally, however, this is only half the work. One must understand the reasons for the unwillingness of young people to serve in the Armed Forces and to consider how more efficiently to conduct military-patriotic work. Our scientists are currently drafting pertinent recommendations."

Cases which were virtually never encountered by political workers have occurred in Army circles. Between 20 to 40 percent of the boys drafted from Central Asia do not conceal that they are believers. They bring with them in the service objects of religious cult and practice religious ceremonies. Approximately 70 percent of the soldiers were members of a variety of informal groups, prior to military service. And if the deputy political officer does not know, even in general, who are the metallists, he would find it quite difficult to communicate with the servicemen.

It is even worse when the political worker proves to be weak in political matters. One of the students (he asked to remain anonymous) described a case in which he was involved. At one of the classes with the troops he made a skeptical remark about the Baltic people's fronts. Someone immediately raised his hand and a soldier asked him whether he was familiar with the program of the people's front of his republic. The political worker was unable to give a clear answer. At that point the servicemen who had been a member of the people's front in civilian life, started to describe the movement in detail. As my interlocutor admitted, he did not wish it on anyone to find himself in a similar situation.

All of this put together creates a new situation in the troops in which, in the view of Colonel V. Malikov, deputy chief of the department of party-political work, for the time being not all political workers have learned how to act efficiently.

"Consider the officer corps. There is the gravest possible contradiction: on the other hand, the desire to serve; on the other, absolute social lack of protection. Yet, as in the past, this contradiction is being suppressed and no efforts are being made to resolve it," forcefully said Major I. Bogachuk. Interrupting one another, the former deputy political officers spoke of the lack of amenities in the garrisons, living in other people's premises, the fact that efforts are made not to find jobs for officers' wives, and the fact that that today it is not easy for people to live on a major's salary (the speaker has two children)....

"Here is a simple example which will make everything clear," Major A. Osipenko said, illustrating this with an example. "It is an excellent thing for our country to show concern for the people who suffered from the earthquake in Armenia. For some reason, however, the families of military servicemen who were serving in the area were forgotten. Unlike many others, they were not paid any compensation. When the wife of one of our officers was being discharged from a hospital, we at the academy collected money to buy her clothing. You know, it is difficult to a deputy political officer to explain this to the people, along with many other things."

Generally speaking, the time of complacency in political work among the troops, as in our entire society, is past. A situation has developed in which the most sensitive problems and previously unusual statements have become part of the daily work of the deputy political officer. Today his opinion is not accepted axiomatically. We need people who do not think in patterns and who must undergo a different type of training.

"The main idea of perestroyka in the method of teaching is converting from the questions and answers approach to a creative discussion, from a monologue to a dialogue, from depersonalized general work with the students to its profound individualization...."

(From the theses of the Concept of Restructuring the Activities of the Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin)

"On the surface the changes may not be all that noticeable," said Colonel General N. Kizyun, the academy's chief. "However, that is not our purpose. Our task is different: to give a new content to forms of work which have proven their usefulness."

Nikolay Faddeyevich then said that, as in the past, the students have 1 free day a week, and that class attendance is mandatory. The workday consists of 6 hours of lectures and seminars and 3 hours of independent work. However, business games and debates are being practiced in the academy much more frequently than in the past. In 3 years of training the student must take more than 30 tests and 15 to 17 exams. This was the case in the past as well, but their nature was different.

"For example, at the state examination on topical problems of Marxist-Leninist theory and CPSU policy, we do not draw questions," N. Kizyun emphasized. "In the

course of the talk we ask the student to discuss two major problems. If he disagrees with something he must argue and prove his point. We have no use for learning by rote."

In order to develop the skill of independent thinking and analytical work at the department of social and military psychology, the students try to participate more actively in various research projects. For example, visiting units of the Belorussian Military District, they studied the problems which existed there and gave recommendations. Having determined, in particular, that company officers did not see here advancement possibilities, they suggested necessary changes. Naturally, they also came across a widespread evil such as old soldiers' privileges. They suggested the organization of a "dependency chain," as described by A.S. Makarenko, the outstanding educator, i.e., reciprocal control among people. This may prevent people from throwing their weight around. However, we cannot help but see that so far efforts to eliminate nonstatutory relations in the Armed Forces have been, let us admit, not all that effective. Probably those scientists who believe that without the comprehensive study of the philosophical, social and psychological roots of this phenomenon its elimination would be unlikely are right.

Does the new training system meet with a response among those who observe its stipulations? Colonel S. Syedin, chief of the social and military psychology department, described the following incident. At one point Lieutenant Colonel A. Ridzevskiy, deputy chief of the military department at the Dnepropetrovsk Mining Institute asked him to suggest how better to teach, how to make classes more interesting. It was recommended to him to follow one of the academy methods based on problem solving. In this case the theoretical material is presented in the guise of logical systems which can be used in seeking an answer to a question. This method was adopted by the institute. It was indicative that during the recent actions by students who demanded an end to the study of military affairs in VUZs, Ridzevskiy's students insisted that classes be continued. They considered them interesting.

In the military law department the students are learning how to act under specific situations which could quite likely appear in army life. For example, one student was given the following assignment: "A woman rings you up and reports that a soldier who is about to be discharged has promised to marry her. She asks you to order him to register the marriage." What answer could you give her? One must make a decision on the basis of the laws and rely on the laws. In a rule of law state the army cannot live according to its own convenient rules.

The academy students constantly come across the principle of gaining knowledge and learning how to apply it without waiting for any prompting. In the computer laboratories there are display classes which are very popular among the students. Computer time, as I was told here, is very precious. This is understandable, for

learning with the help of computers is quite convenient. One types a code and questions appear on the screen allowing the student to test his knowledge.

On the invitation of one of the laboratory associates, I sat behind one of the display screens. The question which appeared on the screen did not seem to be one of the most difficult. I typed the answer. The computer confirmed the accuracy and indicated the works of the Marxist classics in which that specific idea was developed. How would the machine react to an error? The computer advised not to be hasty, to think, and indicated what to read. However, it did not provide the right answer. The student had to find it for himself.

I saw the training material facilities of the air force department. I looked at the cockpit of a fighter aircraft. The instruments, toggle switches and steering wheel were the same as in a real aircraft. Actually, this was part of an aircraft. In front of the cockpit there was a screen on which that which the pilot sees in flight was reproduced. The stress factor was the only thing he did not feel. The instructor, however, could model any failure of the engine and the life support systems. As a rule, it is first-class fliers who join the academy but even they could learn something with this simulator.

There were also those who were only now mastering the handling of new models of aircraft and learning how to fly them. I saw an officer try to "land the fighter aircraft" but fail and try again. Let me point out that this is not any kind of game: frequently the students come out of the simulator sweating.

Next to it, in the laboratory of the navy department, the students could practice in the sonar room of a submarine. The hall on the opposite side included a tank. It was a real tank without, however, the armor plating. A special battalion and an automotive and infantry companies service the simulators and the academy training grounds.

This aspect of the training of the students is, unquestionably, as important as any other. In Army life situations frequently arise in which appeals and persuasions are insufficient. Personal example is needed and if the political worker is unfamiliar with the equipment or is a poor marksman the soldiers will not respond to his words, whatever he may be saying.

"The academy graduates develop the readiness and ability to promote in the people a new political and military thinking, and to secure the party line in perestroika and the development of democratization and glasnost in the troops...."

(From the theses of the Concept of the Restructuring of Activities of the Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin)

The aspiration to learn how to think originally, accurately and inventively meets with a response among the students. Academy graduate Major I. Blidzhyan,

recalling his teachers, referred with particular respect to Colonel O. Rakhimov, from the philosophy department. Oleg Khadzhi-Aliyevich teaches that nothing should be accepted on faith. Everything should be questioned, interpreted and analyzed and no attempt should be made to wait for the superior to express his opinion. Seminars conducted by Rakhimov always turned into free debates in which useful observations and conclusions became crystallized.

But let us not idealize the situation. The restructuring of the teaching methods is proceeding with difficulty. There are those who do not accept the new ideas and others whose baggage of knowledge is light. According to that same Major I. Blidzhyan, innovators and conservatives are approximately evenly divided in academy. Another graduate noted that efforts to teach a person to be independent are still found in the academy no more frequently than the old approaches to teaching, although such efforts are increasing with every passing year.

In all likelihood the academy would have been unable to train political workers who can promote democratization and glasnost in the troops had it not cultivated itself these principles within its own walls. Its students participate in all of its organizations, including the scientific council. During the time that I studied the work of this higher educational institution, steps to upgrade the efficiency of teaching were being discussed at the culture and arts department. Third-year students were invited to attend the session. They had already passed their examinations on these subjects and nothing prevented even the most silent among them from openly voicing their thoughts.

Such a free exchange of opinions is practiced not only in that department. Features marking the democratization of academic life are encountered in various areas. Let us visit, for example, the department of party-political work in the Soviet Armed Forces.

When Colonel Yu. Lukinov started asking the students themselves to evaluate his lectures, many were those who interpreted this as an eccentricity. They predicted that, benefiting from the anonymous nature of such an investigation, heavens knows what he could be told. They were puzzled: why surrender his authority? However, the authority of the teacher only increased and the advice of the students (as a rule serious and practical) helped him better to plan his lectures. Now wishes addressed to an educator can be seen even on the display screen. Let me point out, however, that it is only the most competent among the teachers who practice this method.

In my view, an interesting method for evaluation was applied by Captain Second Rank A. Nechayev. He rates his students' final test by averaging four grades. The first is based on the results of seminars. The second, on the examination answer. The third is given by independent experts among the students who were present at the test. Finally, the fourth is the student's self-rating. Naturally, here as well we see a display of trust in the students with

whom the democratization of the training process actually begins. They are entirely worthy of this trust: as a rule, neither the expert nor the personal ratings are higher than those of the teacher.

Many people today, concerned with perestroika in our Army and the democratization of its life, recall the good traditions of the Russian Officer Corps. In its time, the best part of the military was the pride of the nation and the bearer of high culture and intelligence. The progressive officer corps was noted for loyalty to duty, devotion, dignity and honor. Today, unfortunately, many of our officers hold a much more modest position in society. Why not learn from our predecessors their good qualities? Is it not a lack of culture that triggers manifestations of rudeness of which we are trying to rid our Armed Forces? To a certain extent the department of culture and arts of the academy, the only one of its kind in the country, tries to fill this gap. It holds its classes in the Museum of Graphic Arts imeni Pushkin, and the Tolstoy, Mayakovskiy, Gorkiy and Bakhrushin Museums. Contacts have been established with battle-painter artists in the studio imeni Grekov. Chamber orchestras, frequently performing in the hall of acts, acquaint the students with musical classics.

"We try to awaken in the individual an attraction for culture and teach him the fundamentals in understanding its value. If we can plant in him a seed of interest, there will mandatorily be shoots and the person will try to master the wealth of culture by himself. Such is the task we assign ourselves," said Captain First Rank V. Ignatov, deputy chief of the culture and arts department.

The ability to understand one's interlocutor and to communicate with people, as we know, requires a certain degree of intelligence. This skill, nonetheless, is one of the main instruments of the political worker. Therefore, culture becomes his required professional quality.

Despite the seeming incompatibility, democracy can well adapt itself to the strict Army principle of one-man command. Furthermore, a spirit of democracy was inherent in the Russian Army. Let us recall perhaps the councils of the holders of the Order of George. It was they who decided who among the soldiers is worthy of the George Cross, and no commander had the right to present this most honorable award without taking the view of the council into consideration. What about the officer meetings? An ensign would demand an apology of a colonel if he believed that the colonel had been tactless in his behavior toward him. Are the alumni of the Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin ready to restore the democratic traditions of our Army and to contribute to the creation of a democratic situation in Army circles?

Regardless of the topic with which our talks with teachers and students in the academy began, it always turned to that subject. A great variety of suggestions were

made. For example, why not offer the person the possibility of volunteering for the Army without waiting for the draft, as is practiced in the GDR? Let this person be given the right to choose for himself the branch of the Armed Forces and place of service, after which he could be given some benefits such as, for example, that of joining a youth housing complex. Perhaps Army service would then become more attractive to the young men and the desire to avoid the draft would disappear. Or else why not allow a soldier to go on leave of absence wearing civilian clothes, as is practiced, for example in the Bundeswehr? Why not offer the boys the possibility to relax from wearing the strict uniform? Here wearing blue jeans in a discotheque is considered more natural than wearing a uniform.

There were many other "whys." Why not criticize orders issued by commanders at the party meeting of the unit? Essentially, this puts the commander outside the range of party criticism, since any decision is formulated as an order. My interlocutors were not calling for arguing with the commander for an army is inconceivable without the principle of one-man command. However, in the view of the party members it was simply mandatory to analyze subsequently a given step and draw lessons for the future.

Why, according to the instructions, should the commanding officer direct the work of the party organization? Clearly, this is not within his range of competence but of that of the deputy political officer. Is it sensible for the commanding officer to certify the deputy political officer? Thus the political worker becomes dependent on the commanding officer's good will. Should the right to certify not be given to the superior political authority and the party organization of the unit? In that case, probably, the deputy political officer would feel freer, would act more daringly and would display principledness more frequently. Could the Army lose from this?

The readiness of the academy graduates to act as is demanded today of a political worker can be seen not only in what they think but also the way they act. Here is an example: recently, a new cultural-national community was set up in Moscow, consisting of people of different ethnic groups from Dagestan, who live in the capital. The need to draft a program for action appeared. At that point Lieutenant Colonel N. Musalov, academy post-graduate student, suggested:

"Let us visit units in the Moscow Military District and speak with the boys from our autonomous republic about their service. Many of them were unable to become used to the strict Army requirements and have accounted for 20 percent of gross disciplinary violations. Why? Is it because of their irresponsible attitude toward military service? Could linguistic or other types of difficulties be the reason? As an Avar, I am quite concerned by this. The members of the community could try to help, for the word of the elder in Dagestan is respected.

This idea was liked. While this article was being prepared for printing, members from the community were trying to reach an agreement with the district command as to when precisely they could visit the various units.

I was told by many graduates of the Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin the following: "Having come to the Armed Forces, I shall try to create the type of conditions for service by soldiers and officers which would be consistent with contemporaneity and *perestroika*!"

Well, this is a worthy objective and I wish you success, comrades deputy political officers!

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## INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF SOCIETY

### Two Legacies

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[Text] Innovation and continuity are two dialectically interrelated principles which largely predetermine the historical process and its pace and contradictions. Their unity exists in a state of eternal confrontation. Continuity is related to the calm development of events while innovation assumes the upper hand at crucial moments. Today we are experiencing precisely such a moment, which reminds us of the time of drastic changes, the time of revolutions which, as Marx said, "constantly criticize themselves and also stop in their motion, returning to something which already seems to have been achieved so that they can begin this process all over again, mocking with merciless logic the half-way nature and poor aspects and unsuitability of their initial attempts" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 8, p 123).

Why is it that Lenin's question "What Legacy Are We Rejecting?" sounds so topical to us today? As we answer it, however, we must remember Vladimir Ilich's words of caution: the people always receive two different legacies from the past. One is something that must be decisively rejected in order to rapidly move forward. The other is an organic part of our ideological arsenal, which helps this movement, which speeds it up.

Such a legacy is received not only by people but also by societies which have come to a new stage of development, and to political parties. For example, by the end of the 19th century, Lenin related the assimilation of the legacy of the Russian Liberation Movement by the Revolutionary Social Democrats to the creative, the Marxist interpretation of the legacy of the Russian Revolutionary Democrats and, at the same time, the rejection of both the liberal and the extremist traditions of populism. The dialectical conflict which arose was complex. But do simple sharp conflicts exist?

The proper handling of a legacy is a difficult science. In this area errors are very easily made by, so to say, throwing the baby out with the bath water and breaking, in one fell swoop, the links which connect us to the past, to the wealth of national culture and to global civilization. Unfortunately, we do have such a bitter experience. Some excessively radical personalities tried to build a qualitatively new social structure on an empty lot, on a "construction site" cleared even from the vestiges of the old culture. These were efforts clearly doomed to failure although triggered by good intentions. This approach was radically conflicting with Lenin's thought on the need to master the entire wealth developed by mankind and the fact that socialism should rely on the comprehensive experience of civilization and global culture. Nonetheless, Marxist tradition, continued by Lenin, formulates as the most important starting postulate the principle of historicism which does not accept any "random negation" but which, nonetheless, is based on change, development and progress. Leninist historicism in the approach to the past and the present rejects both the preservation of that which is hopelessly obsolete as well as innovation for its own sake, or in the words of Vladimir Ilich, the combination of what is old with lifeless fashion (see "*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 2, p 440).

The question of the attitude toward legacy is very relevant today as well. It is no less contradictory than it was during Lenin's time. Now, however, it is most frequently a case of the legacy of the last 7 decades. The greatest possible attention is focused on the most complex events in the spiritual and political development of Soviet society since its appearance. What should we preserve and what should we firmly abandon from our post-revolutionary past? What methods of party influence in the spiritual area of social life could be used today as well and what parts of the ideological arsenals must be mercilessly rejected? We shall try to answer these questions on the basis of older and more recent party documents.

Anyone who says that all political decisions which today make us blush were born in the quiet of offices, on the basis of "wise" instructions issued by peremptory "authorities" would be sinning against the truth. In any case, on the surface this did not always appear to be the case. In 1948, for example, on two separate occasions the VKP(b) Central Committee held conferences on the same topic: a discussion of the opera composed by V. Muradeli. Most of those invited to attend the first were personnel of the Bolshoy Theater; most of those invited to the second were the musical public at large, composers, conductors, music critics and music experts. The following fact gives an idea of the way the second discussion took place. Zhdanov, the featured speaker, named the most "penalized" composers, who included Shostakovich, Prokofyev, Khachatryan and Myaskovskiy, and turned to the public:

"Who do you wish to add to the names of these comrades?"

The minutes read: "Voice from the hall: Shaporin."

"It is precisely these comrades that shall be considered the main leading personalities in the formalistic trend in music," the speaker agreed, adding: "This trend is radically erroneous."

It is true that in the notorious VKP(b) Central Committee Decree "On the Opera 'The Great Friendship' by V. Muradeli," "public opinion" was not taken into consideration: Shaporin's name was not mentioned. The fact itself, however, confirms that the "genre" of informing was not considered reprehensible at that time. This applied even to public informing, not to speak of anonymous.

There obviously is some kind of pattern: immorality, reaching a certain point, begins to be considered by some people as almost like an objective need which can be properly assessed only either from the outside or from the position of a historically entirely different public morality. It is precisely on the basis of such positions that we judge the 1930s today.

To judge is easy but to understand is considerably more difficult. Our historical awareness is currently experiencing a time of tempestuous renovation, a period during which the desire to judge is frequently prevented from developing into the urgent need to explain what it was that took place with us, why, how, for the sake of what.... A great deal of what our contemporaries have experienced seems absurd, a devilish witchcraft, a universal confused reasoning.

Let us take as an example a single excerpt from the VKP(b) Central Committee Resolution of 14 November 1938 "On the Organization of Party Propaganda in Connection With the Publication of the 'Short Course in VKP(b) History'." The modern reader could easily guess what is the meaning, for example, of a statement such as "it is necessary to realize that it is precisely neglect of political work among the intelligentsia and our cadres that led to the fact that some of our cadres, finding themselves outside the political influence of the party and deprived of ideological tempering, went politically astray. They became confused and fell prey to foreign intelligence services and their Trotskyite-Bukharinist and bourgeois-nationalistic agents." We can remember dozens of names of our outstanding compatriots who became victim of unconscientious calumnies, who were slandered, sent to prison and physically exterminated. It is precisely in that same excerpt of that same resolution that we find another statement directly preceding the one we quoted: "Such an anti-bolshevik attitude toward the Soviet intelligentsia is wild, and of a hooligan and dangerous nature to the Soviet state." One had to be living in the 1930s not to realize how fantastically hypocritical this was. One had to live until the end of the 1980s to be able to give such hypocrisy its just political assessment.

Today we note the following: hypocrisy in the approach to artistic creativity (and not only to it alone) was, for

decades, a mandatory attribute of official policy. We still remember the routing of the Leningrad journals ZVEZDA and LENINGRAD, unprecedented tactless, savage and insulting respective resolution, hearing from the rostrum of the latest party congress in the accountability report, words which immediately became a fashionable propaganda hit: "We need Soviet Gogols and Shchedrins who would burn with the flame of satire everything that is negative, corrupt and dead in our lives, anything which hinders our forward movement." It is true that among the numerous quotations in newspapers and journals we also found one which, in today's terminology, could be described as "informal":

"We need people like Shchedrin and people like Gogol to protect us from disturbances."

Satire did not fit very well the definition of socialist realism, as understood by Stalin.

The decree on the Leningrad journals was actively promoted and widely interpreted in terms of all sectors of ideological work. Six months later the result of the noisy campaign was summed up in the form of yet another decree: this time it dealt with the Moscow journal ZNAMYA, whose editors "had failed to draw proper lessons from the resolutions on the journals ZVEZDA and LENINGRAD." Furthermore, "the journal had poorly assisted in exposing bourgeois cosmopolitanism," etc.

The summed-up results of the implementation of the 1946 decrees on problems of literature, theater and cinematography led to yet another offensive mounted against art and the assertion of administrative regulations in an area in which such regulations are categorically contradicted, for they conflict with the nature of artistic creativity. Among others, such ideological pressure undermined the originality of art of the peoples of the USSR, ignored considerations of the historical originality in the development of national cultures and, in some cases, as was the case with the resolution on V. Muradeli's opera, pitted some Soviet peoples against other. Such a diktat, added to incompetence, made dogmatism a mandatory attribute of cultural policy and led to the blossoming of the theory of conflict-free art.

In one of the standard-setting articles published 40 years ago in BOLSHEVIK we read: "Individual writers, insufficiently well familiar with party life, are artificially structuring conflicts which could have taken place no later than 20 years ago. Some people still think that party work is a kind of rushing which, furthermore, is considered to be the particular virtue of the communist. Some writers erroneously tend to depict a progressive public figure as being a failure in his personal life, with bad relations within his family, and deprived of family happiness."

The virtually same requirements concerning literature and art, albeit not so obviously caricaturized, as we see them today, were formulated also more than 30 years later although, it is true, this time the hypocrisy was



presented in more elegant terms, as a gap between words and actions (this was the favorite expression of Suslov's, who was Zhdanov's heir in formulating the main ideological position in the party). This gap was filled not by making actions consistent with words but much more simply: by word substitutions. In 1979 the naive people welcomed with joy (and therefore seriously) the latest CPSU Central Committee resolution on ideological problems and, in particular, its stipulation that "there is still fear of openly calling for a discussion of topical problems of social life, the tendency to smooth over and circumvent unsolved problems and sensitive questions and to conceal shortcomings and difficulties which exist in real life. This is incompatible with the tasks which the party sets in ideological and educational work. Such an approach and tendency to ostentation do not help the project but merely hinder the solution of our common problems. Where criticism and self-criticism are not honored and where there is lack of openness in public affairs, the activeness of the masses is directly harmed."

At that time people were found who had decided to "help the cause" through their creativity, in accordance with the resolution, and they were given encouragement from the highest level. On that same level, however, it was soon realized that too much talk was not doing any good and the 1979 Resolution "On Further Improving..." was followed by another in 1981, "On the Forthcoming Tasks for the Further Improvement..." The forthcoming tasks were defined as follows: "Substantiated propaganda of the historical advantages and achievements of socialism must be the focal point of this entire work.... We must not tolerate the fact that this most important matter is still not being dealt with at all times skillfully and inventively.... We must clearly and convincingly depict the heroic nature of our present, and the beauty and true greatness of the working man, the builder of communism.... We must translate into the language of emotionally convinced and lively characters many statistical data which are superficially dry but are filled with a tremendous social content...." Let us give its due to the formulation of the latter task: statistical data, about the objective nature of which we know quite a lot today could be made convincing only on the emotional level.

Yet another old tradition applied by the party's leadership in the development of the spiritual area of society was the so-called concreteness of this leadership. In 1940 the VKP(b) Central Committee noted shortcomings in literary criticism and bibliography and formulated, as an order, a series of steps "for radical improvements" in this area: to consider the critics section of the Writers' Union as having been artificially created and to abolish it (let the critics find their place in the other sections); to stop the publication of the journal LITERATURNYY KRITIK and all special publications to be discussed by the press; surveys to be published for each production sector no less than once every quarter, and so on. All of this was quite specific. In 1948 the VKP(b) Central Committee condemned gift editions of "Dead Souls"

and "Peter I," published by Goslitizdat. Actually, neither N. Gogol nor A. Tolstoy were criticized. As noted in the respective document, the prime and, clearly, main shortcoming was the weight of the book: the former weighed 2 kilograms and the latter, 4.5. Once again, this was quite a specific evaluation, to the half kilogram degree.

Or else let us take as an example the more familiar 1946 Decree "On the Repertory of Drama Theaters and Measures to Improve It." Here as well the main practical task was not abstract: each drama theater was to stage two or three ideologically and artistically sustained plays annually, dealing with contemporary Soviet topics. Six months later, the critics complained that in order to implement this resolution the Moscow theaters should stage as many as 80 plays. Meanwhile only seven had been written by the beginning of the new season. The specific assignment was followed by a specific demand. The plan was fulfilled by less than 10 percent. This was nothing to joke about!

Administrative command methods were applied in managing spiritual production, with the consistency and openness inherent in the various stages of development of Soviet society. In the 1930s a "historical" resolution brought a strict and simple end to the "abundance of various viewpoints and arbitrary interpretations of the most important problems of party theory and history."

In August 1938 the VKP(b) Central Committee passed a resolution on M. Shaginyan's "Bilet po Istorii" [History Question] (part I, "The Ulyanov Family"); 9 years later the Central Committee secretariat paid the same attention to the book by S. Gil "Shest Let s Leninym" [Six Years With Lenin], as a result of which the publication of scientific works, memoirs and works of fiction about Lenin was severely hindered. More than 600 works about Lenin were actually banned, including N.K. Krupskaya's memoirs and John Reed's book "Ten Days Which Shook the World."

The restructuring of the literary-artistic organization was carried out in the same directive-oriented manner; the literary-artistic associations were disbanded. The language of the decree was entirely consistent with its spirit: "To eliminate..., unify..., implement...." In its interpretation of the decree, one of the publications of that time did not conceal the fact that blocs in literature and art are dangerous, that they could be used by class-hostile elements, that they prevent from identifying the class enemy which hides between statements about socialist realism, "a more refined and more dangerous enemy which is acting somewhere in our immediate vicinity."

The language of diktat was substantially softened in the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, and an economic vocabulary, understood by many of the then cultural leaders, was added to it. For example, the 1972 Decree "On Steps for the Further Development of Soviet Cinematography" linked the future blossoming of this genre to 15-20 state commissions annually. The CPSU Central



Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree which was passed 12 years later asserted that "the system of state orders makes it possible to express the social needs for one type of motion picture or another." As in the past, the social need was formulated as a directive.

Should we underestimate this part of our legacy? Naturally, we should not. Traditions which took decades to develop do not disappear in an hour, the more so since they had developed not as a result of accidental errors or administrative outbursts or excesses caused by an incompetent diktat or by the inertia of stagnation. Quite the contrary: the element and excesses of inertia became the inevitable and by no means the accidental result of the type of deformed socialism under which several generations of Soviet people had lived.

However, other traditions existed as well....

The makers of cultural policy in the 1930s and of latter times frequently justified their actions with references to Lenin. This was done through the method of "selective quotations," of arbitrary interpretations of various ideas expressed in Lenin's works, separated from the historical realities which necessitated political actions. This applied, above all, to the Decree On the Press, which Lenin signed soon after the victory of the Great October Revolution. No one concealed the fact that this was an answer to the concentrated attack mounted by the counterrevolutionary press representing various shades of opinion. "...Restricting the press even at critical times is admissible only within limits which are absolutely necessary....," the decree stated. However, if we were to convince everyone that with the victory of socialism the class struggle does not abate but becomes aggravated, the range of absolute necessity of dictatorship in the spiritual area could be expanded as widely as one may wish, which is precisely what happened. It is only now that we can finally undertake the practical implementation of the accurately formulated Leninist principles of a socialist attitude toward the mass information media: "The moment the new order is strengthened, any administrative influence on the press will be lifted and the press will be given total freedom within the limits of responsibility to the courts and in accordance with the broadest possible and most progressive law in this respect." This formula provides an entirely acceptable platform for the currently drafted law on the press, which is coming out nearly 7 decades late.

And how relevant (as though recently written!) are the concepts in the famous Leninist article "Party Organization and Party Literature." We have still not forgotten the "accursed time of Aesop's fables," for it was only with their help that in the 1960s and subsequently we could tell the truth from the theater proscenium. And is the writing of those "immortal" works by one of the recent leaders of the state and the party not an example of "literary servility" and were the reviews of such works not written in the "slave language?" It would have been hardly possible for said decrees to have as their epigraph the lines from that same Leninist article: "...Least of all

can literature be subject to mechanical equalization, leveling, and domination of the majority over the minority" (*"Poln. Sobr. Soch."* [Complete Collected Works], vol 12, p 101).

Therefore, the chronicles of our spiritual development also included a different tradition which was quite well-grounded and not all that brief as some people imagine today. This was a time short of decrees but rich in scientific, literary and artistic schools, that which today we could describe as real socialist pluralism of opinions, without which spiritual life inevitably goes into stagnation and degradation. Nonetheless, it is particularly necessary to mention one document if we speak of the Leninist tradition of the party's leadership of culture. The resolution "On Party Policy in the Field of Artistic Literature," which was passed on 18 June 1925, after Lenin's death, is the summation and development of his views and an example of the real political influence of the party on artistic creativity. One of the authors of this resolution was M.V. Frunze, chairman of the literary commission of the RKP(b) Central Committee.

"...The party must speak out in favor of the free competition among different groups and trends in this area. Any other solution to this problem would be a bureaucratic pseudoresolution.... The party must comprehensively uproot efforts at home-grown and incompetent interference in literary affairs; the party must be concerned with making a thorough selection of individuals to serve in establishments which deal with the affairs of the press in order to ensure the right, useful and tactful leadership of our literature.... Greater attention must be paid also to the development of national literatures in the numerous republics and oblasts of our Union." This almost 65-year old resolution sounds truly contemporary.

The Leninist course of displaying a careful attitude toward talent, the variety of schools in science and art, and the comparison among different viewpoints in seeking the truth includes a very valuable experience which, alas, has not been studied and has been "coercively forgotten." Today not every specialist could explain what was meant, for example, by the extremely harsh formulation of one of the party resolutions of the end of the 1930s: "Grossest possible political errors of a harmful nature in the addenda and the remarks and commentaries to some volumes of Lenin's works." The greatest anger was focused on the 13th volume, 3rd edition, which included "Materialism and Empiriocriticism."

An entire decade elapsed between the publication of this volume and the frightening accusations and their consequences, a decade during which "grossest possible political errors of a harmful nature" did not exist. This sharp metamorphosis conceals a drastic change from the pluralism of the 1920s to the official uniformity of the "Short Course." The addendum to the 13th volume included the article by V.I. Nevskiy, which Lenin had included in the second edition of his work and which had

been written on his instructions. However, at the time of the promulgation of the resolution, V.I. Nevskiy, along with one of the editors of the third edition of Lenin's works, N.I. Bukharin, had been reclassified from acknowledged party theoreticians to "enemies of the people." The reviews of "Materialism and Empiriocriticism," published in that volume, which appeared immediately after the publication of the book, and one of which (as openly stated in the remarks) was written by "one of the most reactionary ideologues of the White Guard Emigres" did not fit at all the concept of unity of thought of 1938.

Incidentally, in the 1920s, on Lenin's instructions, excerpts and unedited materials on the situation in Russia, found in many emigre publications were published in the Soviet press, frequently with no comment, so that the Soviet people would have a clear idea of who was fighting against them and how. Knowledge of the ideological opponent, and even of his malicious attacks and threadbare criticism in SOVDEPIYA, and even open slander, helped to evaluate the historical significance of our own affairs and to realize the need to mobilize all forces in the defense of the young socialist fatherland, and to face an aggressive and treacherous enemy, his indiscriminate search of means and his ideological helplessness.

Such a conflict of opinions presented the individual with a choice, with an alternative. Only a party convinced of the rightness of its policies and trusting the common sense, natural wisdom and practical experience of the people could decide to take such a step. The strongest convictions are based on truths personally perceived by man. Therefore, the people must be given the opportunity to do so! Spiritual life is, in terms of its specifics, unusual. It carries within it a charge of creativity in its various hypostases, whether applicable to the nature of the new social system, the creation of artistic values or their perception. In this case schematism, directness and intolerance are decisively contraindicated and unnatural.

"The literary aspect of the party cause of the proletariat," Lenin wrote, "cannot be routinely identified with other aspects of the party cause of the proletariat" (op. cit., vol 12, p 101). The author of these lines provided splendid examples of an original party approach to a complex area such as the spiritual life of society. The greatest possible tactfulness, tolerance for dissidence, and aspiration for a dialogue with men of science and culture were precisely what distinguished his rather complex relations with the great writer A.M. Gorkiy who sharply (but sincerely) attacked the bolsheviks in 1917, and the great scientist I.P. Pavlov who challenged the chairman of the Sovnarkom: "I am not a socialist and I do not believe in your dangerous social experiment." The conclusion of this polemic is known. A.M. Gorkiy wrote an unsurpassed essay about Lenin. With his typical frankness, I.P. Pavlov admitted that "yes, I must say, gentlemen, that Lenin was indeed a man with a great

mind and honesty. He sensed accurately the pulse beat of life, which is something rarely achieved."

In the long years and decades which followed, the best representatives of the Soviet intelligentsia tried to preserve the tradition of an honest, open and sometimes polemic dialogue. This included forms natural to the artists: works were created which exposed the dangerous ills of society and which called for immediate action and for the healing of socialism. Sometimes such works reached the reader, viewer and listener, as a rule not thanks to but despite official stipulations. Repeatedly the men of science and culture tried to impart their pain and concern for the destiny of the country to those who had assumed the right to make final decisions on absolutely all matters. We know that in the case of many of them this aspiration ended tragically. Nonetheless, people who showed sincere concern for the fate of domestic culture tried, at meetings with party leaders, to explain, to prove.... At that same 1948 Conference of the VKP(b) Central Committee, which dealt with problems of music, not everyone obediently accepted the directive-oriented speeches delivered by Zhdanov. Not everyone hastened to add names to the list of composers who were "alien to the Soviet people and their artistic tastes." There also were those who defended their viewpoint, who provided a highly skilled analysis of the condition of Soviet art, profound and self-critical, an analysis which retains its value to this day. However, the party leaders showed no ability and desire to properly assess competent opinions. The event described by one of the participants in the conference proved to be much closer to the spirit and content of the party resolution which was adopted soon afterwards.

On one occasion, as first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party (b) Central Committee, Kaganovich held a meeting with composers and undertook to explain to them why the participants in the famous "Powerful Handful" were principle-minded in their activities and ardently struggled for their program. Probably, the composers made the assumption, because the "Powerful Handful" had as its ideologue a gifted and outstandingly educated and progressive person such as Stasov. "I believe," the answer was, "...because whereas Stasov was their ideologue your ideologue is the entire party. You work under exceptionally favorable conditions." As to conditions, the crushing decree we mentioned used virtually identical words.

Recently the Soviet people welcomed with satisfaction the lifting of perhaps the most hateful of all party resolutions on ideological problems: the 14 August 1946 VKP(b) Central Committee Resolution "On the Journals ZVEZDA and LENINGRAD." The resolution "On the Opera 'The Great Friendship' by V. Muradeli," was subjected to criticism significantly earlier, in 1958, in a Central Committee resolution "On Correcting Errors in the Assessment of the Operas 'The Great Friendship,' 'Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy' and 'With All Our Hearts.'" It is rather strange to read today this document which claims that the initial decree "as a whole played a positive role

in the development of Soviet musical art," and that "some erroneous evaluations in said decree reflected J.V. Stalin's subjective approach to individual works of art and creativity." It turns out that "Molotov, Malenkov and Beriia had a strongly adverse influence on him in solving such problems." The decree considered erroneous the article in PRAVDA on the subject of the operas "Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy" and "With All Our Hearts," which had not been mentioned in the 10-year old resolution, any more than did their authors.

According to that logic, probably we should have long acknowledged as improper the assessments found in articles which had created a lot of stir in their time, such as "Confusion Instead of Music," "Ballet Falsehood," "Cacophony in Architecture," and "Painters-Daubers," i.e., the entire series of repressive articles dealing with the various types of art which were fired out as though from a machine gun, at the start of 1936. Actually, only one of all the decrees on ideological problems of recent decades remains relevant: "On the Procedure for the Publication of the Works of Soviet Writers in Their Lifetime," which noted clear excesses in this matter. Actually, the "implementation" of this decree in 1971 can be judged by the fact that during that 5-year period the plans called for publishing the collected works of 820 living authors.

Is the official "lifting" of ideological resolutions of the past necessary? We could add to this list the 1957 resolution on the journal VOPROSY ISTORII which criticized historians who had dared, at the very beginning of the "thaw," to critically review the dogmas included in the "Short Course," concerning the 1917 events. It became necessary officially to disavow the "fundamental" article in KOMMUNIST (No 3, 1969) which was the official substantiation for stagnation in the science of history and the revival of the cult myths relative to J.V. Stalin's activities. Many other such materials and directives may be cited. We believe, however, that the basic political approach to such documents was defined by Central Committee resolution itself on the lifting of the familiar 1946 decree on the Leningrad journals. The party clearly and unequivocally proved how one must react to these aspects of its history.

Furthermore, the time has come to take a different look at the significance of resolutions and decrees concerning the party's leadership of the spiritual life of society. "Different" means Leninist. "We are far from the idea of preaching any kind of uniform system or solution of such a problem with a few resolutions" (op. cit., vol 12, p 102). For decades it was not considered acceptable to quote this excerpt from the universally known article "Party Organization and Party Literature," not to mention the development of this Leninist thought and its practical implementation. However, it was precisely this article that was taken up by the authors of the 1925 Resolution which, unlike many other which issued mandatory rules to publishing houses, creative associations

and agencies involved in the state management of culture, dealt with the party itself, defining its ways and means of influencing the spiritual life of society.

Specifically, here is what was said in that resolution: "As it guides literature as a whole, the party can provide as little support to any given **single** faction in literature (as it classifies such factions on the basis of differences of views concerning form and style) as it can resolve through resolutions problems concerning the form of family life although, in general, it unquestionably guides and must guide the building of the new way of life.... Equally inadmissible is any decree or party resolution **legalizing the monopoly** on literary-publishing by any group or literary organization."

Alas, guidance in the development of literature and the arts in the country, as of all social thinking, took a different path. This path was openly and frankly defined in the editorial in the journal BOLSHEVIK in 1948: "In a talk with the first American worker delegation and in characterizing the communist society, Comrade Stalin pointed out that in that society art is provided favorable conditions for its full blossoming. Under Comrade Stalin's guidance, on a daily basis the Bolshevik Party is steadily guiding Soviet art toward this full blossoming. In its resolutions and instructions the party's Central Committee has provided a work program for all ideological sectors and, in particular, all areas of the arts, defining the specific tasks of literature and the arts and the ways and means for their successful implementation."

Today we are making, unaided, unexpected discoveries in the history of domestic philosophical thinking, realizing its uniqueness and contradictoriness and becoming familiar with quite disparate viewpoints concerning our recent and distant past something which, in terms of history, only yesterday was considered criminally punishable. The works of M. Zoshchenko and A. Akhmatova, literary workers who were subject to an official prohibition, are being reprinted and actively read. D. Shostakovich's music can be heard throughout the country, although he was "authoritatively" declared an "antipeople's" composer. Having pierced through the "pile of the years," characters from the so-called "shelved" motion pictures turn to us from the screens, pictures which were proclaimed in their time as "lacking profound social interest and firm moral foundations." The readers are receiving truthful books about the difficult periods in our history, books which were previously ideologically banned precisely for "major violations of the truth of life."

Time puts everything in its place. The starting point of this new time in the development of Soviet society and its spiritual life in the direction of a decisive democratization is clearly marked: April 1985. As of then, with every passing month and year two conflicting approaches to the history and culture of socialist society and the place and role of the party in this very complex area of social life are clashing ever more sharply and

obtaining a social interpretation. According to old historical tradition we have two legacies. It is as though the spiritual wealth and administrative experience which, for such a long time, were under administrative-command rule, have crystallized and are powerfully entering our lives. However, it is not all that simple to fill the gap, which lasted for decades, in the mastery and development of the Leninist tradition of the party's influence in culture. A dialogue is being reborn between party leaders and the men of science and culture. Unfortunately, the party committees on different levels have not everywhere mastered this method of political work; the command and prohibition style of party influence on the development of the spiritual sphere is making itself felt. However, the process of democratization in this area as well is advancing, although not without contradictions or struggle. The legacy of the first postrevolutionary years is being updated. It is acquiring a new image, not only under the influence of the positive changes which are taking place but also in the course of clashes with remaining stereotypes of the past.

We keep looking very closely at our past and quite frequently become indignant and puzzled: How could this happen? We would so much like to reject a great many things which were tragic and shameful. However, they too occurred. They live in the memory, in the inertia of thinking and acting and in the documents, which are the impassive witnesses of former ideological and other storms.

It is hardly worth it today systematically to refute and delete in the usual form of resolutions all that was unfair, all that is found in dozens of old resolutions and in thousands of so-called fundamental newspaper and journal articles. The supreme judge—time—has already passed its sentence. History cannot be corrected in hindsight. Our duty is to evaluate as required, with scientific accuracy, the historical events. The dark pages of the past are our common pain and, in itself, this pain is a warning against future errors.

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## DISCUSSION AND DEBATE

### Aspects of Social Progress

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[Article by Doctors of Historical Sciences A. Volkov and Yu. Gavrilov and Doctor of Philosophical Sciences B. Kapustin]

[Text] One year ago KOMMUNIST published the theses of international affairs experts of the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences ("Social Progress In the Contemporary World," No 7, 1988). The theses arose the interest of social scientists and a wide

circle of readers. The materials were discussed in seminars and in many scientific and educational institutions; they were translated and published in the GDR, Italy, Finland and many other countries. The discussion of the theoretical problems of social progress continued on the pages of the journal in the guise of direct responses to the publication and articles which appeared independently but which dealt with the same topics.<sup>1</sup>

Following is an article the authors of which—the initiators of the discussion, Doctors of Historical Sciences A. Volkov and Yu. Gavrilov and Doctor of Philosophical Sciences B. Kapustin—sum up the readers' ideas and thoughts on the ways of continuing the theoretical quest without claiming to provide a final summation of the results of the discussion, for the topic remains exceptionally relevant and the discussion goes on.

What is particularly interesting in the readers' responses? What seems to be the most important feature for the further study of the problems of social progress, taking into consideration the discussions in which we have participated, the time which has passed, and the changes in our society and throughout the world within this compressed period of time?

In reading those letters, which are quite varied in terms of content and evaluations, we are bound to note their characteristic feature: the "philosophical" trend which has been triggered, obviously, by the need for an original interpretation of new slogans and ideas and the need to find in them answers not only to the question of "how to do it?" but also "why," and "what will be the outcome?" This may be possibly be symptomatic and characteristic of the present in a double sense: as a manifestation of the growing involvement of the masses in "big politics," which asserts the rights of man to have independent views on basic world conceptual problems, and as an aspiration to run the ideological credo through the crucible of "active life," and to see the coupling of theoretical postulates with the dramatic realities of the contemporary world. This general trend in the letters also determines the nature of our dialogue with the readers.

### I

One of the key starting concepts in the theses under discussion is the "crisis of civilization." This concept has still not acquired a permanent status in domestic social science and triggers a variety of interpretations among foreign researchers. Not surprisingly, it is precisely this that has drawn the attention of the authors of many of the responses received by the editors. Their views on the "crisis of civilization" are also quite divergent.

Some authors reject the very possibility of using this concept in the analysis and study of the nature of contemporary global processes. The characteristic arguments based on this viewpoint are presented by A. Galkin, doctor of historical sciences and prorector of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Social Sciences. Above all, he calls for specifying the type of civilization

we are discussing: general or specific, individual (such as the "industrial civilization"). If we are referring to general civilization, the reasons for the problems which face it are, according to A. Galkin, the disparity between the levels of accumulated knowledge and skills, on the one hand, and the level of moral maturity, the degree of efficiency of existing social structures, on the other. The solution is seen in reaching a higher level of civilization in international relations, in internal governmental policy and in interpersonal relations. In this case, the concept of a crisis "in general loses any specific meaning whatsoever."

If the term "crisis of civilization" implies a crisis in its "industrial variant," the latest version of Russianism, related to a withdrawal from the achievements of science and technology, return to physical labor and physical forms of consumption, and so on, turns out to be the "crisis-free alternative." The concept of the "crisis of civilization," according to A. Galkin, presumes the "acknowledgment of the erroneousness of the path followed by mankind in recent centuries and, consequently, the need to turn back or, at least, to turn to the side although, true, in an unknown direction." Is such a project for the world as a whole not utopian? And even more so, is it suitable for us, for our country, which is experiencing substantial material difficulties, to consider the medicine "which is offered experimentally to societies which are in danger of becoming "too fat?"

Many authors of responses, who oppose this viewpoint, not only acknowledge the legitimacy of the concept of "crisis of civilization" and its cognitive value but also try to make their contribution to its development and concretizing. "The dramatic growth and intensification of global problems," writes S. Krapivenskiy, Volgograd State University professor and philosopher, "largely determines the crisis of civilization and the existence and development of the latter raises a question as to the real possibilities of social progress."

V. Tancher, doctor of philosophical sciences and leading scientific associate at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy, considers that the "crisis concept" is useful in that it enables us to identify the "multidimensionality," the "polyphonic nature of social life." It has "greater forecasting opportunities than the unidirectional historical-deterministic" approach. It helps us to see the "landmarks along the new paths of social progress." V. Tancher relates the essence of the "crisis of civilization" not to contradictions in the area of the spirit (disparity between the levels of knowledge and morality) or theoretical reason and reality (level of knowledge and efficiency of social structures) but to conflicts which occur within the very life of mankind. They are manifested in the gap "between the conditions and the present relations among people, ways of life of mankind and the problems which can be solved...." Such clashes are manifested in their own way in the spiritual area as well.

Thus, the first question is posed: Which is the reality which reflects the concept of "crisis of civilization," and of what specific civilization is it a question? We shall return to this question later.

Many are those who relate refining and developing the concept of "crisis of civilization" to clarifying its reasons and its connection with the overall laws of social progress. Thus, V. Grizan believes that "the crisis of civilization should be linked not to the existence of global problems as such but, above all and essentially, to the crisis of the social organization, a functional consequence of which is the pressing problems of coexistence, resources, life supports, ecology, population, etc." In his view, the way to surmounting the crisis is the type of change in the social organization of contemporary societies which would indicate their reorientation from the principle of unlimited growth to the principle of optimizing and global conscious regulation of worldwide processes, including the creation of a universal "single socioethnic organism."

Conversely, N. Matorov, propagandist, Kuybyshev Aviation Institute, sees the sources of the crisis of civilization not in the development of any specific social system but in the full thousands of years old history of mankind, imbued with natural and social contradictions (both within the individual and on the level of the interaction between society and nature). For a number of objective reasons, contemporary civilization in both its capitalist and socialist aspects brought this contradiction to its peak, questioning man's ability to survive on earth. The solution is found in asserting an ideology and politics of global nonviolence (political, ideological, ecological, and so on) based on balancing the interests of all subjects of social life without exception.

A. Tavasiyev, docent at the MVTU imeni Bauman, also considers as erroneous the fact of "deriving" the crisis of civilization from the contradictions and essential features of an antagonistic type of social development. However, he sets forth arguments of a different order. To begin with, contradictions are a source of development rather than breakdown and threat to the survival of society. Second, contradictions within the antagonistic (capitalist) society itself obviously do not and, within the foreseeable future, obviously will not lead it to the brink of catastrophe as a system. According to A. Tavasiyev, however, the authors of the theses ascribe to such contradictions the ability to lead to the brink of catastrophe the entire human civilization, "a subsystem of which is the societies bearers of said contradictions. Third, historically existing socialism, to which such contradictions should not be inherent, not simply turned out to be a "victim" of the crisis of civilization but also made a tangible contribution to it and to the destructive exploitation of nature, to foreign political actions which aggravate the international situation and to defects in the mechanisms of the social reproduction of man.

The questions raised by A. Tavasiyev bring to light the link between the concept of "crisis of civilization" and

the exceptionally important problem, which has been insufficiently developed by our social scientists, of **correlation between the formative and civilizing aspects of the historical process**. Other authors as well consider this problem from various viewpoints.

This problem is formulated in a sharp almost antinomic form in the letter by S. Kanavenko, professor at the Kharkov Automotive-Highway Institute. On the one hand, he reaches the conclusion that "the concept of the formative progress of mankind, in the aspect in which it developed during the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries does not, under the new conditions, fully answer the most important problems of basic nature." "In that sense the new phenomena do not offer proof of the formative concept of development..." The struggle for surmounting the crisis of civilization and "the implementation of universal human interests is developing in its own channel which does not entirely coincide with the movement of society from capitalism to socialism. These processes are interconnected and act on a parallel basis." On the other hand, however, S. Kanavenko believes that the essence of social progress is not reduced to surmounting the crisis of civilization and does not stop there. The threats to the survival of mankind "greatly complicate the development of social progress," modifying its course at the contemporary stage. Nonetheless, the conclusion contained in the "theses" on the impossibility of further global development in the same directions along which it took place so far and converting it to "the other track of progress" seems erroneous to the author. "The struggle for the solution of universal human problems of our time is interwoven with the struggle waged by the people against class oppression and for national independence, democracy and socialism."

**And thus, we have yet another group of questions: Will the struggle for surmounting the crisis of civilization and the formative development of mankind follow parallel or crossing, merging paths? What in them is "primary," and what is a prerequisite and a premise for the other? Does the solution of the problems exceed the logic of the "either-or" framework?**

Sverdlovsk reader A. Vatoropin is absolutely categorical in his answer: "...The implementation of the idea of a nonviolent world is possible only if a nonantagonistic society is established on a global scale." In principle, the establishment of a new civilization is based on the social reorganization of mankind and the appearance of its formative (nonantagonistic) single system. At the present time, however, universal human interests may prevail as a result of the fact that, threatened by universal destruction, the antagonistic classes are forced "for a time" to abandon the pursuit of their basic interests. A kind of pause develops for the sake of solving the urgent problems related to civilization. However, A. Vatoropin goes on to say, "it is not difficult to assume a development of events—in any case it is entirely likely—according to which universal human interests will yield their priority to class interests if the threat of the destruction of mankind vanishes." In other words, the current stage of

historical development is characterized by an inversion: certain civilization changes, which ensure the survival of mankind, are a prerequisite for its further formative progress based on the "old model."

A different view is held by A. Gritsenko, senior scientific associate, Kharkov State University. He traces the changes in contemporary capitalism which "having become overgrown is made to fit a new social order," and the transformation of historically existing socialism. He notes in both social systems an increasing, albeit specific, orientation toward man and it is precisely there that he sees "objective opportunities for surmounting confrontation and developing an interrelationship" between them. This means that formative changes, which operate here as internal formative development, become a prerequisite for surmounting the present crisis of civilization and the survival of mankind.

**This, therefore, takes us to the third group of complex problems: How to find the ways for leaving the crisis behind us and taking the path to progress?**

In order to understand the views held by the various sides and refine our position on this key problem of world politics it becomes necessary to go back to the start of the dialogue with the readers: to a discussion of the concept of "crisis of civilization."

## II

The crisis of **what type** of civilization are we discussing? Universal human civilization, precisely. However, it hardly makes any sense to view it abstractly, ignoring the features which it possesses at one stage or another in universal history, at least until this history has become truly universal as the practical result of social progress. Therefore, **universal human civilization in the contemporary world is viewed as an industrial civilization**. In this sense, and in this context, the suggested pitting of "universal human" against "industrial" civilization is wrong.

Does such a view mean a rejection of variety in the world? Not at all. Numerous local, regional civilizations have their unique features and inner laws of development. Contemporary industrial civilization, however, is the "air" through which they obtain their "specific weight," a defined trajectory of historical motion and a way of participation in global processes. Frequently, entering the "air of industry" develops into most dramatic consequences for them. In other cases, this status updates previously concealed potentials, leading to highly efficient combinations of the general logic of industrialization with local traditions.

But what does "industrial civilization" mean, and how to characterize its essence? If we proceed from the already suggested criteria and the human dimension of social progress, the "genetic code" of industrialization should be sought in the foundations of human life, in the mass type of industrialization. The hypostasis of **labor** is the individual worker who is the subject of a divided

activity; in the hypostasis of **consumption** we find the "economic individual." This type of person is both a prerequisite and a result of the overall social activeness, obeying the principle of "production for its own sake," the universal usefulness in the case of which nothing is given "as something **greater in itself** and legitimate in itself" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 46, part I, p 387. Subsequent references to this edition will indicate volume and page only). This presumes, as a means of filling part of this circle of usefulness the **conquering** of nature, another ethnic group or an intellectual-spiritual value.

No civilization has been so inventive and free in defining its means of activities as the industrial, and as dogmatic and nonoptional in terms of its objectives. In the case of an industrial civilization such a purpose, protected from the question "why?" which can destroy its logic means an unrestrained growth of material wealth. This dictates the choice of the path of development which is based on the principle of the maximum rather than the optimum. It is only an awareness locked within the logic of industrial civilization itself that can consider this type of development as the only possible one, based on the evolution of production forces, science and technology **as such**. Meanwhile, the unrestrained trade growth stems from the **specific historical type of production forces**, essentially characterized by the fact that live labor is subordinated to materialized labor and, furthermore, the conversion of the former from a "dominant single principle over it (over production—author)" into a "factor which is merely one of the links in the system and the unity of which is found not in workers but in the live (active) machine system which acts in terms of the isolated and insignificant activity of the worker and as a counterbalance to it, as a most powerful organism" (vol 46, part II, p 204). **Reducing the individual to the role of production factor with its "insignificance" within the given system of production forces is what determines, within the range of this system and of the options, human activities which are made to fit a system of straight infinite growth and deliberate lack of alternatives.** Materialized labor, which dominates current labor can only grow but not choose what it is to be. In that sense in the industrial civilization which, in Marx's time coincided with bourgeois society, "the past dominates the present," whereas the long-term development of mankind is linked to the fact that "the present will dominate the past" (vol 4, p 439).

The historical development of industrial civilization had three results, considered most important from the viewpoint of contemporary global problems.

First, being unlimited according to its inner logic, it reached the edge of the survival of mankind on the planet, i.e., the limits of human evolution as a whole and the interaction between mankind and nature **on the basis of this logic**. It turned out that conquest, and violence in general, are fraught with global catastrophe both in terms of relations among nations and the exploitation of

nature. It became clear that there nonetheless is something which is "right for its own sake," and not only as a function of the expansion of the industrial system: the harmony of nature, the independence and right to a choice by the people of spiritual and moral values. It is the violation of such values that threatens with a breakdown the very foundations of the human community.

Second, the blending of industrial civilization with the bourgeois type of social development was violated. The unifying trend in the capitalist production method created "a world in its own image and semblance," and triggered, beyond its historical homeland, clashes and contradictions which encouraged the various societies to seek, in V.I. Lenin's words, "a different transition to the creation of the basic postulates of civilization" ("*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 45, p 380). These alternatives, among which the socialist development variant was singled out after 1917, rejected the **capitalist-formative** unity of the world but took place within the general "air" of the **industrial civilization**.

It turned out that the conditions for surmounting (or bypassing) capitalist formative mechanisms of development were not identical to the conditions for going beyond the limits of industrial civilization. The latter presumes above all the **transformation of man from a production factor into a "predominant single principle"**, from performer to organizer, controller and regulator of production, from a subject of direct labor into a subject of general, creative labor, coming closer to independent activities and, in the final account, a "self-seeking aim" of social development, a "self-value" which dominates all other values in the world. The "bypassing" which is necessary for such a cultural-historical development of the labor subject and for the conditions governing its activities, as being possible only within the framework of an industrial civilization, turned out unrealistic regardless of the option of formative progress. In this context we can say that the "birthmarks" inherited by the socialist source of development, with which G. Shakhnazarov justifiably classifies not auxiliary negative consequences of capitalism (such as crime) but "fundamental... features of the social system" (KOMMUNIST No 3, 1989, p 71) are attributes of industrial civilization. Commodity production and the marketplace, and representative democracy and pluralism are all, in themselves, indications not of a capitalist system but of an industrial civilization, without which there can be no full development of man and society via any one of the available ways of advancing toward it. Therefore, a great deal of that which we classified as the values of a given social system and, therefore, even rejected, sometimes not considering it a value (from the institutions of democracy to scientific achievements such as cybernetics and genetics) are today justifiably described as universal gains of civilization. However, such characteristic features of industrial civilization should also include a utilitarian attitude toward nature and the aspiration to create a world "in our own image and semblance," which turns into the global question of "who whom?" and an



orientation toward the cloning of man as a performer.... Naturally, within each of those options all the features have acted with different degrees of intensiveness and specific formative features.

Third, the development of industrial civilization led in its centers to the birth of processes of scientific and technical transformation of social life. Obeying the systemic logic of industrialization and appearing within it, the scientific and technical revolution began with changes in the material components of production forces. At its present stage, however, it has already become quite clear that **the main content of scientific and technical development is the shaping of a new type of labor subject**, which is no longer the "principal agent of the production process" and which is established alongside it" (vol 46, part II, p 213). Under these circumstances the "labor-capital" contradiction assumes a different aspect. Now it becomes a contradiction between the objectively necessary quality of labor and the political-economic form of its application, a contradiction between the objective requirements toward the worker as an autonomous individual and the hired nature of labor and its alienation. We cannot exaggerate the extent of progress along this way. However, it becomes even less conceivable to understand the contemporary world without having realized or studied this phenomenon to its end. Without this it is impossible to structure the management of contemporary production, to improve the system of social relations and to formulate a realistic and efficient policy. Nor is it possible, without this, consciously to contribute to the survival of mankind and to progress.

Should we discuss in detail the fact that the world has reached only the beginning of such processes and that in each of the formative options of an industrial civilization such beginnings meet specific obstacles, triggering new contradictions and yielding quite disparate results? Is it necessary specifically to stipulate that industrialism can be surmounted not by rejecting its achievements but by restraining, transforming and including them as part of the necessary elements within the system of the new civilization? The "crisis-free alternative" is not one of pitting irrationalism against science, or physical forms of consumption against the marketplace, a return to physical labor against contemporary technologies, a primitive authoritarian collectivism against pluralistic democracy, etc. It is a question of a new level of development of science, technology, the marketplace and democracy which, once reached, could encompass within their contemporary forms both "individual manifestations" of a more general and richer content, in the way Einstein's physics includes Newton's mechanics.

No, unlike the conclusions drawn by some of our opponents, we do not believe that the concept of the "crisis of civilization," presented in the theses, means an admission that the path along which mankind has advanced for the past few centuries has been the wrong one, and that it is necessary to turn back or to branch out. We proceed from the fact that **one of the historically natural**

**forms of civilization in the progress of mankind has exhausted its possibilities and is experiencing a crisis, for which reason it needs a natural change to a new form and to a different type of development, made naturally ready by the entire course of history.** Such a change means progress but in another element.

We know that crisis and catastrophe are not one and the same. Crisis includes a catastrophe as one of its possibilities, which takes place if society is not only unable to live according to the old style but is unable to find the way to the new one. Another possibility is that of the restructuring of society. In that case the crisis is merely a necessary feature of its renovation, of its social progress. The meaningful analysis of a social crisis presumes a specific determination of which one of its aspects (regardless of their interconnection)—the formative or the civilizing—is subject to a crisis, and what are the truly existing mechanisms for surmounting it, available at the given stage.

### III

The shaping of such mechanisms is a major component of social progress. The effectiveness of their action is characterized by the preservation and retention, in converting from one level of progress to another, of the increasing cultural stock acquired by mankind and, subsequently, its enrichment. The death of the world of antiquity and the conversion to a feudal system in Europe were paralleled by the virtually total destruction of the civilization of antiquity in its material and spiritual manifestations. The revolution of the modern times embodies a significantly more complex mechanism of social renovation, which makes it possible to carry out formative changes while preserving the most important achievements of European cultural development, on which subsequent industrial civilization was based. The peculiarity of social progress at the present stage is that the problem of the civilized reorganization of mankind under the conditions of the preservation of the key formative characteristics of its main branches is being solved and must be solved.

This requires profound and truly revolutionary changes in the mechanisms of social progress. It is a question not of any given tactical maneuver, the purpose of which would be, once the crisis situation has been surmounted, to return to the models provided by the history of modern times, but of an objective law which must be reflected in the strategic concepts oriented toward advancement under the conditions of a postindustrial civilization. As M.S. Gorbachev said in his United Nations speech, "two great revolutions—the French of 1789 and the Russian of 1917—had a powerful impact on the very nature of the historical process, radically changing the course of global events.... It is precisely they that largely shaped also the way of thinking which currently prevails in public awareness. This is the greatest possible spiritual wealth. Today, however, a different world appears before us, which requires the search of new ways into the future. We must search,



naturally, relying on acquired experience but also seeing the basic differences between that which was yesterday and that which is happening today."

The orientation toward nonviolence is the common denominator of such changes in the mechanisms of social progress. This is not simply a means of preserving the formative nature of capitalism and socialism as it developed in the preceding historical stages, under the conditions of the nuclear age. It is a **principle of their restructuring**, which opens the opportunity for entering the postindustrial era.

Surmounting the crisis of civilization and the social renovation of mankind are inseparable from each other precisely because in the postindustrial era no single system can function while remaining as it is now, limiting itself mainly to "superstructural" corrections. The crisis of civilization is not simply one of "worsening circumstances" in the formative process. The development of systems and their internal formative restructuring pass precisely through changes in the foundations of the civilization of the human community. This is the only possible path to progress.

The contemporary situation in the restructuring of civilization sets a new contradiction in the center of our age. The formative process of mankind does not now depend on the outcome of the confrontation between capitalism and socialism (in their "classical" industrial condition). **G. Cherkasov**, head of the department of philosophy and scientific communism at the Komi State Pedagogical Institute, believes, justifiably in our view, that the focal point of the age is the conflict "between the two methods (types, forms) of development and the solution of social contradictions: the antagonistic, which leads to the gross physical (according to Marx) clash among people and the nonantagonistic, which presumes the conscious regulation (planning, democracy, political standards and other attributes of the developed subjective factor)." What is meant by "antagonism" is not the indicator of the substantiation and depth of contradictions but a certain **type**, to which the destruction of one of the sides is the only prerequisite for its resolution, i.e., a type embodied in the class struggle in a "Pugachev style," so to say. The opposite of this is **development as a form of elimination of contradictions, as both sides raise to another quality.**

The formative nature of capitalism and socialism, which has passed through the crucible of civilizing transformation, does not doom them a priori to be the bearers of any one specific way of development in the international arena or in the internal life of the individual countries. The struggle for the existence of one method of development or another is developing both within the framework of individual formative societies of different types as well as on the scale of the world as a single entity.

Can this struggle be reduced to the conflict between labor and capital or between the bourgeoisie and the working class, in terms of which all other social forces could be considered only as allies and "fellow travelers?" This is

no simple question. Its study calls for taking into consideration at least two major circumstances.

First. In the 20th century relations between labor and capital also obeyed the common logic of development of bourgeois society, which was formulated by V.I. Lenin as follows: "Some basic features of capitalism have begun to convert into their opposite" (op. cit., vol 27, p 385). The current phase of the scientific and technical revolution provided a new round of such a conversion compared to the stage of transition from pre-monopoly capitalism to imperialism. For the sake of its self-preservation and development, the capitalist production method cannot fail to provide ever greater scope for independent principles in the functioning of the worker, the enrichment of his individuality and forms of involving the working people in the production process which exceed the limits of strictly hired-labor relations.

Not only are the redistribution mechanisms modified, a process which does not stop with a neoconservative wave. Also modified are the ways and means of the industrial consumption of manpower and its social reproduction, increasingly deviating from the shape which is prescribed to it by the law governing the existence of manpower as a commodity. In the opinion of N. Osipov, candidate of economic sciences, from Magnitogorsk, it begins to assume "both the properties of a commodity and of a noncommodity." Naturally, this is a question of no more than trends which are appearing only within the range of a relatively narrow circle of "scientific and technical revolution cadres," as an element of the modern overall worker. However, this is also an indication of the possible trend in the modification of relations between labor and capital, a modification precisely, but not an elimination. For the key forms of alienation of labor, related to its subordination to capital and defining the formative nature of this type of social development—from the labor product and means and to conditions for a thorough organization—are retained. The contradiction between labor and capital is transformed but does not disappear; this contradiction assumes, to a large extent, new forms. Its subject becomes less the cost of manpower than the possible influence of workers on management, use of means of production, control over the functioning and shifting of capital, for this determines the labor conditions and the very possibility of working. The question is whether it is possible in principle, within the framework of capitalism, to resolve the contradiction between the need for labor and the labor subject of a different quality compared with the past, between an interested, creative labor, and the political-economic form of its implementation, while preserving its status as hired labor. Capitalism has repeatedly proved its ability to resolve or to transform contradictions and, by this token, softening their sharpest angles. However, in this case as well it is a question of the following: surmounting hired labor, even partially and inconsistently, would change the essential characteristics of capitalism and its foundations.

Second. The industrial civilization developed in the formative environment of capitalism, the development of its basic contradiction and the formative types of alienation related to it determined the development as an organic entity not only the production method but the entire bourgeois-industrial society with its specific civilization hypostasis. Contradictions and types of alienation of a special kind **develop on the level of this systemic integrity**, carrying within them the contradiction between labor and capital in its as though "transformed" and summed aspect: the alienation of man (and not only of the proletariat) from nature and from the cultural and historical roots which fed him the juices not only of national but also of global spiritual life and the rights and opportunities for exercising a moral sovereignty over the evolution of science and technology, which develops into the threatening domination of the technological mind over the sensible person and over the purpose of his life and, finally, responsibility for his own destiny and life on the planet, which is expressed in a concentrated fashion in the reality of the threat of a nuclear apocalypse.

In establishing the genetic and functional relations between formative and civilizing types of alienation, we must not forget that the means of their existence and development are not identical. Contemporary capitalism proved the possibility of raising its formative contradictions to a new level and making changes thanks to which its existence as a social system is retained for the foreseeable future. So far, however, no ways of transforming the contradictions of civilization have been found, which raises the question of the survival of mankind as a whole. Capitalism "within itself" could not find such means of civilizing restructuring, for both the obstacles and opportunities of creating them are found within the laws and contradictions of the dynamics of the **world as a whole**, i.e., they are manifested and operate on a different, on a higher level of the systemic organization of mankind compared to any one of its formative "subsystems."

The problem is not even the fact that the civilizing contradictions cannot be automatically eliminated by solving the formative contradiction between labor and capital, even if this were possible. The problem is that resolving this formative contradiction (as a process) can take place only through and in the aspect of solving civilizing contradictions. The surmounting of the crisis of civilization is a necessary aspect of the inner logic of social progress as a movement toward freedom. In the contemporary world the key to the elimination of all types of alienation and **the form of this elimination itself** involve the elimination of civilization models of alienation. The struggle for such objectives presumes a deployment, grouping and correlation among sociopolitical forces other than the struggle between labor and capital.

But even in that case, the authors of several responses to the theses ask, puzzled, what relation does all of this have to the problems of the internal development of socialism,

our deficits, disorganization of the market, and undermining of the basic incentives for labor and, therefore, labor discipline which, taking global practices into consideration, were developed by the industrial society of yesterday or even the day before? Could it be that in our country the shaping of a normally functioning industrial system and by no means its elimination and a thrust toward a postindustrial world could be on the agenda?

Obviously, a positive answer to this question would significantly simplify our perestroika tasks. However, it would hardly be accurate. To begin with, without our postindustrialization in its ecological, military-political and global economic aspects, it would be inconceivable to surmount the global crisis of civilization precisely as a consequence of the interdependence within the contemporary world.

As **A. Yablokov**, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member, wrote about one of these aspects, "our ecological trouble is assuming an international dimension." This becomes clearer against the background showing that in terms of the use of nature the leading capitalist countries "are implementing ideas which are more socialist in nature than in our domestic practices." The reverse consequences of this inability to solve the problem in terms of our own development are obvious.

Second, we know that the water in a river does not flow twice. We cannot simply return to a "correct" industrialization oriented toward the consumer, after its structure was erected on the basis of a different layout. The time factor, the trends of global development, the scarcity of resources and the degree of social tension in society do not allow us to restructure it, to copy the blueprints for developing a "correct" industrialization, as tested in the West. The only thing left is to initiate with the existing industrial base a conversion to a postindustrial economy. Is this utopia? Yes, if we plan the type of conversion according to models which call for the scientific and technical modernization based on a "correct" Western industrialization within the same sociocultural context and the same human material inherent in the West, i.e., proceeding on the reorganization of the material and technical base of production to new forms of organization of labor and development of a different type of worker.

However, this may not be utopia if we seriously try to implement the Leninist strategy of a "different transition to laying the fundamental premises for civilization." Possibly, our scientific and technical reorganization will advance not only by importing computers, alien to the sociocultural infrastructure of society, but as a result of changes in that same infrastructure. Probably the link which would enable us to pull the entire chain is the active assistance of a trend we mentioned: the shaping of a new worker, independent and self-organizing, possessing precisely the characteristics which are consistent with the postindustrial type of output.

Is this once again subjectivism, once again the shaping of "sensible needs" and "personality planning?" God forbid! But is it possible to reach the target through a way different from that of the West: not by converting man into an appendix to the machine, with the disciplining power of hunger, Taylorism, Fordism, and the patronage of the "welfare state," based on the effect of objective laws of economic development rather than ignoring them?

It is perhaps not accidental that in V.I. Lenin's "testament" the idea of a "different transition" to civilization is linked to a definition of socialism as being a "system of civilized members of cooperatives," developing under the conditions of commodity-monetary relations. This would apply to a cooperative which is not a temporary measure for patching an economic tear, not a concession to the sluggishness of the human material and even less so an auxiliary authority serving the governmental economic sector. No, this would be a strategic target, a **universal cooperative**, developed in its specific forms in the various economic sectors and parts in the country, and in the different stages of development of the socialist alternative. This would be precisely a strategic objective, for it would combine the solution of two problems or, rather, would combine them into one: coming closer to the socialist ideal by combining labor with ownership and developing man as the main productive force. This does not clash with the logic of the natural transition from an industrial to a scientific and technical civilization but, conversely, is consistent with it to a greater extent than is hired labor alienated from the means of production.

Universal cooperativization is the solution to the great contradiction which was encountered by socialist philosophy in an industrial society: the contradictions between social justice and economic efficiency, and between protecting the working people and stimulating their development. The solution of contradictions was not achieved by replacing bourgeois economic relations, which urged development, with command-administrative coercion. A condition for such a solution could be found only in the conversion to a different historical logic: replacing external coercion as such with a motivation for self-development. But it was that same trend which, in the course of its development and as it covered the necessary stages, that led beyond the framework not only of the formative features of capitalism but also the civilizing features of industrialization. That is why at its very first (subsequently interrupted) stage, this trend linked the Russian NEP with the global NEP, promoting a transition to an inner "civilian world" as the foundation and prerequisite for universal cooperativization and for a cooperative of diversified mankind, which looks at "Russia not as an egotistical center which destroys all other economies, the economies of other countries... but a Russia which calls for restoring the economy from the viewpoint of the entire world" (V.I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 42, p 70).

Was this a paradoxical concept in a situation in which, the Civil War had just ended and when a long and difficult path remained to be walked even to Genoa and Rapallo? However, the point is precisely that historical paradoxes, unlike logical errors, establish the real possibilities and need for replacing the types of social development and converting them to a different system of coordinates. They are symptomatic of profoundly revolutionary situations. Such is the nature of our perestroika as well. The solution of its key problems could be, as we pointed out, only paradoxical: undertake a broad reorientation of the economy in favor of the consumer and of scientific and technical progress and start, if you wish, with postindustrialization.

#### IV

The conversion of global social development to another system of coordinates, related to the crisis of industrial civilization, urgently raised the question of the criteria of social progress. The authors of a number of letters share the viewpoint expressed in the theses, according to which the extent of development of man himself is such a criterion.

At the same time, the view is quite widespread that the consideration of the universal nature of man as a criterion of social progress is accurate only as it applies to the communist system, and that the development of production forces was and remains the general sociological criterion of progress. Some authors, such as E. Klesov, docent at the Belorussian State University imeni V.I. Lenin, oppose the very idea of the universalization of man as a criterion and a guideline of progress for, in their view, "the appeal for universality is also an appeal for the equalization among people and of their activities;" "man is not universal: he is individual, specific and unique;" in practical terms, universality indicates nothing other than lack of professionalism, incompetence and dilettantism.

In this connection, the following should be made clear:

First. Within the framework of the Marxist theory, the development of production forces (if we do not interpret them in a mechanistic, in a technical way) and the development of man cannot be pitted one against the other as criteria of social progress for the simple reason that "production forces and social relations are both different aspects of the development of the social individual...." (vol 46, part II, p 214). The fact that at certain stages in history, as a result of alienation production forces are pitted against man and assume "as though a material aspect and are, to those same individuals, no longer the power of individuals but the power of private property...." (vol 3, p 67) is a different matter. The opposite of this phenomenon is the fact that man develops "not integrally" but "in only one specific area." Therefore, the pitting of the development of production forces against the development of man as a criterion of progress is not simply a theoretical illusion but also a reflection of the **contradiction** within the social form of

human development, reflecting the specific historical stage. However, in establishing this contradiction we must not forget, Marx emphasized, that capitalist "production for its own sake as well is nothing other than the development of the production forces of mankind, i.e., **the development of the wealth of human nature is a self-seeking purpose**" (vol 26, part II, p 123).

Second. The universalization of man has nothing in common with his dilettantism. Labor specialization, based on the nature of its **subject**, not only is not eliminated but acquires a richer meaning in the course of the development of society and the individual. The concept of universalization presumes something else: first, increased variety, wealth and dynamics of the human relations of man, which trigger the development of his needs, interests, capabilities and possibility of self-realization; second, the progressive mastery of conditions and factors of an increasingly powerful and creative influence on the surrounding natural and social world and the increasingly powerful influence in applying specific steps concerning the object, not only to the extent of "immediate physical need" (vol 42, p 93). Therefore, universalization is something directly opposite to equalization and depersonalization of people. This is a trend of enrichment of the individuality and humanizing of the "world of man" and the growth of freedom.

Third. A turn from a situation in which labor was intermediary in the influence of machines on the object, acting only as its appendix, to the point where the labor means is an intermediary in the activities of the worker who retains the creative functions of planning, organization and regulation of the production process (see vol 46, part II, pp 203, 218) is a major landmark. However, we must not ignore the fact that prerequisites for such a turn appear significantly earlier, are accumulated in history and develop a certain trend. As Marx noted, working in a factory in the 19th century already "begins to require a universality, an aspiration toward the comprehensive development of the individual" (vol 4, p 160). Furthermore, the general logic of development of bourgeois society goes through a complex system of contradictions, for "in the unrestrained aspiration to a universal form of wealth, capital chases labor beyond the limits determined by the nature of the requirements of the worker, thus creating the material elements for the development of a rich individuality which is equally comprehensive in terms of production and consumption, and labor which, therefore, acts no longer as labor but as the full development of reality itself..." (vol 46, part I, p 281). Furthermore, this is an **essential** trend on the level of the socialist future, for "private ownership can be destroyed only with the all-round development of individuals..." (vol 3, p 441).

The new feature of our age is that the implementation of the principle "not at the expense of man" has not only become an imperative for survival but is presented as an objective opportunity for the further development of mankind. Therefore, the extent of humanizing politics,

economics and conceptual systems has become the most important indicator of their progressive nature and viability in the 21st century and a universal criterion of social progress.

#### Footnote

1. See A. Bovin "New Thinking—New Policy" (No 9, 1988); I. Usachev, "The Universal Human and Class Features in World Politics" (No 11, 1988); Yu. Krasin, "The Labor Movement In Search of a Democratic Alternative" (No 14, 1988); G. Shakhnazarov, "East-West. On the Question of Deideologizing Intergovernmental Relations" (No 3, 1989); V. Gerns and R. Shtaygervald, "Democratic Alternative and Antimonopoly Strategy" (No 4, 1989); A. Ivanov, N. Kirabayev, I. Malkovskaya and Ye. Nitsyn, "More Innovation and Daring" (No 6, 1989); and L. Mitrokhin, "Marxists and Christians" (No 7, 1989).

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### Toward the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on Improving Nationality Relations in the USSR

#### National Self-Determination: Concept and Implementation

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[Article by Aleksandr Yevgenyevich Zharnikov, candidate of philosophical sciences, scientific secretary of the department of scientific communism of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism]

[Text] Soviet researchers in the field of national problems are facing today a difficult question: What is the reason for the tension which appeared in our country? What are the origins of conflicts among nationalities, unprecedented in this country and, on the surface at least, unexpected. We usually point out the array of accumulated problems: serious deformations in the development of national and international processes, the negative legacy of the past, subjectivism, theoretical errors which created the thesis that the national problem had been totally solved in the USSR, etc. This is indeed so but is this not the consequence of another, a more profound reason, the influence of which generated the possibility of deformations and exaggerations?

#### 1

The basic prerequisite for the present national tension is seen by many as being the Stalinist distortion of Lenin's ideas. In their view, the heart of the matter is as follows: in December 1922 the party officially rejected the idea of national autonomy, which consisted of the unification of non-Russian people with Russia as the "elder brother." Although the Leninist concept of an equal union among equal peoples was adopted, after assuming power, in the

final account Stalin implemented his own autonomization plan under a different name. But if this is indeed the case, what made the victory of the Stalinist plan possible? And how, if such is the case, are we to explain the fact that by no means all of the conflicts among nationalities, which we have witnessed in our country are related to the specific nature of the existing national-governmental structure? For along with the problems on the "republic-center" level we come across clashes among nationalities within the republics themselves.

Is it not logical to assume that the disproportions and distortions which are now revealed in a great variety of aspects of national policy are caused by the deformation of its key, its fundamental principle. What is this principle?

Unquestionably, 1922 was a particular landmark in the history of the country's national relations. However, in order to see more clearly the complex and contradictory underlining, which preceded the founding of the USSR, we should probably look at earlier events. In this case the year 1919 appears to be much more important, for at the beginning of that year the 8th RKP(b) Congress adopted the second party program, a special section of which dealt with national policy. The main differences and debates broke out at that time on the principle of the self-determination of nations.

At that congress Lenin was virtually alone among the speakers who systematically and to the end defended the right of nations to self-determination. This principle had already been codified in the first party program and at that time had not triggered any serious objections. What had taken place, and why was it that after the revolution the majority of the then party leaders (people whose sincerity was unquestionable) nonetheless made an energetic effort to reject it?

In order to restore the logic which guided them we should probably consider not only what they opposed but what they favored and, above all, what was the reason for which they adopted precisely these views.

Here are some of the most characteristic excerpts from the discussion which broke out at that time:

**N.I. Bukharin:** "The concept of nation includes all classes of a given society. Therefore, since today we have charted a course of proletarian dictatorship, it seems to me that we cannot raise the slogan of the right of nations to self-determination....

"In the work of the commission, on the basis of the statement made by Comrade Stalin at the 3rd Congress of Soviets, I suggested the following formula: self-determination of the toiling classes of each nationality" ("Vosmoy Syezd RKP(b). Protokoly" [8th Congress of the RKP(b). Minutes]. GIPL, Moscow, 1959, p 47).

**D.B. Ryazanov:** "Our party is totally unprepared to analyze the question of the right of nations to self-determination.... Little has been done in our country

from the political point of view so that, suddenly coming across this slogan, we are taking a risk not only on the international but also on the internal, Russian scale. This could lead to unexpected and undesirable consequences" (ibid., p 69).

**G.L. Pyatakov:** "...Since we are economically uniting, building a single apparatus and a single Higher Council of the National Economy, a single management of railroads, a single bank, and so on, all this famous 'self-determination' is not worth a broken egg. It is either simply a diplomatic game which must be played in some cases or, worse, assuming that we start looking at it seriously" (ibid., pp 80-81).

**M.P. Tomskiy:** "I think that no one in this hall would say that the self-determination of nations and a national movement would be normal and desirable. Our attitude toward it is an attitude toward an inevitable ill" (ibid., p 82).

**N. Osinskiy:** The destruction of all oppression "does not mean that we must reject the right of the nations to separate and settle their own destiny, for this is a conventional, a demonstrative slogan and we have resorted to such slogans repeatedly during the first period of the proletarian movement" (ibid., p 90).

Was the view which prevailed at the 8th Congress merely the result of individual errors? We do not believe so; it had prerequisites, both social and theoretical, and the two were closely intertwined.

In order better to verify the nature of contradictory historical facts, which played a major role in reducing the principle of national self-determination to mere statements, we must not forget another essential detail: the realm of national relations, determined, in the final account, by socioeconomic development, also has a relative autonomous value. The national factor (largely thanks to its ethnic aspect) is historically more durable, more "conservative." For example, a nation could change socially, converting from one system to another while retaining its "national nationality," i.e., its ethnic aspect (language, cultural features, national traditions, customs, characteristic mentality, etc.). The particular historical durability of the national factor includes the real possibility of noncoincidence, of disharmony between the socioeconomic and the national development of the society. The founders of Marxism-Leninism considered the contradictory nature between the social and national factors above all as being of a class nature, related to the division of nations into antagonistic classes. The founders of Marxism also suggested a proper way of eliminating this contraction. Actually, it is found in the "*Communist Party Manifesto*," in the thesis to the effect that the proletariat "should rise to the status of a national class, should be constituted as a nation..." (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 4, p 444).

From the viewpoint of the classical theory of revolution, based on the victory of the revolution in the most developed capitalist countries, such an approach would

have been natural. In that case the "proletarian nation" would be the only possible solution of the problem. However, the socialist revolution won not in industrially developed countries but in Russia, a semifeudal multinational country, the majority of whose ethnic groups had no working class whatsoever. Under those circumstances, there could not even be a question of any kind of national consolidation "on a proletarian basis." As a result, Russian reality itself formulated the objective contradiction between socialism and national development on an entirely different level. Its elimination could no longer be based on the old, the classical foundation.

The qualitatively new realities, which did not fit the old theoretical framework but were, as in the past, assessed on their basis, were what led to the formulation at the 8th Congress of the concept of the "self-determination by the working people" within each nation. However, another opinion existed as well, that of the practical lack of need for self-determination. It proceeded less from said theoretical postulates than the heterogeneous nature of social reality. Was the principle of self-determination of nations realistic in general in the case of Russia, whose peoples stood at great many different levels of development? Under those circumstances the "realists" could go for strict centralization. The self-determination of nations, however, was considered by them as suspect, as a potentially threatening division.

At the 8th RKP(b) Congress, however, in addition to those viewpoints there was one more, presented by V.I. Lenin. After the revolution he had reinterpreted a number of problems based on reality, including this one. It appeared as though the impeccable Marxist thesis of the self-determination of the "proletariat within the nations" ("*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 25, p 292) was becoming unacceptable at that moment. "Abandoning the self-determination of nations and replacing it by the self-determination of the working people is entirely erroneous..." (op. cit., vol 38, p 160). He also said: "If we say that we do not acknowledge the existence of any kind of Finnish nation but only toiling masses, this would be absolute nonsense. We cannot fail to acknowledge this for it will force us to acknowledge it" (ibid., p 161).

Although perfectly aware of the need for unity, nonetheless V.I. Lenin categorically opposed the course of rigid centralization from above. "When Comrade Pyatakov said that the Ukrainian communists act in accordance with the directives of the RKP(b) Central Committee, I could not grasp the feeling behind those words. Was it regret? I cannot suspect Comrade Pyatakov of this feeling but the sense of his speech was the following: Why do we need all those self-determinations when we have a splendid Central Committee in Moscow! This is a childish viewpoint" (ibid., p 182). He also said: "...In the case of the national problem we cannot think that in all cases it must become an economic unity. Naturally, this we need! However, we must achieve it through propaganda, agitation and voluntary association" (ibid., p 183).

Subsequently, the idea of full and comprehensive democratization as the primary prerequisite for the solution of many problems, including the national, was to assume the main role in V.I. Lenin's theoretical and practical activities. As we know, it would lead to the idea of the NEP which, after "serious and lengthy" consideration, would lead to the creation of a variety of forms of socialist ownership. It is only on this basis that political democracy could develop. In the realm of relations among nationalities, this is the concentrated expression of the principle of self-determination. Without equality and democracy the real, i.e., the voluntary and firm unification among different nations is inconceivable.

Therefore, as early as the beginning of the 1920s, there were two conflicting approaches within the party concerning the future long-term development of an economically backward multinational country. The first proceeded from the need for maximally developing the democratic principle in all areas of life, the legitimate outcome of which was the principle of self-determination. The second relied on strict centralization; the concept of autonomization became its theoretical expression.

Until recently it was accepted to believe that V.I. Lenin, having subjected to annihilating criticism the idea of autonomization, had buried it once and for all. In reality, everything turned out to be more complex. It is a well-known fact that after Vladimir Ilich's death, in the final account, the trend toward a strict centralization of power prevailed. It triggered the command-administrative system, the destructive influence of which could not fail to affect national relations.

But what was the material foundation on which the inflexible durability of the command-administrative system developed, a system which converted the right of nations to self-determination into nothing but a slogan? And what were the real political forces which created and manifested it?

Relations between cause and consequence have already become a subject of close study. The elimination of the NEP, along with bourgeois property, actually eliminated the developing variety of forms of socialist ownership. This inevitably led to the statification of the means of production and, in turn, intensified centrifugal trends. We believe, however, that statification occurred in our country not only of the means of production but actually of entire areas of social life, including the national.

Everything belonged to the state and to the state alone. However, with a single and, furthermore, abstract owner (for if it belongs to everyone this means that it belongs to no one in particular), the self-reproducing and rapidly growing bureaucratic stratum becomes the spokesman for its will. As a result, not only the variety of forms of socialist ownership but also the variety of national interests were replaced by a variety of departmental interests, for the command-administrative system, and

the bureaucracy which expressed its interests are, essentially indifferent to national interests and values. The individual official could, naturally, love his people. He may be an internationalist or, conversely, may profess nationalistic views. However, as a separate social stratum which exercises the power, by virtue of its objective status the bureaucracy always puts departmental above national interests.

We know how worried V.I. Lenin was on the subject of the power of the bureaucracy. On the very day of the founding of the USSR it was precisely the bureaucracy, as a political force interested in and capable of destroying the shoots of democracy in national relations, that Vladimir Ilich pointed out. The danger of bureaucratic methods in national policy was noted also in some party documents. Thus, the resolution of the 12th RKP(b) Congress prophetically noted that "...The Union of Republics is considered by a significant percentage of Soviet officials, both centrally and locally, not as a Union of equal state units, the purpose of which is to ensure the free development of national republics, but as a step toward the elimination of such republics, as a beginning of the establishment of the so-called 'one and indivisible'."

As we can see, it is difficult to reduce the deep roots of existing international reality exclusively to the victory of the Stalinist plan for autonomization. Their real underlining is the victory of the command-administrative system with its inseparable bureaucratic militancy and the statification of national life. Stalin no longer needed to change the officially proclaimed principles of Union to autonomous structures. With the total omnipotence of the command-administrative system any type of national-state system (including the autonomous) was bound to be distorted. The development of any ethnic group, from the largest to the smallest would mandatorily yield to the pressure of the bureaucracy with its specific understanding of the task of the "blossoming and rapprochement" of nations. While still officially proclaimed, the principle of national self-determination inevitably turned into a beautiful slogan which no one could take seriously.

Naturally, we also achieved unquestionable successes in the realm of national relations. However, they were achieved not thanks to but rather despite the existing situation. Furthermore, we must not forget that the efficiency of the command-administrative system in general is limited merely to the framework of extreme situations which could, for instance, threaten the destruction of the country and require maximal concentration of all forces and possibilities. This makes it clear why the recent "relatively calm" decades were characterized, on the one hand, by socioeconomic stagnation and, on the other, the fast growth of national self-awareness, thus re-emphasizing the old dialectical contradiction between the social and national development of society.

It is legitimate to assume that the situation which has developed today in the realm of national relations is the result of the actual collapse of the command-administrative system. It is that same reason which largely determined the "precrisis condition" of our economy. The particular difficulty of the present situation is that the status has remained transitional: the concept of the qualitative restructuring of national policy is in the stage of development and its methods and instruments have still not been entirely defined.

Is this not one of the explanations for the attitude toward individuals of Russian origin, which has worsened in some areas? Let us take a realistic look at things. The command-administrative system, by emasculating the principle of national self-determination, replaced it with the concept of the "elder brother" not openly but purposefully. This met with some success. Today this stereotype has exhausted its possibilities but its rejection is difficult and, in frequent cases, painful. Under these circumstances the sins of the compromised system began to be linked in the ordinary mind to the concept of the "elder brother," i.e., they were transferred to the Russian people who themselves had suffered no less than the other (suffice it for example to look at our Nonchernozen). Unfortunately, there also appeared forces which, deliberately speculating on the problems of their people (who is without problems?), are trying to blame the "elder brother" as being the culprit. That is why the definitive dismantling of the discredited system and the abandonment of the old stereotypes are necessary prerequisites for the elimination of many of the tensions which have appeared and for the further development of a single multinational country.

2

What, in the realm of national relations, could be pitted against the command-administrative system? More democratization is the only option. However, in order for such democratization not to become, once again, an abstraction, it must also have legal guarantees and, above all, a material base. In the realm of national relations the role of such a guarantee could obviously be played only by an efficient mechanism for the protection of national values and interests. The importance of its formulation is defined not only by the needs of individual ethnic groups but of the country as a whole for, as we know, the "international" factor exists only if the "national" one is present. The one is inconceivable without the other in the same way that a strong center is inconceivable without strong republics.

However, the creation of efficient mechanisms for the protection of national and international values is possible only on the basis of a key, a starting principle: the principle of self-determination of nations. As M.S. Gorbachev noted at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, this principle, formulated by Lenin, was and remains one of the main elements of the national policy of the Communist Party.



Generally speaking, however, what does self-determination mean today? Before the revolution, V.I. Lenin believed that "Self-determination of nations" in a Marxist program **cannot** have, from the historical-economic viewpoint, any significance other than political self-determination and state autonomy and establishment of a national state" (op. cit., vol 25, p 263). However, he ascribed this understanding only "to all cases of bourgeois-democratic national movements" and to them only (ibid., p 268). Such an interpretation of self-determination was also related to the specific situation of a specific country—Russia—where there was no "drive on the part of 'aliens' to unification with the Great Russians, for fear of worse national oppression..." (ibid., p 271).

Is it accurate today, under qualitatively new historical and sociopolitical circumstances, to relate the self-determination of nations exclusively to statehood? Nonetheless it is frequently identified with that exclusive right of separation, in fact confusing it with state sovereignty and interpreting it, furthermore, one-sidedly. Is this not one of the reasons for the cautious attitude displayed toward this principle and the fear that it would not cement our unity but play a divisive role?

Indeed, appeals to convert to a confederative system are being based today on identifying national self-determination with state sovereignty, applying the yardsticks of the turn of the 20th century. It is presumed, in this case, that each republic should convert not simply to cost accounting but, essentially, become economically and politically separate, with its own currency, customs fees, armed forces, republic citizenship which includes meeting residence requirements, etc.

It would probably make no sense especially to argue with the supporters of a federal system. Suffice it to say that federations have not justified their existence historically; no such federations remain in their pure aspect. The profound trends in the development of mankind, such as the universal process of economic internationalization lead not to separation, as was the case during the period of "bourgeois-democratic national movements," but conversely require even greater unification. In terms of our specific reality, the following question is legitimate: How is a federal system conceived, in general, if all Soviet republics are multinational and in a number of them the so-called "nonaboriginal" population accounts for nearly one-half or, sometimes, even more than one-half of the entire population? Reality is reality. One may like it or not but one must take it into consideration.

I believe that life itself invests today in the understanding of the principle of national self-determination a more flexible and, at the same time, a clear and unequivocal content. This is nothing other than **self-management in the realm of national relations**. It is self-management within the framework of a single country but in a great variety of areas: in national-state relations, culture, linguistic life, national customs, traditions, etc. For it is

precisely the self-management principle that was enunciated, above all, by the command-administrative system in asserting comprehensive centralization and supreme diktat.

Does this mean that the concepts of "sovereignty" or "sovereign rights" have no longer any meaning? Naturally, it does not. One must simply shift the emphasis. Above all, we must not forget (as the supporters of a federation do) that "sovereignty" cannot be the exclusive prerogative of a Union republic. With equal justification one could speak of sovereign rights or, rather, of the restoration of sovereign rights of autonomous formations and administrative-territorial units. This has been pointed out in the currently discussed draft general principles for restructuring economic management and the social area in Union republics on the basis of expanding their sovereign rights, self-management and self-financing.

Another aspect is equally important. The concept of "sovereignty," related to the governmental or territorial-administrative aspects cannot, by virtue of this fact, reflect the entire variety of national life. This is self-management of only one of its areas which is important but not the only component of national self-determination. Therefore, today the question of the restoration of the Leninist principle of the self-determination of nations should be considered in its comprehensive variety and not reduced to any given specific feature. In this case we must also take into consideration the historical stage currently experienced by the country and the specific situation which has developed within it.

At this point, the need for the restoration and further development of the Leninist principles of sovereignty and self-determination is not exclusively theoretical. It is being felt increasingly and is being formulated practically by the public in our republics. Thus, in the days of the Georgian tragedy, in summing up the results of his talks with hundreds of people, E.A. Shevardnadze noted: "A great many people spoke of things such as sovereignty, independence and self-determination, knowledgeably, with previously unconceived erudition.... Their thoughts and suggestions certify to the accuracy of the conclusion reached by the party's and country's leadership concerning the need to draft a new Fundamental Law, which would be consistent with the true and not the imaginary realities and requirements of a union of republics and peoples, a union which could be the foundation for real trust among peoples."

Obviously, the question of restoring the sovereign rights of republics has become particularly pressing today for the reason that centralist omnipotence was manifested quite clearly on the level of national-state life. The "system" of republic management which was developed, structured on the basis of a strict supervision, centralized allocation of material facilities, and so on, is today

seriously clashing with the democratization process. The traditional pressure "from above" has not only lost its previous efficiency; a loss of faith in its implementation has led, in a number of cases, to real opposition "from below."

The problem, however, has also another aspect. The four types of national-state and territorial-administrative formations which exist in the country are of different quality, for their rights are by no means equal. Consequently, for the time being nor are the real possibilities of the individual ethnic communities, depending on where they live: in a Union or autonomous republic, in an autonomous oblast or an autonomous okrug.

Under these circumstances, the all-round development of self-management in the national-state area could, without remapping the borders, become a true means of the gradual elimination of the existing qualitative disparities in this case. In turn, this would contribute to the elimination of many other accumulated problems and encourage social and national justice further.

However, improvements in the national-governmental area cannot be achieved without solving economic problems. As we know, however, the process of statification affected, above all, the economy. The growing disproportions in the development of the unified national economic complex and the interests of a number of republics and ethnic groups became its major negative consequence. Their necessary interconnection was disrupted. The actual development of the economy took place as though it was happening not in a multinational country but in a country populated by a single ethnic group. This affected many aspects of national development and relations among nationalities.

The exceptional methods and pace of industrialization forced many Soviet peoples to adapt within a maximally short time to a developing industry with which they were previously unfamiliar. The idea that industry itself should adapt national traditions, labor preferences and skills was not considered at all.

One of the results of the omnipotence of the command-administrative system was the ecological situation, which became threatening for a number of ethnic groups. The situation affecting the ethnic groups in the Baltic republics became exceptionally difficult, marking the peak of activities of ministries and departments which occasionally behaved like multinational companies.

The following question arises: Is it realistic, in general, considering the existing situation, to create the type of instruments which would convert the principle of self-determination of nations from a statement to reality? And if so, on what practical basis could self-management take place in this case?

We believe that the currently discussed possible conversion of our republics to regional cost accounting and self-financing could play a greater role than that of a purely economic incentive. From the viewpoint of

national life it could become the specific material content of the principle of national self-determination on the republic level, for despite all possible difficulties and contradictions, this is a real and perhaps, for the time being, the only potentially possible alternative to the unjustified violation of the rights of republics and their self-governing principles.

Now, however, as we already pointed out, the task is not only one of restoring the sovereign rights of national-state and territorial-administrative formations. We must restore the principle of national self-determination in its full magnitude. This cannot be accomplished without solving an array of other problems.

The command-administrative system left negative marks in the area of culture, linguistic policy in particular. It may have seemed that the fact that there is no legislatively established single state language in the country (which is something which V.I. Lenin steadily opposed, for a state language means a language mandatory for all) would constitute an inviolable foundation for the free cultural development of the Soviet people. However, the study of the real state of affairs indicates that here as well the trend toward bureaucratic administration prevailed.

Violating the harmonious combination of bilingualism and the established understanding of this process as unidirectional and not reciprocal led, in the final account, to a respective local reaction which occasionally led to extremes in some republics (in the Transcaucasus and now the Baltic) where the language of the local ethnic groups was legislatively mandated or is being mandated as the state language on their territory. The languages of the other peoples of the country are granted no juridical status whatsoever. There is no definition whatever of the functions concerning the language in which national groups could communicate. Yet the reality is such that without this entire areas in our lives will become inactive.

The need has now become pressing to adopt a unified all-Union USSR law on the free development and equal utilization of the languages of the Soviet peoples. We believe that its adoption as well could be considered one of the stages in the restoration of the real rights of the principle of national self-determination, self-management in the spiritual area in particular.

It is a well-known fact that the efficient mechanisms for the protection of national and international values needs an array of legal guarantors, among which the country's Constitution would play the main role. However, if we consider the way the principle of self-determination of nations is presented today on the constitutional level, a number of questions arise. According to the Constitution, it is postulated only in the case of Union republics (Articles 70 and 72). This means that 15 Soviet ethnic groups which have given their name to those republics have the right to national self-determination, whereas the others do not.

It is logical to assume that the solution to this situation is to codify the right to self-determination of nations also within each Union republic. The real mechanism for the defense of national and international values and interests must be given to all ethnic groups without exception. Equality cannot be the privilege of the elect.

Naturally, problems and difficulties are inevitable in this case. Could the right to self-determination, codified within a republic, become reality if the majority of republics do not have national-governmental formations? Furthermore, currently there are more than 100 ethnic communities in the USSR, while there are 53 national-state and national-administrative units. The creation of any forms of national statehood for a number of ethnic groups is greatly hindered by the dispersed locations of their settlement throughout the country or their small size. Furthermore, what are we to do with ethnic groups which have their own republics but which also have compact groups settled in other republics?

An optimal situation could probably be found in this case as well. The specialists have already raised the question of restoring the national rayons and national soviets as they existed by the turn of the 1930s. Why not today as well create for the various groups of the same people (if they live in different parts of the country) corresponding national rayons? Their numerical strength could change constantly. In the case of small and permanently settled ethnic groups the creation of national soviets could be an entirely acceptable solution. Naturally, such formations should be granted a respective legal status. Combined with the principle of national self-determination applicable to each Soviet republic, such steps could give a broader and qualitatively new nature to national-state self-administration.

In this connection another fruitful idea is the one being expressed currently, on the creation of a chamber of nationalities in the supreme soviets of our republics. Such a step could offer more adequate opportunities for reflecting and protecting the interests of all ethnic groups living in a given republic, even if they have no national-state or administrative structure. The relevance of this solution is enhanced also in connection with the conversion to a competitive electoral system according to which a given area will nominate several candidates. Under such circumstances each ethnic group should be given the guarantee that its representatives would mandatorily be members of the legislative authorities and participate in the exercise of self-management principles.

Extending the effect of the principle of national self-determination to the level of individuals would be the logical completion of the process of eliminating the formal declarative nature of the principle of national self-determination. Why is it necessary for an individual to be classified as a member of an ethnic group with which he has no actual links: he has never lived within it, does not know its language, has been raised in a different national culture, and so on. Can this question be solved on the basis of blood ancestry? Suggestions have been

made to eliminate altogether from the internal passport the "nationality" clause. I believe that this step would be not only essentially erroneous but even dangerous. Under the conditions in which the command-administrative system has by no means been eliminated, such a step would be clearly assessed by the non-Russian population as an effort at refined Russification under the guise of the elimination of nationality in general. Such an approach was mocked by K. Marx himself, when he said that what denial of nationality indicates is the absorption of an ethnic group by the model French nation (see K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch*" [Works], vol 31, p 193).

Free national self-identification is a different matter. It does not presume in the least any "elimination of nationality" or deletion of the respective entry in the internal passport. It could, however, make consistent the actual correlation between reality and the juridical principle and become the final dot over the i in the actual assertion of the principle of national self-determination.

Naturally, natural and heterogeneous processes are taking place in the national life of the country and they can neither be urged on nor slowed down.

Our path is the path of further democratization. However, it must be correlated with reality and reality demands, above all, the restoration of the pivotal principle of Leninist national policy: the principle of national self-determination.

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## PUBLIC OPINION

### Desire to Act (Readers on Problems of Health Care)

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[Review by V. Krichagin, candidate of medical sciences, senior scientific associate, All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Medical and Medical-Technical Information, USSR Ministry of Health, of letters to the editors on problems of health care]

[Text] The *KOMMUNIST* editors showed me letters responding to *KOMMUNIST* articles on problems of health care. The overall assessment based on the editorial mail is roughly the following: despite the positive changes which have taken place here in recent years, we are still far from doing well in this area and perestroika in this field is not developing as actively and efficiently as demanded by the situation. Why is it that huge outlays of human and material resources invested in human health are ineffective? Why is it that resolutions which are good in terms of their content do not always lead to the expected results? Although, as Moscow physician Yu. Kukel writes to the editors, "the listing of sores does not constitute a diagnosis but may indicate the reason for

their appearance and is not, in itself, a treatment," nonetheless many readers deem it necessary to go into such reasons and to submit constructive solutions.

According to Professor A. Yarmenchuk (Chelyabinsk) the roots of many errors lie in the stagnation of science and in the organizational and managerial way of thinking which led to gigantomania, to the building of superlarge complexes, totally ignoring the development of the internal structures in practical health care. Physician M. Radutskiy from Tashkent believes that one of the most important reasons for the present unsatisfactory condition in health care is neglect of basic medical help and shifting the main attention to its specialized varieties. "The therapist's section," he writes, "has turned into a dispatcher which sends the patients to the various specialists. This undermines his professional significance and skills."

Professor I. Brekhman (Vladivostok), author of the valeology concept (the science of health), notes that "medicine (and health care) deal primarily with individuals who are already sick. However, adverse social and ecological factors affect everyone without exception and everyone pays for scientific and technical progress with some of his health. For that reason people should be in the field of vision of medicine whatever their condition. The unified governmental network of the USSR Ministry of Health, with its full set of institutions, ensures essentially the opposite development "from illness to health. This is an extensive and very expensive and inefficient way." Let me add that a great deal was said about prevention in the discussion of the main trends of restructuring the health care system but the respective part of the programmatic document which was drafted remained quite declarative. The strategy and tactics of the struggle against noncontagious diseases and chronic pathology were not properly developed.

"In the medical field contemporary methodological knowledge is in its embryonic stage," V. Naslednikov from Kuybyshev emphasizes. "The categories of morality, human empathy and dignity do not exist in a technocratic way of thinking. The danger which this represents has begun to be manifested in accidents, catastrophes and ecological breakdowns, not to mention the fact that in itself this kind of thinking has not ensured the elimination of technical backwardness, lowered production costs or else added to the volume of goods. Features of technocratic thinking in medicine abound. However, the danger of this disease has still not been realized. Are the humane principles not sacrificed in medical schools for the sake of preserving obsolete stereotypes? Is the truth not sacrificed for the sake of the opportunity to write a dissertation on sometimes useless and pseudoscientific topics?" He further adds: "There are solid reasons to claim that the applied systematic approach alone could have a revolutionizing influence on the thinking of medical workers. Unfortunately, however, in looking back, one can frequently see gross cases of wrong thinking."

The author of this letter combines two problems: technocratic thinking and glasnost. Total neglect of the systemic approach was promoted from above, for the leadership during the time of stagnation did not need the type of approach which would expose its lies. Glasnost was even less desirable: how could it explain why, for example, the life span in our country was so short and infant mortality so high? I remember the way the now deceased Professor S.N. Cherkinskiy cried by reading the document which prohibited the publication of all data concerning environmental pollution. He predicted that behind the screen of secrecy a "departmental piracy" would begin and projected that the activities of the sanitation service would be reduced to naught.

That was precisely what happened. The chief physician of Ternovskiy Rayon A. Lysyy (Krivoy Rog) reminds us in his letter that N.A. Semashko, the organizer of the Soviet health care service, assigned to the physician-hygienist the honorable role of advisor to the authorities on problems of disease prevention. In practice, however, that same counselor turned into the person responsible for the sins and incomplete work of technocratic managers on all levels.

Nor is the prestige of the health service enhanced by the recently published draft USSR Health Code. The maximum amount of fines which may be levied from an inspection is raised to 100 rubles. However, as practical experience indicates, production workers will not be frightened either by the amount or the threat of criminal prosecution. "As long as responsibility for environmental protection will be exclusively in the hands of the health service physicians," A. Lysyy concludes, "we should not expect any improvements in the developing ecological situation. As long as responsibility for health indicators is that of the medical personnel, while the administration stands aside, no substantial improvement in such indicators will exist!"

Truly frightening data are cited in the letter of G. Sushko, a physician from Zaporozhye: "As early as the mid-1970s, professional examinations revealed that there were virtually no healthy people in the most able-bodied age group between the ages of 20 and 35." For 3 decades there have been increasing disturbances of the vegetative nervous system and immunoprotective forces have been declining in Zaporozhye. In recent years there have been outbreaks of baldness in children and adults with a clinical picture not different from the one which occurred last year in Chernovtsy. "Based on the study of the threatening state of health of virtually all people in Zaporozhye—and our city is in a leading position in terms of the exceptionally stressed ecological situation—for the past 15 years we have been sounding the alarm," G. Sushko points out. "This, however, is ignored by the USSR Ministry of Health and the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences."

From his analysis of vocational illness of workers, V. Retnev, doctor of medical sciences in Leningrad, has reached the conclusion that in recent years the situation

in that oblast has improved somewhat. "However," he writes, "we must most honestly say that we are still far from having reached a satisfactory condition. About 30 million working people are being exposed to the effect of harmful industrial factors. Because of the low skills of physicians and the unwillingness, in frequent cases, to "expose" vocational diseases, data about them are being scaled downwards or simply concealed. Investigations reveal the frequency of such diseases to be between 6 and 10 times higher than reported. Such concealment of a most important problem does not contribute to its quick solution."

The study of the editorial mail leads us to believe that there nonetheless are ways which would motivate managers of industrial enterprises seriously to undertake the study of ecological problems and to see to it that self-recommendations are observed. This requires the inclusion among the basic indicators of the socioeconomic development of output an assessment of the health of the working people and of the surrounding population. The most radical and accurate way is that of democratizing management on the territory, as a result of which the activities of enterprises and departments will fall under the real control of the public.

One of the most pressing problems discussed in the editorial mail has to do with the financial aspect of medical services. Virtually no one among the readers questions the principle of free services as such. Many people believe, however, that the nature of this principle (in its present interpretation) changes with the changed situation.

**V. Kovalenko** (Kharkov) notes the following: "In recent decades, particularly in the 1980s, it became obvious that the principle of universally accessible, free and skilled medical help had lost a great deal of its meaning. Free aid, alas, is frequently not consistent with the concept of "skilled," and skilled aid is by no means universally accessible and is frequently not free."

**G. Turkovskaya**, a resident of Magnitogorsk, complains of the wretched and ramshackle condition of the local hospitals. She believes that, while there is still time, money should be collected for their rebuilding and proper maintenance. "Let the people pay not for treatment but for basic comfort, even if it is no more than a ruble," she suggests.

"From socioeconomic, free medical services have become a political concept. This has already become a 'sacred cow,' which must not be touched," writes **Yu. Morozov**, associate of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences All-Union Cardiological Scientific Center. "But why is it that we cannot convert to other computation systems such as, for example, separate hospital funds or, perhaps, partial self-financing? We do not sufficiently study the experience of England, Sweden, the FRG and other countries. Yet their systems include a number of rational features. Our scientists and practical workers

must formulate plans based on nontraditional innovations. It is clear that the usual stereotypes are no longer helpful."

Many readers point out that the funds for "free" medicine come from the taxpayer. Naturally, they would like to see the people's money spent efficiently, with maximal usefulness to the cause. For the time being, the annual appropriations for health care are "dropped" from above and are distributed according to the notorious "rationing principle."

Is it mandatory for the health care budget to be formulated by superior authorities? Would it not be possible, for example, to give the cities and rayons one-half of those funds in the guise of a checking account, with which to maintain the health of their population? Let a physician who is in direct touch with the population handle such funds. With such a local health fund the people would be able to seek treatment wherever they wish. Naturally, the state pocket is not bottomless, for which reason obtaining expensive nonemergency medical services may require appearing in front of a special commission which would control the accessibility of complex and exceptional types of medical help. The second half of the budget could be used by the state to finance the work of hospitals, polyclinics and outpatient clinics and the building of new establishments. The salaries of the specialists they employ would be paid by the patients.

Incidentally, this is roughly the nature of the British system. In 1948 Britain borrowed a great deal from the experience of the USSR. However, subsequently it quickly made corrections considering that the single way of channeling financial funds was insufficiently dynamic.

Interestingly enough, **M. Radutskiy**, the Tashkent reader, also suggests such a model. In his view the basic primary unit in health care should be the office of the section physician who should be given the funds appropriated for protecting the health of the population in his section, those same "per capita" funds. It could be precisely the office of the section's physician who would pay consulting specialists, surgeons for performing surgery, and hospitals for the treatment and the number of days spent in bed.

On this subject, let us point out that efforts were made to apply a similar system in the United States. However, the physicians were unable to deal with the financial aspect of the matter, which turned out to be exceptionally labor intensive. Alongside physicians practicing general medicine, legal and financial offices offices mushroomed.... We believe that, nonetheless, the solution should be sought in the multiplicity of forms of concentration of funds in social health care accounts with an equally great variety of ways of disbursing them. In particular, **L. Loos**, a reader from Ulyanovsk, believes that in medicine free services and cost accounting could be divided as follows: basic medical aid is given free and

standard services and treatment are paid by the enterprise or organization where the patient works; the trade union could supervise the disbursement of the corresponding funds; in the view of the author of this letter, the trade union should also be given the right to determine the percentage of the cost to be paid based on the medical report so that it could thus keep track of those who abuse their own health; by using in the treatment of people the enterprise fund (essentially the suggestion is to set up hospital funds which, in their time, had existed in our country), the thus saved budget funds could be used to improve the maternity service, increase old-age assistance, develop scientific research, and so on.

Therefore, many readers point out, we must not simplify the principle of free services and reduce it to drafting a code of standards which would determine what part of the budget should go where. Naturally, if necessitated by practical requirements, one could change the existing order in minor matters. This, however, would make it possible to achieve no more than some improvement in various areas without being able to strengthen the health care system itself and to rebuild in full its reputation.

"Not one of us can be sure that the billions that are appropriated can radically improve the health care system," bitterly notes Physician V. Karpenko, from Sagunovka Village, Cherkassy Oblast. "Unwittingly we draw the analogy with agriculture: it too could absorb many more state budgets without any visible changes on the store shelves. That could be the case with medicine as well as long as it is treated as an economic category. Generally speaking, we try to understand the fact that equality and equalization are not one and the same and that anonymity in the satisfaction of human needs is by no means a gain of socialism but, rather, its side and harmful by-product. Specifically speaking of health care, however, as in the past we do not mention the fact that free medical aid, as it is today, has nothing in common with the socialist ideals."

In a similar way, V. Semushin, an oncologist from Volgograd, wonders why the country's health care system is treated like a "parasite," as a sector which only consumes and which, for a long time, was given only the "left-overs" of the national income. Why, he asks, is medicine considered allegedly unprofitable?

Let me add another question myself: In general, what does profitability mean? In no way is it the same as profit (in terms of cash). If we look at it this way, the social security paid to the retired and the disabled is obviously a loss. That same pension, however, is repayment of withholdings from wages of the preceding generation which, in a number of countries, is done openly, publicly. It is profitable to repay our debt to the elderly: confidence in the future stimulates today's labor productivity. We have unlearned how accurately to understand the profitability of social security, according to which the working people voluntarily surrender from their income funds spent to deal with a variety of misfortunes, such as the birth of a defective child, temporary or permanent

disability, or loss of the bread winner.... In the area of health care, if it is to be considered a sector, there is also a component of direct and indirect profitability manifested, let us say, in the increased quality of life of individuals suffering from chronic illness, the disabled and other population categories. That is why, V. Semushin writes, it is time seriously to formulate the social requirements concerning health care as a sector and to define the conditions for meeting them.

The letters concentrate extensively on an important topic such as the depersonalized nature of primary medical aid, and the "loss" of a physician personally responsible for the health of the people and for errors in diagnosis and treatment. "Although officially the physicians function within so-called section brigades, their activities in watching over their patients remain uncoordinated," writes Docent L. Pokrovskaya from Moscow. "A patient who 'does not fit' the field of a specific specialist could hear the following: 'You are not my patient.' But whose patient is he then? The result is long trips from one office to another until the patient can be diagnosed and the physician who will henceforth take care of him has been determined." Such an unseemly picture is presented to us by a teacher at the Institute for the Advancement of Physicians, a person who is forced to teach others something which she personally considers wrong.

In connection with the problem of the "dilution of responsibility," I unwittingly recall the perplexed expression on the face of physicians at the Elista Hospital, where a mass contamination of patients with AIDS had taken place: even before that time conditions had been unsanitary but nothing serious had happened. Could it be that something had indeed happened and that no one had noticed it? For example, type B virus hepatitis spreads in the same way as AIDS and also does not appear immediately. In that case, just try to find out who is to blame! Now, it turns out, industry is blamed for not producing disposable syringes. This may be so, but in this case the prime reason for the tragedy is the low work standard in medical establishments. It is no accident that a similar case occurred in Volgograd as well.

Where is the person who will help the patient find his way in the clumsily interwoven medical world and, if so required by the situation, stand up for his rights? For it is no secret to anyone that the patient is actually rightless in the face of this huge apparatus. The authors of many letters to the editors share the opinion that the medical personnel obey the systems and algorithms as issued by their superiors and that their salaries are based on the work hours they have put in (who cares about compassion and charity!). Most readers favor the creation of the institution of family physicians. However, the question is raised: Where are they to be found? The section therapists are drowning in instructions, rightlessness and daily pushing to such an extent that it is hardly possible to entrust them with the protection of people's rights.

**S. Fedorov**, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member, estimates that we need 600,000 family physicians. This requires the retraining of almost one-half of the physicians in the country. Although, in my view, this figure is quite inflated (if we consider as a base the British rate, which is four family physicians per 10,000 people, 115,000 to 120,000 would suffice for the entire Soviet Union), the problem nonetheless is not one of numbers but of where and how to train such specialists. In this area reasons for pessimism are much stronger, for it is easy to assume that the strong bureaucratic custom of making any problem more complicated than necessary and undertaking its solution as though from scratch would force us, once again, to lose years in drafting programs and decades before instruction cadres can be trained.... The result would be that the first class of graduated specialists in this new area could be expected not before the year 2000 and the filling of vacancies, by the middle of the 21st century.

It is true that the readers suggest a variety of ways for the faster re-creation of the institution of family physicians. **I. Tereshchenko** (Krasnodar), believes that the patient can be suitably protected only by a physician he has chosen himself and for whose work he pays. With this option no additional resources and cadres would be required. All that is necessary is to legalize the interrelationship between the family physician and the state service. This way, the author of this letter believes, family medicine could stimulate the development of governmental medicine and accelerate its restructuring.

Naturally, not everyone agrees with this. Furthermore, in terms of present-day legislation a private family physician cannot practice to begin with, for the legislation stipulates that the country's citizens can obtain medical help only in government establishments.

In their letters the readers pay great attention to the professional training and personality of the family physician. For example, **F. Zusmanovich** (Kurgan), claims that the time of the erudites, the ideological heirs of the zemstvo physicians, is in the past. "Naturally, one could issue an order and promote the army of sectorial therapeuticians," the author writes. "But then a useful project (one more!) would be replaced by words, the more so since for the time being there is also no one who can teach and retrain."

In criticizing the imperfect nature of today's curriculums in medical schools, **Ye. Potemkina**, professor at the Moscow Medical Stomatological Institute imeni N.A. Semashko, writes: "Today more than ever before our young people need moral upbringing, the development of kindness and spiritual nobility, which are mandatory qualities of the physician of the future. The concepts of good and evil were thoroughly eroded in previous decades and the need for ideals is much more urgent among the medical students of today.... A feeling of sacrifice will always exist in the people. However, this instinct must be developed in those who do not have it to

a sufficient degree, and we must contribute to its manifestation in those who are richly endowed with the ability for self-sacrifice."

Some readers refer to the statements by Ye.I. Chazov, USSR Minister of Health, to the effect that unquestionably we shall be able to deal with the material and technical difficulties in the immediate future but that the most difficult thing is to change the mentality of the physician. Other viewpoints exist as well, however. Physician Yu. Kukel (whose letter we mentioned) claims that today we must above all be concerned less with changing the mentality of the physician than with creating conditions in which the personal qualities of the specialist could be manifested to their fullest extent, for no one forced the zemstvo physician to go to the boondocks. He knew that there he would be able to develop himself most fully as an individual and would have both rights and the trust of the people. Today the rural physician (as well as, actually, the one in the city) is not a creator but, at best, a conscientious performer. The author of this letter also asks the following: Why is it that the contemporary physician is frequently unable to compete with people who have ESP, with a sorcerer? He answers as follows: the point is that that same sorcerer was, is and must be an individual with a personality, regardless of whatever real or imaginary talents he may have. Meanwhile, that of which we were proud—having the greatest number of physicians in the world per 10,000 population—was achieved by lowering the exigency toward them throughout all stages in their training and work, by providing poor technical, scientific and pharmacological support (which, incidentally, is the worry of many readers but which, I believe, should be the topic of a separate discussion). Clearly, relying on the mass training of mediocre physicians was not justified.

This problem must be solved already now, for the sake of our own generation, without postponing the conversion to family medicine to the distant future. The independent family physician, trusted by the patient, is needed not only by them but also by the entire health care system, the standard of which has dropped precisely because of the impersonal nature of medicine.

One of the arguments which medicine formulates today in its defense is the following: we have reached a time when the reason for diseases (changed way of life, harmful habits, low quality of nutrition, genetic disturbances related to environmental pollution, alcoholism, drug addiction, etc.) are beyond our control. We know also from foreign studies that medicine is responsible for only 15 to 20 percent of the cases of illness, the rest is out of its hands....

This view would have been justified had we had, for example, a ministry of treatment rather than health care, i.e., of **protecting the health** of the population. For prevention—known as one of the leading trends in restructuring the health care system—means, in addition to everything else, constant control over the activities of ministries and departments, taking place not to the



detriment but to the benefit of human health. Was it possible for the leadership of the Ministry of Health not to have known in the past that in industrial centers environmental pollution is growing at the speed of an avalanche? That the food industry has converted to the manufacturing of surrogates? That mass physical culture is weakening in the country, sacrificed to prestigious record setting by professional athletes? <sup>1</sup> Naturally, they knew but they did not sound the alarm. They did not demand of the government to take radical steps; they blocked "unsuitable" information and reduced prevention to outpatient examinations of the population.

Naturally, since the state has assigned to a ministry the task of protecting the health of the people, that ministry should have real control rights and, in particular, the right to veto the implementation of one project or another if, in the final account, it were to harm the individual. Here, however, we face the major threat of converting the Ministry of Health into a supermonopoly with the inevitable consequences of inflated bureaucratic apparatus, dispersal of functions, running idle, and red tape in solving even the simplest possible problems.

Furthermore, and this is my personal viewpoint, I cannot agree with correspondents (and there are many) who believe that some kind of comprehensive health department should be created in order to solve the vital problems of domestic health care. Such a department would include, in addition to the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Social Security, the State Committee for Sports, the State Committee for Nature and other related departments and establishments. Naturally, a reorganization in this area is necessary. It is obvious, however that this should not be achieved by mechanically merging departments but within the context of a study and refining of the principles of the social policy of the state and the elimination of technocratic approaches which prevailed over long periods of time. The slogan "more socialism" means, I am confident of that, also solving problems related to the development of society with the help of social forces which express their will through the people's deputies. For the time being, as in the past, all changes in the health care system take place by order from above while local initiatives and the voice of the public are weak are not seriously taken into consideration.

In my view, readers who consider that restructuring of the health care system means the maximal transfer of management functions from the ministerial level to the level of the soviets, and the strengthening of the rights of public organizations and movements, including the medical ones, are right. As **Ye. Repin** (Novokuznetsk) accurately notes, "it is not the Ministry of Health that should prescribe to us what to do, but it is the free citizens, independent physicians and sovereign medical establishments that should grant the ministry the right to solve a certain number of problems of a national nature." It is precisely they who could bring order in areas in which no centralized system could function in principle.

Professor A. Yarmenchuk reminds us of the concept expressed by Albert Einstein: in frequent cases the formulation of the problem is more difficult than its solution. Actually, it is already obvious today that by maximizing forces and means in the health care system (which has a leading position in the world in terms of physicians, hospital beds, etc.) we are obtaining minimal results (by no means are we in a leading position among the developed countries in terms of basic health indicators). But how can we eliminate this contradiction? I am confident that the implementation of radical changes requires, above all, the awareness that in health care the lever rests not in influencing diseases but reproducing health. Francis Bacon himself claimed that the first duty of medicine is to protect the health and only after it came the second, that of treating diseases.

"Human health means, above all, a 'healthy' way of life and thinking," write **A. Kislov** and **E. Yashin**, associates at the State Central Institute of Physical Culture. "Man must become the master of his destiny and health. He must be provided with an analysis of his condition. He must have at his disposal recommendations on how to change it. However, it is he who must decide what to do and how to do it. We need a universal educational activity which would contribute to asserting the personal responsibility of the individual for his own health and longevity."

Doctor of Medical Sciences **V. Pashinskiy** (Tomsk) writes about the four "whales" on which, metaphorically speaking, rests the person's health: physical activeness, nutrition, biorhythm and struggle against alien substances and xenobiotics (I would add yet another "whale," a normal physiological stress which separates us from the animal world and maintains the life tone). The basic thought of the author of this letter is that as we undertake radical socioeconomic changes we must, unlike the situation in the past, above all proceed from the need to improve the conditions which determine the population's health. One could increase the health care budget as much as one wishes but unless all of these factors are not taken into consideration no radical changes would take place.

In the general opinion of the readers, domestic health care is today at the crossroads. Statistical data, which have now become widely known, have triggered not only concern and worry but also the desire to act and jointly to seek the most efficient solutions. It is on such an encouraging note that we would like to conclude this survey of editorial mail, for however tempting and attractive the ideas of perestroika in the health care system may be, they will not turn into a live and specific action until the people have accepted them as their own.

#### Footnote

1. We must point out that the editorial mail pays great attention to problems of restructuring the system of physical culture, which greatly determines the development of a healthy way of life. In particular, **V. Berlovich**,

from the city of Zhukovskiy, in the Moscow area, recalls that mass physical culture is an element of general culture, of the productive use of the leisure time and a mandatory prerequisite for the harmonious development of the individual.

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## Sociological Surevey

### About Our Concerns

18020015j Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 9, Jun 89 (signed to press 2 Jun 89) pp 74-76

[Survey by A. Sogomonov, candidate of historical sciences, and A. Tolstykh, candidate of psychological sciences, scientific associates at the VTsIOM]

[Text] One of the obvious results of the policy of perestroika and glasnost in our country is the public discussion of a wide range of socioeconomic problems which in the past have been stubbornly concealed. Only yesterday, it seems, we were tuned exclusively to the wavelength of celebrating achievements while today society is flooded by critical moods and discussions on the most sensitive problems which are snowballing. Unquestionably the desire openly to look at the realities of life and openly to speak about what we have seen is a positive trend which, however, has a psychological side effect: it seems to many that it is precisely perestroika that created those "sensitive spots" which, if looked at more closely, must be "credited" to the period of stagnation.

In this connection the following question arises: How to streamline the new knowledge acquired thanks to glasnost, and how to determine the priority of the tasks in the program for socioeconomic change?

The country's political leadership unequivocally states its intention not to limit itself in the search for answers to exclusively relying on the views of experts, but also actively to encourage a social dialogue on a broad democratic basis. Hence the argued need to study public opinion, going beyond general ideas concerning the feelings of the people.

It is precisely to this effect that the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion of the AUCCTU and the USSR State Committee for Labor (VTsIOM) conducted a mass survey on a Union-wide selective basis among the population of 66 urban and 34 rural settlements in seven parts of the country (East and West Siberia, the Northwestern European part of the country, Moscow Oblast, Kazakhstan, the Urals and the Northern Caucasus). The objective was to define the real sum of pressing socioeconomic problems, to single out among them the most urgent and to explain to the population the priorities in resolving them.

By socioeconomic problems we meant the disparity between the real needs of the people and the nature and

means of their satisfaction, established as a kind of stress in the social consciousness. The specific list of these problems and their formulation, adapted to the mass survey of public opinion, was drafted by surveying experts.

As a result, a list of problems was submitted for evaluation, which the experts considered as most pressing. The respondents expressed their attitude toward such problems three times: initially from the viewpoint of the relevance (essential nature) of each one of them personally to the respondent and his family; the respondent was then asked to single out one, the most pressing; finally, the respondent had to determine the sequence for the solution of problems (which problems should be solved immediately and which could be postponed).

Before undertaking the presentation of the basic results, let us note one circumstance which we consider of essential significance. An extremely small number of respondents expressed the wish to add to the list (slightly over 1 percent), and only 3.5 percent found answering the questions difficult. These figures could confirm the fact that the enumerated problems were firmly part of the social consciousness and that their gravity was unquestionable.

In answering the first question, every respondent could note as vital any number of problems and, furthermore, add other problems he considered relevant. Therefore, the sum of the answers could exceed 100 percent.

The result was the following sequence (in percentages):

—Poor Supplies of Industrial Goods and their Low Quality .....	55
—Food Shortages and Poor Quality .....	51
—Widespread "Pull" and Unfair Distribution of Goods .....	49
—Low Income, High Prices .....	47
—Environmental Pollution .....	47
—The Housing Problem .....	35
—Poor Medical Services .....	31
—Dependence on Officials in Solving Vital Problems .....	27
—Low Level of Upbringing of the Growing Generation .....	24
—Insufficient Concern for the Elderly .....	23

The concerns expressed in the first five could be summed up, in our view, as a single complex of shortages. We should not be bothered by the inclusion of ecological problems, for the people consider as aspects of environmental pollution also the lack of clean air, ecologically pure products, drinking water, etc.

Conversely, a certain (although quite substantial) lagging of the housing problem, compared to the first five, is astounding and it would be difficult in a quick expert analysis to find an easy explanation for this fact.

Conversely, putting first the problem of the scarcity of industrial goods is clearly related to the specific situation which has developed of late, in which despite traditional expectations of the population, even at the end of the quarter or the month store shelves remain bare (reduced exports of light industry goods, "perestroyka" in the domestic light industry, poor competition provided by cooperatives, etc.).

In moving from the first to the second question (one of the gravest problems) the picture changed substantially. This time the housing problem was "rehabilitated," so to say in the eyes of public opinion: it jumped from sixth to first place. In general, there was a certain regrouping upwards in the list (in percentages):

—Housing Problem .....	17
—Low Income, High Prices .....	16
—Environmental Pollution .....	14
—Widespread "Pull," Unfair Distribution of Goods .....	12
—Lack and Poor Quality of Foodstuffs .....	11
—Poor Supply With Industrial Goods, Their Low Quality .....	8
—Dependence on Officials in Solving Vital Problems .....	7
—Poor Medical Services .....	4
—Insufficient Concern for the Elderly .....	3
—Low Level of Upbringing of the Growing Generation .....	3
—Difficulty in Answering this Question .....	4
—Other Problems Listed .....	1

As we already pointed out, the priority given to the housing problem is natural: we know that despite the increased capacity of civil construction, the waiting line for housing is not getting shorter. Thus, in April 1989 it included 14 million families (approximately 1 out of 8!).

It is also logical that the housing problem is followed by that of the living standard (as a summation of the entire daily situation of the Soviet people, as seen through income and prices). Concern related to social inequity and food shortages is almost as high as the "leaders." In this case we find a curious metamorphosis which involves the problem of the lack of industrial goods. Obviously, its significance in the mind of the common people is of a subordinate nature compared to more relevant population concerns, such as where to live, what to breathe, how to subsist, and what to eat?

Having thus assessed the essential and pressing nature of the problems, the respondents then determined the sequence in solving them. The answers to the third question (What problems must be solved immediately and which could be postponed) brought to light the latest reclassification of opinions (since the respondent was asked to note simultaneously several positions, the sum total of answers, as in the first case, exceeded 100 percent):

—Environmental Pollution .....	87
—Scarcity and Poor Quality of Food .....	82
—Housing Problem .....	79
—Poor Supply of Industrial Goods, Their Low Quality .....	74
—Widespread "Pull," and Unfair Distribution of Goods .....	73
—Low Income, High Prices .....	67
—Low Level of Upbringing of the Growing Generation .....	63
—Poor Medical Services .....	63
—Insufficient Concern for the Elderly .....	61
—Dependence on Officials in Solving Vital Problems .....	56

The first position assigned to the ecological problem is easily explainable. Public opinion is under the influence of the press, television and radio, which are clearly encouraging the growth of the environmental protection movements which, naturally, contributes to the process of instilling an ecological awareness in the population.

As we consider this list of problems we must bear in mind that the actual feelings of the people, the richness of their practical experience, their contacts with their immediate surroundings and, once again, the influence of the mass information media become strangely interwoven in defining priorities. It may be assumed that the sequence which has come out not only reflects the considered views on systematic changes in practical realities but also indicates the significance of one problem or another in terms of daily life.

A comparison among answers to all three questions provides a curious pattern. Regardless of the way the list quoted here is presented to the people, each time it is divided into two stable groups. The first includes the six problems which invariably turn out on top, while the second is that of problems which are invariably at the bottom of the list; all problems within the first group are oriented, so to say, to the "immediate" future whereas those in the second, are "long range." In other words, as it became clear, people give preference to their daily concerns and only then think about the fate of the elderly and the future of their children.

It is entirely natural that, taking into consideration regional differences, differences in the evaluation of the most pressing socioeconomic problems proved to be quite substantial. The threatening nature of the ecological catastrophe in Eastern Siberia and Moscow is rated as being approximately twice as high compared to the Northwestern part of the RSFSR and Kazakhstan. Concern related to the dominance of the bureaucracy in Moscow and Eastern Siberia is almost triple compared to that in the Urals. Conversely, the housing problem was somewhat "pushed back" in Eastern Siberia but considered the most vital in the Northwestern part of the RSFSR. The assessment of the scarcity of industrial goods and their low quality for the country at large is approximately the same but it almost took first place in the list of the population of the Northern Caucasus. In turn, the food problem for them and the Muscovites turned to be less relevant compared to Kazakhstan and the Northwestern part of the RSFSR (the difference between these two areas was in the 300 percent range). Social injustice is felt less by Muscovites and in the Northwestern part of the RSFSR but is more than 300 percent stronger among the population of Kazakhstan and Eastern Siberia.

Three problems "lead" in Moscow: housing (20 percent); environmental pollution (19 percent); and low income and high prices (15 percent).

The survey ended with the determination of the most important "sensitive spots" within the problems considered leading in all areas: housing, ecology and food.

According to the respondents, the worst aspects of the housing problem are the long waiting periods (70 percent), unfair allocation of apartments (43 percent) and low quality of construction (37 percent).

The gravity of the ecological problem is related by the population above all to the pollution of the air over the cities (69 percent), the pollution of rivers, lakes and seas (54 percent) and the increased level of radiation in settlements (42 percent).

The main components in the food problem were the scarcity of food products (52 percent) the high prices charged by the cooperatives (40 percent) and the extensive use of "pull," fraud and speculations in trade and in the organization of public catering (33 percent).

This review quotes only the most general and essential results of the survey on the vital problems of socioeconomic life. The study of public opinion on this topic will be repeated annually, which would enable us to provide a dynamic picture of changes in the orientation and frame of mind of the population.

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## Reportorial Assignment By Readers' Request

### What Is Behind the Conflict

18020015k Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 9, Jun 89 (signed to press 2 Jun 89) pp 77-85

[Article by Andrey Vladimirovich Vasilyev and Maksim Iosifovich Krans, *KOMMUNIST* special correspondents]

[Text] Two people came to see the editors. One asked somewhat provocatively: "Does *KOMMUNIST* consider itself responsible for its publications?" The other one explained: "We read one of your articles on the attitude toward perestroika and initiative from below and decided to act. However, everything ended sadly. We were pushed around and that one (he nodded in the direction of his comrades) was even expelled from the party. The reason? "For haste in problems of democratization...."

They introduced themselves: Yuriy Boldyrev and Sergey Vasilyev, electric fitters at the Mine imeni M. Gorkiy in Donetsk. For 3 hours we listened to their story, in the editorial premises, a story which led to our assignment to Donetsk.

The story turned out to be conflicting and complex. It lacked a clear clash between "innovators" and "conservatives," or between the collective and the "chiefs-bureaucrats." It has lasted for more than 1 and a half years. However, it is worth telling, for this story reveals a great deal and helps us to understand something quite characteristic of our days, something typical of conflicts in production collectives, conflicts which sometimes reach the point of strikes, as has been the case in the mines of that same Donetsk....

This mine is located in the very center of the city or, rather, in its geographic center, for official Donetsk, with its wide streets and boulevards, offices and theaters, is somewhat on the side. However, under it too is the mine, which has spread its own drifts and shafts deep under the surface. It begins with the "lift," or the stationary systems shop, which is described as the core of the mine (we heard this sentence from just about every one of our interlocutors). It is through it that the brigades of coal hewers and drifters drop 700 meters down, and it is from there that both coal and rock come out. It was precisely there that Boldyrev and Vasilyev worked.

Clearly, a great deal depends on the reliability and rhythmical work of this shop, and its personnel should be knowledgeable and experienced. The shop is staffed by such personnel and, from the professional viewpoint, the administration had no particular complaints concerning the electrical engineering service which handled the functioning of the "lift." However, the microclimate in the shop was not calm. Its collective was heterogeneous in terms of ages and type of people. Occasionally there would be conflicts and quarrels would break out, and it took a great deal of efforts to resolve them. That is

probably why senior mechanics did not last long at the "lift," and of late had to be replaced almost every year. Gradually the people became accustomed to such reshuffling, and since managers were appointed without showing any particular interest in the opinion of the workers, the workers themselves displayed a certain degree of fatalism: "The bosses know better" ... But then, suddenly, everything changed.

"Naturally, this was because of perestroyka," Boldyrev said. "April 1985 triggered the hope that now a great deal would change for the better. All of us were for perestroyka. Actually, when the future renovation of the society was being discussed, there were virtually no differences. However, the moment the question would turn to what one could change in our sector, differences would appear and some people simply lost their enthusiasm."

Nonetheless, in the course of time a group of workers developed who found the role of observers unsuitable. Yuriy Boldyrev, Sergey Vasilyev and Vyacheslav Mukhopad were among them. What type of change did they want? What, in their view, had to be restructured? Here is the view of electric fitter Mukhopad:

"Actually, we wanted to awaken in the people a feeling of ownership. Specifically, we suggested the following: First: make brigade life public, i.e., publicly determine the labor participation coefficient and openly distribute bonuses and leave. Second: deploy cadres on the basis of their practical qualities, through elections. Finally: create the type of atmosphere in which hackwork, informing and toadying would become impossible.

One would think that this program had nothing startling. To the workers, however, it meant a great deal, for it affected the foundations of their daily life, relations within the collective and relations between them and management. How to achieve all of this? At that point the workers' attention was drawn to the article "Rejecting Cliches and Stereotypes" by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences O. Yanitskiy (KOMMUNIST No 11, 1987). They saw in the article a virtually photographic description of the situation at their own mine. They were particularly interested in the author's idea that perestroyka will take place not "as a parade drill," but with the help of small groups which will gradually spread their influence throughout the collective (it was essentially in connection with this recommendation that we were asked whether the journal would stand by its own publications). Naturally, however, the point was that the ideas of the author coincided with the moods of the initiative group and provided a kind of moral support to the belief that it was necessary to turn to action.

The situation seemed favorable: the period of accountability and elections was approaching. At an unusually stormy party meeting, Boldyrev, although he was a very recent party member, was elected party group organizer. Soon afterwards, Vasilyev became trade union group organizer and Mukhopad, his deputy. The question of

the re-election of brigade councils arose. Here again they were successful: the majority of positions went to supporters of perestroyka in the collective.

As conceived by our reformers, all of these changes were not self-seeking. Rather, they were considered a necessary prerequisite for the desired changes. They included converting the servicing of mine shafts and underground systems to a brigade or even a leasing system. At the same time, something which the enthusiasts did not conceal, the intention was to elect a new shop management, for contracting was considered by them a kind of collective creativity, for which reason, in their view, the collective had to be headed by a person who was able to coordinate the work under the changed economic management conditions.

It was only later, in their talk with us, that Boldyrev, Vasilyev and Mukhopad described this moment as critical in their relationship with the mine's administration. Whereas in the past the attitude toward "democratic experimentation" was favorable in the electrical engineering service, as of that point the situation changed drastically, for the question of positions arose, the filling of which had always been the prerogative of the administration. Specifically, it was a question of expressing confidence in senior mechanic Nikolay Tsyukalo.

At this point enters another character in our narration of the conflict. At the mine we heard different and sometimes diametrically opposed views about Nikolay Tsyukalo. He was the 13th consecutive mechanic at the "lift." His predecessor had not remained in that position even a few months: he had become entangled in contradictions and squabbles and had "resigned." By appointing Tsyukalo to the shop, the mine's management hoped that, once and for all, he would be able to set things in order. Although he may not have been a brilliant specialist, he had proved himself a good organizer. He seemed to have proved this in his new position as well: through his efforts amenities were provided, and comfortable cabins installed for the operators of the "lift," under his management there were less accidents and the problem of the perennial scarcity of materials and instruments virtually disappeared.

Tsyukalo's opponents emphasized other of his features: he was rude, he did not take the workers into consideration and tolerated no objections. He surrounded himself with people who, for one reason or another, had reasons to fear for their salaries or even their jobs. Many workers recalled the favorite statement by the senior mechanic: "Better hire two idiots than one smart fellow." And yet, all of a sudden he had to cope with three smart ones! Was it surprising that he failed to find a common language with them? Furthermore, he did not make any particular effort to develop a reciprocal understanding with the "troublemakers," for he considered his idea of management the only accurate one. He did not hide this. "I tried to solve problems of strengthening the discipline in the sector with the help of administrative

methods and power, something I was able to accomplish," Tsyukalo wrote in an explanatory note submitted to the mine party committee. This revealed his firm conviction that this was the only way to act and that only an "iron hand" could prevail over "anarchy" in the shop.

Now two viewpoints clashed on whether, given such management methods, the people could consider themselves masters of the production process.

It is true that some of our interlocutors at the mine tried to reduce the conflict to a clash of ambitions and a power struggle. Mining foreman Viktor Panchukov said:

"All the perestroyka favored by Boldyrev and his supporters actually turned into settling their private accounts with Tsyukalo."

Was this the case? We shall not deny that some ambitious aspirations could be seen in the actions of the reformers. However, were these "personal" accounts? Could all of this be reduced to some kind of greed? Today on all levels of production and social management a new generation of leaders is rising: people who are confident in their force and ability to head perestroyka in a given sector, openly nominating themselves to positions of "wheel-horse," leadership and even USSR people's deputies. What is our reaction to this? Our views of such people still vary. However, if we seriously speak of enterprise and initiative, such qualities, daring and confidence in one's practical abilities are simply necessary.

Nonetheless, the reasons for the workers' behavior could not be reduced in the least to ambition. We already mentioned their thoughts. What is exceptionally important, however, is also the fact that the entire atmosphere of perestroyka inspires many people to object to administrative-arbitrary management methods, embodiment in the shop by Tsyukalo.

It would be pertinent to recall at this point that the British philosopher John Stuart Mill believed that, in the final account, the dignity of the state depends on the dignity of the individuals who make the state. Perhaps this is precisely the most important result of perestroyka: the awakening within each person of a feeling of dignity and an unwillingness to tolerate abuse and power methods, not to mention rudeness or simply the traditional status of being a "cog" in the production and social "mechanism." This is the first prerequisite for both enterprise and responsibility.

Vyacheslav Mukhopad wrote the following in his statement to the party committee: "Under contemporary conditions, when the feeling of personal dignity is awakening in the people ever more strongly, such methods (as used by the administration—author) become totally unacceptable. Therefore, the conflict can only worsen. To believe that this can be suppressed with repressive measures against the malcontent is an error. It could create the appearance of tranquillity for a very short

period of time. The people mature socially quite quickly and after a while those who are openly discontented will be in the majority."

Nonetheless, obviously, the administration and the party leadership of the section and the mine had a different idea of the existing situation. The party bureau of the electrical engineering service set up a commission to study the situation, and soon afterwards the commission reported the results at an open party meeting. Its conclusion was the following: Boldyrev had disrupted the discipline with his "democratization." Despite the objections of the supporters of the party group organizer, by majority vote the suggested resolution was passed: "Comrade Yu.A. Boldyrev is expelled from the CPSU for moral and political corruption of the collective of stationary systems, deliberate and purposeful distortion of materials and party and government decrees and mass propaganda media... and for ignoring party discipline. To petition the mine's administration that fitter Yu.A. Boldyrev be transferred elsewhere."

This was quite startling: "Political corruption of the collective," and "deliberate and purposeful distortion" of government resolutions! What powerful instruments did the party commission members have to reach such conclusions? There was neither a "crime," nor proper charges or convincing arguments. How could one accept the draft resolution of the party meeting? Did the people not think about it? Was this the result of being accustomed to such formulations? But could it be that many party members in the section had been informed of the suggested reforms only by hearsay? Or could it be that what prevailed was precisely the type of indifference and collective conformism which, for a long time in our country was confused with collective opinion? Let us not conceal the fact that to this day we do not have absolutely clear answers to these questions.

By no means do we tend to idealize Boldyrev and his supporters or blindly agree with the tactics they had chosen. The reformers as well were short of patience, judgment and sober considerations. Occasionally emotions gained the upper hand and the unnecessarily categorical and peremptory nature of their views prevented them from reaching common decisions and finding a common language. **Impatience** is understandable. However, the other side displayed **intolerance**, which is by no means one and the same. Intolerance was expressed with action: suppression was favored over discussion and strict punishment over arguments.

The fact that nothing criminal could be seen in Boldyrev's actions is confirmed by the resolution of the mine's party committee. It notes that the actions of this party member were improperly qualified but—amazingly!—the "sentence" was left standing on the grounds of the corrected formulation: "For political

immaturity and manifested haste in problems of democratization of production management...." In quite "contemporary" terms, almost using the language of perestroika, there is a great deal of talk about the price of democratization, impatience, etc.

The absurdity of this statement and the very fact that a person had been expelled from the party without adequate grounds did not bother any member of the party committee. As to Nikolay Tsyukalo, "for the sake of balance" he was punished as well. He was issued a strict reprimand, entered in his record "for administrative-arbitrary management methods and belittling the role of the public organizations in the ideological upbringing of the working people." These were also labels but, please note: for "haste in problems of democratization," expulsion from the party; for bureaucratic management, strict reprimand. Is this not typical?

A year went by. Tsyukalo was made deputy director of the mine, in charge of economic problems. Boldyrev (in whose case, in the final account, the Donetsk Gorkom, Ukrainian Communist Party, reduced the penalty to a reprimand), like Vasilyev and Mukhopad, was transferred elsewhere. Juridically, the administration has this right, the more so since it was backed by the statement "as needed for production requirements." However, it was entirely clear to both sides that the "threesome" had been simply separated from the collective, in an effort to put out the flames of the conflict. Nonetheless, the coals stayed hot. To this day this solution does not suit many workers who believe that unfair action had been taken against their comrades. Others, convinced that this was the only right solution, are indignant at the stubbornness shown by Boldyrev and his friends who demand to be returned to their section.

What motivates Boldyrev, Vasilyev and Mukhopad again and again to knock at doors, to write petitions "for the restoration of justice?" Yuriy answers the questions as follows:

"We would like to prove that the time is past when one could use such methods in dealing with troublemakers. The matter does not stop there. We insist that we be returned to the collective and be given the opportunity to complete our project."

But what is the position of the administration? It refers to "democracy." Apparently, all democratic standards were observed: there was a resolution passed by the party meeting of the section, and a resolution of the labor collective council of the mine, which decreed that the matter was closed. Vladimir Prishchep, the mine's director, explained his own view:

"We do not like schemers, the more so if such scheming smacks of adventurism."

At this point yet another topic is introduced in our story, without which a great deal of this conflict would remain unclear, and one more character enters.

Vladimir Prishchep could, probably, be used as a prototype of the hero of a "production novel," which until recently was so popular, the plot of which can be reduced to the following: a man with a strong character comes to a losing plant or a lagging kolkhoz and, within a short time, lifts it to a leading position. Prishchep accepted to manage the Mine imeni M. Gorkiy at a time when it found it difficult to fulfill its plan and when it was given no more than 10 years of life. The first steps of the new director were drastic: he got rid of unsuitable laggards or simply truants and drunks. He rallied around himself a good team of specialists who could look into the future. Studies indicated that with an intelligent approach to the huge coal seam which was under the very center of Donetsk there would be enough coal for a minimum of 30 years of uninterrupted work with an annual increase in coal extraction. The dynamics of the increased production capacity of the mine, considered today one of the best in the sector, jumped from 620,000 tons in 1981, when Prishchep took over, to 1.2 million in 1988.

Even people who consider themselves his opponents have told us the way he, sparing no efforts or time, dedicated himself entirely to the work and how much he had done and was doing for the miners. Yet, here is another detail: Boldyrev was appointed to the mine precisely on the basis of Prishchep's telephone call. It is true that one could hardly accuse him of hiring someone "by telephone." He hired a Donetsk university graduate not as chief mechanic or mine foreman but as a trainee.

Despite this entire difference in age and status, relations between these people developed in an unusual fashion. Boldyrev could see the director during nonreception hours and spent long hours in his office, discussing abstract subjects. Yet the working time of a mine manager is scheduled almost to the minute and knowing this not everyone would dare to bother him without having something important to discuss. Therefore, these people shared something, something of significance to both.

"To speak with Boldyrev was interesting," Vladimir Prishchep says. "I was captivated by his inordinate view on life and original thinking. It was only later, by hindsight, did I realize that he was not coming to me for no reason whatsoever. He had his selfish purpose: he needed the support of an influential person in the mine so that later he would have the possibility of quoting my views."

Even if there was some truth in the words of the director, in all probability Boldyrev hoped that at the crucial time he could use his help. Is there anything prejudicial in this, when one sets oneself a socially significant objective and does not rely only on one's own authority? Once again, let us not try to answer this question simply. The fact is that the party group organizer did not receive any help when he needed it. At one point, at the peak of the conflict, Prishchep hit him hard: "Do not think that you and I are friends!"



Why was it that these people, each one of whom acted on the basis of perestroika and considered himself an active supporter of it, did not become allies and, furthermore, turned out to be on opposite sides of the "barricade?"

In answering this question, Vladimir Prishchep emphasizes that a manager does not have the right to set himself unrealistic assignments. Naturally, he could dream "crystal palaces," with the mandatory stipulation, however, that "whatever fable you may think of must come true." One's plans one must stand on solid grounds. It was precisely this approach that made him oppose the suggestion of Boldyrev, Vasilyev and Mukhopad of converting the "lift" to the leasing system. That is precisely what he had in mind when he spoke of "limelighting" and "adventurism."

"All of this is like leasing the engine of an automobile and not the entire car," the director pointed out.

The experts as well reached the same opinion. In a reference paper they drafted, the simple conclusion was the following: "Converting the servicing of the shafts and underground systems of mines to a brigade and a leasing contract is unacceptable not only from the viewpoint of the safety of the miners' work but also the impossibility of assessing the work of people performing individual operations which do not have any end result and work under multiple-factor production and servicing conditions."

We talked with the authors of this document and their arguments seemed convincing. The use of contracting is held back by numerous restrictions, particularly those related to technical safety. Yet it is known that despite the strict requirements, one miner dies per 1 million tons of extracted coal.

Nonetheless, the future of the coal industry will favor leasing. Everyone understands this, including Vladimir Prishchep. However, he is not in a hurry to promote "comprehensive leasing," although he is perfectly well aware of the entire imperfection of the first form of cost accounting which was adopted since the start of this year at the Mine imeni M. Gorkiy. The director believes that the very concept of "cost accounting" is based on that of "ownership," and that the collective has still not become the true owner. As long as the mine has not been given the opportunity to buy on the wholesale market the equipment it needs, as long as differentiated prices for coal have not been set and, finally, until the miners begin to work on the basis of direct contracts and not as they do now, under the diktat of departments and intermediary organizations, there is no way to speak of total independence. All of this, Prishchep believes, could be secured only through leasing. Today, however, the objective conditions for converting to it do not exist.

"This is a complex matter and it is impossible to carry it out in a single day, by superior order," said Yevgeniy Zimovtsev, mine party committee secretary, agreeing with the director's viewpoint. He is someone who had walked the distance from mine propper to head of

extraction sector. "A sober and considered attitude, a thorough assessment and a gradual approach are necessary. However, the initial steps toward the new form of labor organization are already being taken. By this I mean the brigade contracting method. Initially, on its own initiative the method was adopted by the 11th extraction sector, followed by the others. Nonetheless, it is a question only of internal cost accounting and it is still too early to speak of any further progress."

Let us assume that Boldyrev, Vasilyev and Mukhopad were hasty with the leasing, tried to skip a stage, and failed to take possible and inevitable difficulties into consideration. However, were the initiators of such new developments so carried away as to be unable to hear the convincing arguments "against?" Our view was that on this topic there simply were no discussions whatsoever and that all objections (including those voiced in their discussions with us) appeared later.

Boldyrev explains the position of the management as follows:

"Since the shop manager and the mine managers do not work under conditions of economic competition, what matter to them are not economic or practical criteria in assessing the actions of other people but the 'ours-outsider's' criterion."

We do not know the extent to which this is valid when applied to the specific situation. Based on practical experience, we can determine that in principle this logic has some grounds. In fact, one can understand the difficulty of the situation in which the director finds himself when the workers begin to question the competence or moral qualities of a middle-level manager, for it is precisely he, the director, who appointed the person to that position and, therefore, the director must admit that he was wrong in determining who to trust, who to value and with whom he may have ties of sympathy or friendship. Otherwise, even if he may not have a high opinion of that person he is "one of ours" and if he can allow today for that person be replaced, tomorrow others may be affected and, the day after tomorrow, the people will begin to interfere in the production process, to give instructions and to impose their own will.

The director was obviously pleased with the practical policy of the former senior mechanic ("a doer, for which reason precisely they decided to make him my deputy in charge of economic affairs: he could bring order"). It appears, however, that the real reasons for the conflict were not based on the desire to defend Tsyukalo. They (like those of many other similar conflicts) run deeper. They are more profoundly related precisely to perestroika.

Perestroika and, above all, the economic reform changes the pattern of relations between leaders and subordinates at the enterprise. Its purpose is to eliminate the previously inviolable division between those who make decisions and those who are deprived of this right, managers and managed, "acting characters" and "performers."

Cost accounting and self-management are incompatible with paternalism according to which the command assumes the exclusive right to be concerned with the project and to decide what is better for the work and for the people, how they should live and work, encouraging those who apply themselves and who are obedient, but punishing for violations and obstinacy. The workers, whose wages are increasingly pegged to a variety of conditions determined by the overall results of economic management, are led to demand increased rights in production management, decision-making and the display of individual initiatives.

Nor should we ignore the influence of the overall atmosphere of democratization on the awareness of the people. One way or another, matters are progressing in such a way that the members of the collective, whether operating a machine tool or holding an administrative position, i.e., be they Boldyrev or Prishchep, should have equal right in making decisions on matters which affect the level of their income, labor conditions and, something which is extremely important or even most important, the possibility of self-realization, or on anything which can be summed up as part of their social self-esteem.

Not all workers are equally sensitive to the changes which are taking place, and not all of them consciously begin to act as proprietors. To some of them, the idea of new rights and opportunities becomes distorted. It is manifested in an excessively aggravated and not always justified opposition to the administration, or even to any order or organization. That is probably what O. Yanitskiy, our author, had in mind when he said that the people will take the path of perestroika not in "as a parade drill," but through the actions of the most active and conscious initiative groups. One way or another, the psychological atmosphere at the enterprises is changing. The "managed" neither wish to be nor can be managed in the old way. They proclaim their rights and thus infringe on the rights of the administration. Boldyrev finds it possible to struggle for the type of organization of labor which he considers to be the best. A worker could be **persuaded**, with some effort, but he will no longer acknowledge that someone has the right to **force him** to abandon his ideas. What could be the objection to this on the part of anyone who would like a better, more active and involved attitude on the part of the worker in his work?

But what about the administration? Are they conservatives and opponents of perestroika? No, everything is much more complicated. Some are simply unwilling to surrender their power and the possibility of making decisions without any particular obstructions, although while observing some formal "democratic" procedures. Others are unable to work otherwise, for they have become imbued with methods of leadership which took decades to develop. There is a great deal of "psychology" in this. Perhaps, however, the most essential feature is that the requirements facing an enterprise manager, particularly in areas which are still far from using real

cost accounting, remain unchanged: "fulfill the plan!" Meanwhile, the conditions for ensuring a qualitatively different work have not changed (Prishchep is right when he speaks of imperfect prices, obstacles in wholesale trade, etc.). This leads to a major contradiction fraught with conflict.

Is Prishchep right? It is not up to us to judge but we believe that it makes sense to consider the position of the administration, including that of the director and the party organizations of the sector and the mine, who are called upon to assume the functions of political leadership in perestroika. It seems to us that it is worth to consider precisely whether the administration has been able to detect specifically those changes which are taking place and which will inevitably occur in the very system, in the principles of relations between workers and managers and between managers and managed, and whether the administration accurately reacts to the awakening of the initiative from below. However much circumstances and traditions may have been pressuring the "upper echelon," they are unable to avoid the necessary change in the style of work, and must learn how to act under the conditions of the development of the reform. Furthermore, the responsibility borne by a manager and a rank-and-file worker is not the same in all areas.

If we weigh all the arguments "for" and "against" in our story, the result, nonetheless, will not turn out in favor of the administration and the party committee. Whatever they may say, they wrestled with the workers in different "weight categories." It is precisely in terms of responsibility for the atmosphere in the collective and consistency in the promotion of democratization that there neither is nor could there be any equality.

Incidentally, on the subject of political management methods. As Vladimir Garmatin, director of the Donetsk Obkom, Ukrainian Communist Party, said in a talk with us, the party leaders in the sector and the mine wasted the right moment when they had been asked to interfere in the conflict and to prevent a confrontation; instead, by interfering they worsened their situation: instead of political they used the same old administrative methods. Skillfully helped, the collective of the "lift" could have alone, without outside intervention, calmly determined the views held by the different sides and made a democratic choice. For in the 3 months since Boldyrev's election as party group organizer and until his expulsion from the party, he and his supporters had actually been able to accomplish little, and their program was only beginning to be formulated. Nonetheless, obviously, their plans contained a kernel of truth, considering that they had been able to gain the support of part of the collective. This is also confirmed by the letter which was signed by more than 20 workers.

We talked to many of them and heard the following: by removing the "rebels" from the sector, the management undermined the faith of the people in perestroika and democratization. This may be a rather general conclusion. Nonetheless, everyone judges of the effectiveness of

the reform not only from the newspapers but, above all, from the changes in his surroundings. It is precisely in the labor collective that democratic standards and principles are tested. If they are not implemented on the level of the brigade, sector or enterprise, how could one speak of true democracy on the scale of the entire country?

Although by trial and error, democracy is nonetheless making its way in the mine. The system for organizing an administrative and party reserve has changed: it is not appointed, as in the past, but elected. Managers on all levels (the new senior mechanic who replaced Tsyukalo several months ago must now ask for a vote of confidence of the workers) are being elected in accordance with the Law on the State Enterprise. The same procedure applied to Vladimir Prishchep.

Today on the level of the brigade councils the workers are exercising their rights ever more knowledgeably and decisively. Recently one such council, in the 6th extraction sector, was headed by Valeriy Mironenko. Incidentally, he himself suggested that he be entrusted with the leadership of the brigade which was not doing successful work. He formulated a specific program for improving the organization of the work. In talking with Valeriy, we unwittingly compared the outcome of the two conflicts which had developed, those in the 6th sector and in the electrical engineering service. Why, despite the great similarity of these stories, did their outcome turn out to be so different? Could it be that the time which had passed since had not been lost?

Perestroika awakened the "natural instinct for democracy." A difficult process of accumulating new social experience is taking place. Naturally, one could say that the initial failures, errors and defeats along an untrodden path were useful in a certain sense, for they teach both those who have lost and those who are only entering this path. All of this would have been accurate had it not affected the destinies of people and had a doubt as to the irreversibility of our movement not sneaked into their hearts.

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## PAGES OF HISTORY

### 26 June 1940: Illusions and Realities of Administration by Fiat

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[Article by Oleg Vitalyevich Khlevnyuk, candidate of historical sciences, *KOMMUNIST* consultant]

[Text] The most important management method in the administrative-command system was that of emergency laws, which were strict and, frequently, cruel. The people became used to such laws, accepting them as vital requirements which may not be all that pleasing but are

mandatory. They learned how to circumvent and assess them, looking with sympathy at those who had been singled by their hot breath. For many people the efficiency of the harsh measures triggered no doubts and, from time to time, one hears appeals to apply them. Such administrative moods are frequently backed by examples borrowed from our history and by confused stories about the old order.

The most widespread among them are recollections of the 26 June 1940 Ukase. The fact that before the war people could be tried for absenteeism and lateness is familiar to many. To some this is an inspiring model of the only right "strict" management. To others it is a sad inevitability of the prewar mobilization of the country and everything which, as we say now, constitutes the "blank spots," filled with puzzlements and limited to personal experience or wishful thinking.

Indeed, the ukase was promulgated during a very difficult period.

In the course of the two and a half prewar 5-year periods not only thousands of new enterprises had been built but a new system of production relations had been organized as well. It was based on strict centralization and the rigid hierarchy of a center which issued orders and impeccably obeying subordinates. In order to force the people to do that which they frequently found to be neither interesting nor unprofitable, methods of ideological indoctrination and repression were used. It is true that officially, although not extensively publicized, the expediency of forced labor was admitted, for which reason the fact that millions of people were detained was considered not only a means of maintaining political stability but also a natural national economic task and a method for supplying manpower to a powerful industry under the jurisdiction of the NKVD.

Despite the seeming simplicity of the administrative-repressive system and the strong aspiration of the Stalinist leadership to make it reality, it had never existed in its pure aspect. To rephrase the then familiar expression, one could say that the "fortresses" which, as it were, the system could not capture, were plentiful. The strongest among them were the real economic laws, the ineradicable interest of the people, and their need to lead a creative, independent and normal life. For that reason, from time to time the makers of the system maneuvered, made concessions and, to some extent, slightly opened the door to the beginnings of cost accounting and autonomy. It was precisely this that rescued the system and ensured the socioeconomic development of the society.

In the second half of the 1930s the creative principles of the country had been reduced to a minimum. The administrative system was alone. Initiatives and economic management methods, which reduced its contradictions, disappeared. The consequences of this were catastrophic.

In itself, the administrative economic mechanism was helpless in solving the problem of efficiency in quality. It led to excessive waste. For example, recorded industrial losses alone for the first 2.5 years of the 5-year period, equaled a 45-day volume of output. The clearly manifested orientation toward gross indicators led to wiping out the results of the stressed work of millions of people. On 1 November 1940, according to partial data, eight industrial people's commissariats had failed to install 33,000 metal cutting machine tools although 58,000 such tools had been manufactured in 1940. Those same people's commissariats failed to use 6,000 units of forge-press equipment although 4,700 such machines had been produced in 1940. It was true that modern equipment was in scarce supply. Some of it was purchased abroad (4,600 metal cutting machine tools and 4.6 million rubles' worth of forge-press equipment in 1940). In addition to other reasons, these purchases were also made for the purpose of additionally producing tens of thousands of machine units which were then put in storage. Such examples of inefficiency and economic anarchy were numerous.

Manpower was used just as wastefully. The neglect of the social area and the lack of efficient forms of labor organization and incentive substantially lowered labor productivity. For the same reason cadre turnover had reached a critical level. In order to compensate for low labor efficiency, the enterprises had to have high manpower surpluses. Under conditions of harsh command management methods the growth of the administrative apparatus was marked by high rates.

All of these problems were aggravated as a result of the real threat of war and a significant increase in the size of the Armed Forces and in defense expenditures.

Unquestionably, the existing situation required that steps be taken. The choice of such steps was extremely limited. Under the specific conditions of the 3rd 5-Year Plan the only remaining option was the use of the customary and already developed administrative-repressive methods. Their area of application at that point reached its peak.

The administrative apparatus grew and, at the same time, its already substantial rights concerning the use of repressive measures were further increased. In 1939, for example, a mandatory minimum of labor days was set for the kolkhoz members; failure to work the minimum labor days carried the threat of expulsion from the kolkhoz and, therefore, the loss of all means of subsistence. In 1940 production of substandard or unfinished goods was equated to sabotage. During the 3rd 5-Year Plan penalties for the violation of labor discipline were increased as well.

In December 1938 an extensive resolution was passed on steps aimed at streamlining labor discipline. In particular, it stipulated mandatory firing for being three times late for work or other violations in the course of 1

month; workers and employees who had left their enterprise could be expelled within 10 days from their departmental-owned housing; a resignation request required 1 month notice. Labor books were introduced at enterprises and offices starting with 1939.

However, soon afterwards it became clear that in themselves these steps were not all that effective. The basic reasons for the high turnover—poor working conditions, wage equalization and lack of housing—remained, for which reason the obstacles which had erected up to hinder resignations were being inventively surmounted and triggered new problems instead of resolving old ones. Many workers easily "lost" their labor books and, considering the scarcity of cadres, were quickly issued new ones. Some of the consequences of the implementation of the 1938 law were unexpected. The makers of the law, for example, believed that to a certain extent the labor turnover would be reduced if a month's notice had to be given to the administration. Actually, before resigning, the people looked for new jobs but their new employers did not always agree to wait a whole month. Many enterprising workers learned how to circumvent this obstacle by using that same law: they deliberately showed up for work late, for which reason they were immediately fired for truancy. Lateness for work incidentally, had to exceed 20 minutes, for which reason this method was known as "playing at 21."

Naturally, various interpretations were possible in assessing the experience from the implementation of the 1938 resolution. In all likelihood, some people did understand that administrative measures were not omnipotent and that other solutions to the problem should be sought. However, a different point of view prevailed and, obviously, given the specific circumstances of the 3rd 5-Year Plan, was bound to prevail: since the "dam" was leaking ("there were loopholes for drifters and truants," as the people said at that time) it had to be made higher and stronger. This led to the 26 June 1940 Ukase.

Its full title was the following: Ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium "On Conversion to an 8-Hour Workday and 7-Day Workweek and Banning the Unauthorized Resignation of Workers and Employees from Enterprises and Offices." In addition to increasing the working time (by an average of 33 hours monthly) harsh penalties were imposed for absenteeism and the worker was assigned to the enterprise. Absenteeism without legitimate reasons was punished with corrective labor at the place of work for no more than 6 months and loss of 25 percent of wages. Unauthorized leaving of an enterprise or office was punishable with a prison term of 2 to 4 months. The judges had to try such cases within 5 days and sentences were executed immediately. It was only the enterprise manager who could allow a worker or employee to leave, under cases strictly stipulated by the law: illness, retirement, or training. According to the same ukase, managers who avoided prosecuting the workers in court were themselves prosecuted.

According to B.L. Vannikov, people's commissar for armaments, Stalin reluctantly agreed to the promulgation of the ukase, yielding to the pressure of the economic managers. Whether the leader was sincere or pretending which, incidentally, was not all that infrequent, this meant that some fears concerning the ukase, political more than anything else, nonetheless existed. Actually, from the political viewpoint the ukase consisted of two seemingly conflicting parts. On the one hand, the workday was lengthened without any material compensation (which was stipulated in a special ukase), implying an appeal to the conscientiousness and patriotism of the people. On the other, the use of harsh punishment questioned their ability to make such sacrifices or their desire to work conscientiously. Essentially, these steps which threatened every worker could not be popular. The Stalinist leadership was aware of this.

Nonetheless, the ukase was passed. Probably, once again, the decisive role here was played by faith in the universal efficiency of bureaucratic administration and repression. It was hoped that the ukase would help to stop cadre turnover, strengthen the positions of production managers and bring order. Other considerations were also possible. We know, for example, that during the 3rd 5-Year Plan many national economic plans were being managed by the NKVD. Detentions were the main source for supplying manpower to this people's commissariat, and although such detentions never stopped, there no longer was such a substantial influx of inmates as there had been in 1937-1938. Taking into consideration also the high mortality rate at NKVD projects, we may assume that this economic sector was experiencing major manpower difficulties. To a certain extent, the 26 June Ukase gave hope that this problem as well would be solved.

The promulgation of this ukase, which supplied one more proof that its lack of popularity was realized, was accompanied by a powerful although somewhat hasty propaganda campaign. On 26 June, the day the ukase was passed, the newspapers carried the appeal of the AUCCTU to all men and women workers, engineers, technicians and employees and to all members of trade unions. Reminding them of the increased threat of war, the AUCCTU suggested the implementation of the steps which, the very next day, were published as a ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. Along with the ukase, an explanatory report submitted by N.M. Shvernik, AUCCTU secretary, to the AUCCTU Plenum was published. The newspapers also carried the first reports on meetings held at various enterprises in the country. As early as 27 June, along with the text of the ukase, MOSKOVSKIY BOLSHEVIK was able to publish a report on its discussion at the evening shift of the Dinamo Plant. According to the newspaper, the worker Trifonov had said: "The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase... expresses the will of all honest working people in our country."

This theme, added to reminders of the threat of war, was basic to all reports on meetings and propaganda articles,

which were quite similar to each other in tone. Obviously, it was a question not simply of presenting the ukase as a result of the urgent wishes of the working class. The people of the 1930s had already participated in various campaigns of exposing enemies and production disorganizers and their accomplices. They knew how rapidly a wave of repression could exceed all bounds. For that reason, once again, with a view to strengthening political stability, which was so urgently needed, considering the difficult international situation, it was as though workers and employees had been given the advance promise that as far as repressions went, the ukase would affect only a minority which, as the AUCCTU appeal noted, would affect "3-4 percent of young workers and employees... who, switching from one plant to another, undermine the discipline and are unwilling to work honestly...." Conscientious workers had nothing to fear, they would not be touched.

It would be difficult to determine the extent to which the participants in the June meetings realized that matters would not be limited to the promised percentages. In any case, even those who believed this were to be profoundly disappointed quite quickly.

Several days after the publication of the ukase, TASS reported the first cases of prosecution for absenteeism and lateness in Moscow and Moscow Oblast, Leningrad, Tula and Kaluga. As time passed, such reports increased in number and the persistently encouraged campaign assumed a wide scope. Rank-and-file workers and employees were tried; directors, considered insufficiently active in implementing the ukase, were tried as well. One month after the promulgation of the ukase, more than 100,000 such cases had been instigated.

Absenteeism declined but no tangible improvements occurred in the national economy. In most enterprises, despite the lengthened working day, production increases were extremely insignificant and, in a number of cases, there were none. Furthermore, the implementation of the ukase met with spontaneous but quite stubborn opposition.

From the very beginning, in order to accelerate the campaign and mold the necessary public opinion, show trials were organized. A witness to one of them wrote: "Today, for the first time in Gorkiy, absenteeists were tried at the automotive plant. Because of its show nature, the case was tried directly in the shop. Men and women workers of the first shift crowded the red corner where the trial took place. Exceptional interest was shown.... Shabunina, an illiterate worker and unskilled laborer at the pressing shop was being tried. She had come to work almost half an hour late. This was the first time she had been late in 4 years of work at the plant. Asked by the president of the court, the witness—the chief of sector—gave the best possible production reference to Shabunina.... Shabunina pleaded guilty. She explained her lateness by the fact that the previous evening relatives had come to visit her, stayed late, her husband worked the night shift, and this was the first time that she overslept.

She repented in court: "I never thought that I would dishonor myself as a worker." When Comrade Gusev, the prosecutor of Avtozavodskiy Rayon, asked for the maximum punishment—6 months corrective labor—the president had to quiet the noise in the hall. An unpleasant discussion broke out between the prosecutor and the defense attorney. Each one of them spoke twice. The lawyer spoke spontaneously, his arguments were convincing and his witticism addressed at the prosecutor triggered an adverse reaction in the hall. The court sentenced Shabunina to 5 months of corrective labor at her place of work and docked 10 percent of her wages."

A number of similar facts could be cited. The efforts to win over public opinion and make it actively to support the implementation of the ukase did not yield the desired effect. Common sense indicated to the people that excessively zealous participation in the campaign was the equivalent of self-sentencing: "You instruct a party member to give a simple talk, to create a certain public opinion toward the truant but he finds it inexpedient to speak of this... for the reason that, unexpectedly, the same could happen to him." Both the press and various documents cited quite a number of examples of "connivance," as they said at that time, but which was actually a silent solidarity in opposing a harsh law. The "complaint" of the PRAVDA correspondent voiced against the party organization at the Leningrad Plant imeni OGPU was typical: "Koltsov," he wrote, "was expelled from the VKP(b) (for violating the ukase—author); however, he was expelled without being put to shame, without hatred for a production disorganizer; he was not surrounded by scorn."

It would be difficult to believe that moods of discontent did not affect behavior. Naturally, there could not even be a question of any organized opposition. It was simply that people, motivated by normal human feelings, tried to ease the fate of the victim, to soften the blow of the governmental machinery, the more so since in many cases, from the moral viewpoint, those sentenced did not deserve such cruel punishments. Some of them had been late because of the poor work of the transportation system; there were those who could not properly rest in the crowded barracks; there were women whose children had not been accepted in kindergartens, etc. The law was equally merciless toward all, for which reason one of the widespread methods of opposition was the close study of the "case," and to find alleviating circumstances. "...A large number of examples could be cited," complained People's Commissar A.I. Shakhurin, addressing the plenum of the Central Committee of the Union of Aviation Industry Workers, "...of statements that someone should be tried whereas the members of the group (the trade union—author) would say that he should be reprimanded and that they had analyzed all the reasons, those related to daily life and others. And all of this instead of treating this question on the level of a principle."

Some judges and, clearly and particularly people's assessors, were not all that willing to raise this question to the

"level of a principle." Such a straight and lifeless principle-mindedness was difficult to accept by some enterprise managers. Some of them concealed cases of absenteeism, granted workers 2 or 3-day unpaid leave, and so on. In a number of cases workers and economic managers did not conceal their negative attitude toward the new procedure for assigning cadres. For example, PRAVDA provided a critical explanation of such feelings shown by Leningrad workers: "...I feel doubtful about it. The result is that now I cannot budge from my place as I wish;" "now, what this means, if I disagree with the director, he will not expel me from the plant even if a hundred valid reasons exist...." MOSKOVSKIY BOLSHEVIK chastised Belov, director of the Serpukhovo Motorcycle Plant, who believed that demands for resignation should be met.

In the very first days following the implementation of the ukase, it became clear that this legislation nonetheless had loopholes which made circumventing it possible. For example, the law called for dismissal for petty thefts at work and many workers, seeing no other possibility of leaving the enterprise, would steal and be fired. Unwittingly, the number of such pilferers increased. Occasionally, stupid situations developed at the plant gates. The newly hatched "pilferers" themselves showed the careless guards their stolen items.

The Stalinist leadership, which had fully mastered strictly repressive methods for managing the country, had a simple interpretation for all such cases: they were the main reason for the poor effect which the new law had on the economic situation. All efforts and means of the huge governmental machinery were concentrated on surmounting the wheel-spinning of the ukase.

The next party Central Committee plenum was held on 29-31 July 1940. Among others, this was perhaps the only case in the past 30 years that a plenum had dealt with the implementation of a single law—the 26 June Ukase. The plenum's resolutions on this problem were not made public. However, a certain idea of them could be gained by its contemporaries from articles in the press and the turn of practical events which took place soon afterwards.

"The main task of all party organizations concerning industry," PRAVDA emphasized after the plenum, "is now to ensure management and control over the implementation of the measures on conversion to an 8-hour workday and 7-day workweek and of prohibiting the resignation of workers and employees from enterprises and offices." Priority was given to the requirement of taking more strictly to task enterprise managers for the implementation of the ukase. With increasing frequency the press reported on trials of managers. Directors were being tried, as the author of one of the articles which popularized the new course explained, "for failure to be in control.... For failure to promote discipline even at the cost of taking repressive measures, for spinelessness and for sentimentalism...." USSR Prosecutor Pankratyev

himself was the victim of the struggle against the "sentimentalists." He was removed from his position for failure to supervise the implementation of the 26 June Ukase. On 5 August 1940 PRAVDA published the editorial "Protecting the Truants Is a Crime Against the State," which condemned the "rotten liberals"—heads of enterprises and court officials.

Ideological indoctrination and the trials of "protectors" were soon supplemented with legislative steps. On 10 August 1940 the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium promulgated two other ukases: the first stipulated that cases of absenteeism and resignation from enterprises and offices would henceforth be tried without the participation of the people's assessors. The second increased liability for petty theft at work: instead of dismissal, 1 year in jail, thus plugging the last loophole for those who wished to leave. Having thus blocked all outlets, the state launched a hunt for absenteeists, applying the standard rules of mass repressions, which had been well worked out and were merciless.

By 15 September 1940 more than 1 million cases had been tried throughout the country, related to the application of the 26 June Ukase. Therefore, whereas in the first month of the application of the ukase there were more than 100,000 cases of labor discipline violation, as we pointed out, there were 900,000 in the 45 days which followed. However, as had frequently been the case in the past with administrative measures, the increased strictness of the penalties resulted in an even greater disorder and increased irresponsibility and demoralization.

The most obvious result of these efforts was the unparalleled increase in various "breakdowns." In general, the experience from the application of the 26 June Ukase lets us take a close look at this phenomenon, traditional to the command system. The system uses the concept of "breakdown" frequently, ascribing to it anything that is unpleasant and scandalous and paralleling administrative-repressive measures. Yet the widespread nature of "breakdowns" and their systematic nature could have, one may think, led to the following idea: Could it be that such a "breakdown" was the obligatory and inevitable result of administration by fiat? If economic methods, the implementation of which requires major efforts are, in the final account, organically part of reality, are self-reproducing and act on a semi-automatic basis, in the case of administrative methods matters are different. They are aimed against the realities of life. They build an artificial environment and, therefore, they lack any internal sources of development and need constant and increasingly greater external impetus, which makes it possible to "urge on" reality and, therefore, are inevitably of a "breakdown" nature. It is easy to notice that the history of the 26 June Ukase was, in that sense, classical.

F.F. Denisov, born 1875, worker at Printing Plant No 1 in Voronezh, was sentenced to 2 months of corrective labor at his job, with a docking of 15 percent of his

wages, for being 24 minutes late. Denisov, whose production experience stretched over 50 years, had worked in that printing press since it was founded and not once had he allowed a faulty product, or been guilty of absenteeism or lateness. He had received bonuses repeatedly. He was late because by habit he had showed up for work at 1600 hours, having forgotten that as a result of the conversion to an 8-hour workday, the beginning of his shift had been moved to 1530 hours. A woman working at the Kharkov Tractors Plant had forgotten her pass at home and, at the plant gate, was turned back to fetch it. She came back 15 minutes later. This sufficed for the court to sentence her to 2 months of corrective labor and to dock 20 percent of her wages. Leningrad worker Nikitina, mother of 5 children, returning from leave after giving birth, asked the enterprise's manager to be laid off. The management refused either to dismiss her or to find a place in the nursery for her child. Nikitina was forced to be absent and was sentenced to 4 months in jail.

The difficult housing and living conditions, shortage of children's institutions, as was repeatedly written at that time, made mothers particularly helpless. However, even realizing the absurdity and cruelty of such penalties for women who found themselves in a hopeless situation, enterprise managers did not dare help them. The ukase prohibited resignations for the purpose of caring for children and granting leave for this reason was qualified as "rotten liberalism." As a result, situations arose such as the one described at the plenum of the Central Committee of a trade union: a worker, reaching the point of despair, had come to the plant with a 45-day old child; she was not allowed to work at the enterprise; they were unable to secure a place in the nursery and were afraid to grant her leave of absence.

A large category of felons consisted of victims of the poor work of the transportation system, people who had been unable to purchase a ticket to return from their regular leave, etc. Frequently workers and employees were late because the administration did not announce on time changes in their work schedule. Another typical category of felons was that of workers who had failed to show up for work because a member of their family had fallen severely ill, despite the fact that the illness had been documented with a disability document. There were frequent cases in which judges rejected any reference to illness or old age only because the accused had no medical certificate. Incidentally, it was becoming increasingly difficult to obtain a medical reference, for physicians as well were frequently accused of liberalism and patronage and, in frequent cases, were demonstratively brought to trial. In some cases, the frightened administration did not accept a medical certificate, sending the case of the sick person to the court, letting it to handle it.

On the surface, such actions by enterprise managers and judges seem unlikely. In fact, however, they can be easily explained. In implementing exceptional repressive measures, those who carry them out always find it simpler to



"overstep" than "fall short." Fearing the threat of punishment, many economic managers and even judges totally stopped to think, for thinking and studying the case frequently meant paying for one's "liberalism." For example, the director of the Stalingrad Tractor's Plant (a very big enterprise, whose director was a famous person and, therefore, better protected), issued an order according to which the case would be sent to the court on the 2nd day after a case of absenteeism, although the law called for transferring the case on the 2nd day after the reasons for absenteeism had been deemed insubstantial. Dozens of innocent people were thus sentenced, including those who had been sick for more than 2 days. "We are plagued with overinsured economic managers," Ukrainian Judge A.P. Zaporozhchenko said. "We are forced to fight not only truants but also overinsurers who submit cases to the court with no reason whatsoever."

However, the judges as well overinsured themselves. Constantly urged on, limited by tight 5-day deadlines for the trying of cases, and deprived of people's assessors, less and less frequently did the judges study the circumstances of the case and ever more frequently supported the decisions of the administration. Incidentally, in the essay on Zaporozhchenko (entitled "A Fighter for Revolutionary Legality"), the following fact was cited as an illustration of a model judge: "In cases of absenteeism Zaporozhchenko has revoked no more than 2 or 3 sentences."

Revoking sentences based on the 26 June ukase began after it became clear that repressions had exceeded all limits. Temporarily the Stalinist leadership retreated and the USSR Supreme Court provided the following explanation: "The trying of criminal cases, as stipulated in the 26 June 1940 Ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, without a proper investigation of the circumstances could bring about either the release from legal responsibility of a malicious violator of labor discipline or the sentencing of an innocent person." It was at that point that the sentences on the cases we described were lifted. Without it, we would have been unable to determine the fate of those people, any more than, to this day, we know about the fate of hundreds of thousands of people tried on the basis of the 26 June Ukase, who were less lucky.

Therefore, to a certain extent the tremendous moral damage caused by the application of the ukase was, to a certain extent, officially acknowledged. However, the economic expediency of this step, which was the main reason for which this ukase had been promulgated under the difficult prewar conditions, was never questioned. That is precisely why to this day some people believe in its expediency.

After studying a number of testimonies and documents related to the ukase, I am sure of the following: the question of its economic expediency, as that of other similar steps, was never studied. It was accepted as an axiom.

But let us compare a few generally known figures. Increasing the working time by 33 hours monthly as a result of a conversion to an 8-hour workday and a 7-day workweek was the equivalent to adding to industry about half a million workers for a period of 6 months. The 26 June Ukase significantly contributed to reducing absenteeism and manpower turnover. For example, compared with the same period in 1939, absenteeism in industry in the 4th quarter of 1940 had declined by a factor of more than 3. Increases in industrial output totaled 14.7 percent in 1939 and 11 percent in 1940.

In comparing these figures with the statements by contemporaries to the effect that after the enactment of the ukase enterprises began to work only slightly better and, in a number of cases, even worse and that excessive hopes were being put on the ukase, we may conclude that the initial estimates related to the ukase proved unjustified. The correlation between discipline and increased labor productivity was much more complex than the supporters of administration by fiat believed. There is a threshold of coercion, apparently not too high, beyond which its effect is primarily destructive, merely triggering the illusion of order. The command system which strove to achieve administrative omnipotence could not fail to cross this threshold, for which reason it steadily destroyed what it created.

The unquestionable advantages of a certain strengthening of the discipline were lost through the effect of a significant number of negative factors caused by the ukase. The excessive harshness of the law and the repressive procedures applied in its implementation created an overstressed moral and psychological atmosphere in the collectives. Reinsurance, reduced responsibility, a wave of slanderous accusations aimed at settling accounts and, finally, the bitterness of the punished (there had been cases of people sentenced to forced labor deliberately breaking machine tools or producing defective goods) made simply impossible to determine the moral and economic harm of all this.

Reliance on bare administrative fiat contributed, as a rule, to the blossoming of strict but incompetent managers. Totally relying on the power of punishment, they enthusiastically undertook the implementation of the ukase and came out on top, for the criteria in assessing the work of the manager were abnormally amended: the more cases he sent to the court, the better it was for the director. The ukase fully satisfied the administrative feelings of such managers, strengthening their faith in the omnipotence of cruelty, enabling them, on legal grounds, to ignore the solution of economic problems which they understood little and which irritated them.

"I now feel entirely like a captain of industry..." PRAVDA quoted a foreman. "When I tour my section, the people try to work harder, with greater attention." These words contained a significant amount of truth. Workers and employees found themselves in a truly unparalleled dependence on enterprise and office managers. Naturally, strengthening the power of managers

contributed to strengthening the discipline. However, the question of whether this discipline would be formal—dependent on the arrival and departure of the superior—or else would be used in the interest of production intensification could not be answered in the least with the help of this ukase. Furthermore, the expansion of administrative power frequently corrupted totally the thick stratum of authoritarian managers, depriving them of any incentive to learn economic management methods.

It was obvious, for example, that the harshly condemned worker turnover nonetheless fulfilled an important function of having a reverse influence on managers. Considering the shortage of cadres, "voting with one's feet" prevented, to a certain extent, the open neglect of social problems, problems of labor organization and incentives and, to a certain extent, contributed to improvements in economic management methods and, consequently, to production intensification. The enactment of the 26 June Ukase meant that efforts to solve problems of the efficient use of manpower resources through economic methods had been rejected. After giving the ukase its due, in its editorial "Labor Discipline Is an Inviolable Law," the newspaper LESNAYA PROMYSHLENNOST reminded managers of their responsibility for the workers in their care and the fact that concern for the needs of the people is the best method for surmounting turnover and absenteeism. This article was considered politically harmful. Relying on total impunity and unlimited opportunity to apply even the most archaic means in their use of manpower, many managers concentrated exclusively on the use of assault methods in the organization of labor.

For example, overtime became widespread. This problem became so pressing that it was a topic of discussion at the plenums of sectorial trade unions, held at the end of 1940 and beginning of 1941. On this subject the presidium of the central committee of the trade union of workers in the low-tension electric power industry passed a resolution in which examples were cited of workers not leaving their shops for several days running. Thus, from 24 to 27 April 1941 the fitter Ozerov had worked 22 hours daily; his colleagues Uskov and Yefremov had worked 14.5-15.5 hours daily without time off from 9 to 28 May. It would have been well and good if such overtime had been truly needed! The use of extensive overtime, the resolution emphasized, was "the result of internal plant shortcomings" or, as one of the speakers at the plenum of the Central Committee of Armament Workers Trade Union put it more frankly, "overtime conceals production scandals."

"Scandals" and basic irresponsibility were concealed not only with the help of overtime. Workers were frequently forced to carry out assignments under inadmissible working conditions and with faulty equipment. In order to teach them not to plead tiredness, the workers were taken to court for absenteeism. The managers of the people's commissariats, once manpower had been assigned to the plant, had fewer reasons to burden

themselves with economic problems. "During the third quarter," a representative of one of the enterprises said, "we idled.... The people had nothing to do for more than 2 months. We used this manpower for other things: in transportation, or clearing the snow, or else we simply pushed the people around.... This discouraged them and harmed them materially. Without the law which prohibited the leaving of enterprises, I am sure that one-half of the people would have left."

The greatly weakened incentive to improve the organization of labor adversely affected the growth of labor productivity and quality improvements. This also significantly led to a further worsening of lateness and absenteeism, leading to the paradoxical situation in which, despite stricter liability violations of discipline reached a fixed level and even increased. The threat of punishment could not prevent the adverse impact of factors, such as neglect of the social area, equalization, and poor labor conditions. The admission of the prosecutor of Moscow Oblast, made in April 1941, was characteristic. In a number of rayons, he said, absenteeism is increasing despite the ukase. For example, since the enactment of the ukase, 12.8 percent of the workers at the Istonkino Factory had been prosecuted. "As you can see," the prosecutor summed this up, "a great deal of cases of absenteeism are sent to the courts but the results are poor."

The obviously faulty and excessive expectations of the administration forced a certain correction in the attitude toward the ukase. An indirect criticism of it was contained in statements on the inadmissibility of relying on an automatic increase in labor productivity as a result of the ukase. Propaganda enthusiasm in mentioning the ukase slackened as well.

The campaign aimed at strengthening the discipline was subjected to mild criticism at the 18th Conference of the VKP(b) which, at the beginning of 1941, dealt with problem of the development of industry and transportation. As A. Shcherbakov, Moscow city party committee secretary, said, in promulgating this ukase it was expected that the growth of industrial output would be no less than 14 percent, something which did not happen. For example, in the second half of the year output in a number of Moscow plants declined compared with the first half. The result was that "although working 8 instead of 7 hours, the people manage to produce less. The reason is that at such enterprises slackness and lack of organization are excessively high and the workers idle." The same views were expressed by A. Kuznetsov, Leningrad party gorkom secretary. "In assessing the strengthening of labor discipline," he said, "unquestionably, we must not limit ourselves to a single criterion, that of reducing absenteeism and manpower turnover." It is also necessary to organize the work, to liquidate idling, rushing and overtime. The resolutions passed at the conference noted that the ukase had played a significant role in strengthening the discipline but that the hopes based on it had not been fully justified.

"...Absenteeism and unauthorized leaving of many factories, plants, pits, mines and railroads have by no means come to an end." Characteristically, the resolutions adopted at the conference listed the ukase as one of the steps for improving the economic situation, such as the use of cost accounting, improving labor incentive and increasing cadre initiative.

The resolutions adopted at the next Central Committee plenum, held in February 1941, marked a certain withdrawal from the July 1940 Central Committee Plenum, which had discussed essentially problems of strengthening administrative pressure over managers. It dealt mainly with the problem of awarding bonuses to managers and distinguished workers and increasing material incentives for the rhythmical implementation of plans and mastering the production of new goods.

As is usually the case with administrative measures, the ukase continued to operate in a semi-weakened state. It could not be annulled, but many violations of the ukase were ignored, unnecessary "principle-mindedness" was rejected and people became tired of useless insistence. The practice of legalizing absenteeism by granting short leave without pay intensified before the war; directors willingly allowed people to leave the enterprise and turnover became substantial. Managers protected the violators of the ukase more firmly, as they considered alleviating circumstances. From time to time, all of this was followed by "priming," but without the former enthusiasm and more for the sake of "procedure."

The ukase was repealed on 25 April 1956. A complex and contradictory process of abandoning excessive methods of social management was beginning to take place in the country.

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## IN COUNTRIES OF SOCIALISM: ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS, QUESTS

### Choosing a Path of Development—the Lao Variant (Thoughts Following a Trip to the Lao People's Democratic Republic)

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[Article by Valeriy Grigoryevich Golobokov and Vadim Panteleymonovich Trubnikov, KOMMUNIST associates]

[Text] We flew from snow-covered Moscow to the lush tropics not only to see their exotic nature or gather unusual impressions on the basis of which we could write a lively travelogue. What interested us more was the sociological problem of the choice of path of development, an original Laotian model. The restless areas of Asia and the endless waters of the Indian Ocean slid under the wing of the aircraft. We flew over one of the

poorest countries in the world a country which, 13 years ago, had dared to start from virtually a "historical scratch."

**Reference Point.** Naturally, this is not to say that the Laotian people do not have a history rich in events and a most ancient culture. Both exist. One can clearly see this from the very first trip to the country. In this case, however, it is a question of something entirely different, of a reference point in assessing the attainability of the strategic objective formulated by the Lao People's Revolutionary Party and adopted by the people, and the objective socioeconomic conditions and starting point of advance toward this objective.

We already knew something from the press about the "starting level" of this movement. Laos is an agrarian country, the overwhelming majority of whose active population (more than 80 percent) is employed in agriculture which has an archaic structure. Above all, it is a barter, a closed economy, i.e., an economy oriented toward the satisfaction of the few basic needs of the producers themselves. Fewer middle-sized than small enterprises predominated in industry, essentially manufacturing tobacco products, cigarettes, matches, goods made of wood, shoes, and refreshing beverages. With the exception of tin, substantial natural resources—copper, zinc, iron, and rivers with a high power potential—remain virtually untouched. In other words, it is a country with rich natural resources and undeveloped economy, which is capable of maintaining only the minimal living standard. Actually, all of this is simply the starting point in the history of any nation.

Under such circumstances, is a course toward socialism, which requires, if it is to realize its potential, a high standard of economic, social and spiritual development, not utopian? The more so if we take into consideration the difficulty and complexity of building a new society, encountered today by countries which took this path more than a decade ago, countries which had already attained a much higher level of socioeconomic development.

Naturally, Laos is an intrinsic part of the contemporary world and cannot remain outside of the vital universal human problems which include surmounting backwardness and poverty and creating a society worthy of man, under conditions of a universal lasting peace. It is entirely understandable that for a nation which has experienced colonial and national oppression and which, together with the fraternal peoples of Vietnam and Cambodia, suffered the hardships of a lengthy and difficult national liberation struggle which it won, the idea of socialism is quite attractive. However, developing an enthusiasm for an idea is one thing and its implementation, something entirely different. Is there not a gap which appears here between wish and reality, a gap caused by the revolutionary aspiration to eliminate socioeconomic backwardness as rapidly as possible? Impatience has always been a feature of revolutions and has frequently hindered them. "One must become

imbued with a healthy mistrust of a hasty and quick development forward," V.I. Lenin wrote in his address to the Soviet communists on 2 March 1923, in his last article. "...One must consider testing the steps which we proclaim with every passing hour and take with every passing minute, after which, with every passing second, we prove their impermanence, weakness and incomprehensibility" ("*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 45, p 390).

Under contemporary conditions such impatience could become even worse: the gap is widening between developed countries and countries which are trying to put an end to their backwardness. The feeling of this gap intolerably burns the hearts, and the bright world becomes so greatly attractive, although it is located in a different historical time period.

Could a desired objective become reality in the future? What kind of social choice should be made? What should guide us in determining our way of development? Such are the problems which each nation solves in its own way, independently. "When the power went to the people, and when the state became the master of all the resources of the country and seized the command heights of the national economy," explains Kaysone Phomvihane, chairman of the LPDR Council of Ministers and general secretary of the LPRP Central Committee, "Laos received aid and assistance from the fraternal socialist countries. These sociopolitical aspects became the primary and, at the same time, the decisive prerequisite for the conversion of the country to socialism. This means that we did not wait for the development of production forces but began, as Lenin said, 'with a revolutionary seizure of the prerequisites'."

The choice was made and friendly international aid and assistance were secured. Over the past 13 years a great deal has been accomplished. Nonetheless, the impatient aspiration to cover as quickly as possible the distance from the wooden plow and the hoe to a contemporary economy could not fail to have an impact. Haste not only triggers tremendous enthusiasm but also is frequently the reason for wrong formulations of ways and means. This worsens the objective difficulties of an already difficult constructive process.

Nor was the LPRP able to avoid all this during the first decade of implementing the tasks of the transition to socialism. "Until recently," K. Phomvihane explained recently, "we assumed that a barter economy can be restructured on the basis of the development of the state and the collective economic sectors. This, however, did occur." The straight way of accelerated development of social production forces without establishing forms of production organization and methods of economic activities consistent with the country's socioeconomic standard did not yield the expected results although the country did not stand still and made progress in a number of important areas of social life. As in some other socialist countries, initially Laos underestimated the significance of material incentives in economic and

social progress. The conservatism of a patriarchal way of life and the inability of a barter system, which prevailed in the country, to undertake a dynamic development, were not adequately taken into consideration. The market and commodity-monetary relations were not judged economic instruments worthy of consideration as leading factors in the advance toward socialism. Inevitably, given these circumstances, as the party documents emphasized, command-administrative methods prevailed in management practices.

Having soberly analyzed developments, the party charted a course toward a radical renovation of the entire economic management system, rejecting the bureaucratic and administrative-subsidy mechanism of economic management, while encouraging the purposeful conversion from a bartering to a commodity system and developing commodity-monetary relations and the marketplace, while increasing state industry and promoting the growth of cooperatives in trade, crafts and agriculture. The 4th LPRP Congress of June 1986 and the subsequent Central Committee plenums (fifth, sixth and seventh) formulated and concretized the basic directions of this course on the basis of the creative application of the Leninist ideas of the NEP and the strengthening of the political system of a people's democracy. A more accurate definition was also given to the coordinates of the historical process: the country is at the very initial stage of the transitional period to socialism.

**The Heart of the Problem.** Naturally, questions of how is the new party course being implemented, what problems and difficulties of a practical and theoretical nature arise along this way, and what is the nature of the sociopolitical and spiritual situation in the country were the focal points of all our meetings and talks in Laos.

The first meeting in Vientiane, the Laotian capital, was with Munkeo Olabun, the editor-in-chief of ALUN MAY, the journal of the LPRP Central Committee. Now, he said, we are adding up the results and reassessing achievements. The overall atmosphere in the country has noticeably improved since the 4th Party Congress: a national market is being organized, the production of industrial and agricultural commodities has increased and the population's living standard is rising. Steps are being taken to upgrade economic returns from all five economic systems: socialist, state-capitalist, private capitalist, petty-commodity and barter. Incidentally, our interlocutor emphasized, the most important thing today for us is to convert within the shortest possible time the barter economy to commodity production. The party considers this the decisive link in its economic strategy, which would enable us to pull the entire chain of socioeconomic problems.

Many enterprises have started to work more efficiently. Private and state prices have been standardized. The results of 1988 indicate that tangible features of a healthy competition in production and marketing have appeared. Labor productivity has increased, and economic incentive in production is beginning to play a

growing role. Last year trade increased sharply (by 165 percent). As a whole, something which is especially noteworthy, there have been changes from a barter to a commodity economy.

However, he went on to say, the country's socioeconomic development is a conflicting process. It is not simply the question of a prevailing barter economy, as in the past, or that entire areas of the country still find it difficult to support themselves with food, or else that as a result of the low standard of farming agricultural production is still greatly dependent on the whims of the weather (because of the drought in some provinces the 1988 harvest was below that of the bountiful 1985). The implementation of the new principles of economic management and the increasing use of market instruments brought about new problems, at least at this stage in the reform.

An abnormal situation has developed, above all in tax collection, which is today the main source of budget revenue although, on the other hand, compared to the previous year, more taxes were collected in 1988. A significant percentage of private entrepreneurs try to avoid reporting their activities and therefore paying taxes. State enterprises as well do not meet the rates of withholdings for the state budget. Following are some data on the first 8 months of 1988: the state fuel company was scheduled to withhold 8 billion kips; instead, it transferred to the state budget no more than 1.5 billion; respective figures for the export-import company were 1.5 billion and 200 million, and for the materials procurement company of the Ministry of Agriculture, 374 million and 6.7 million. Many similar examples could be cited. All of this is the consequence of the insufficient development of the economic mechanism and the low level of economic knowledge....

Our talk with Munkeo Olabun clearly pointed at the core of the problems which, one way or another, were raised in all subsequent meetings, and the signs of which we detected at literally every step. Assembled, these are the difficulties of coordinating the national economy, the market and the new state economic management methods.

**Some Theories.** The scant added product of the barter economy dictates the need for social concentration and its utilization with a view to developing the key production areas. This is one of the reasons for the attraction which underdeveloped societies have for centralized forms of economic management, for the first prerequisite for progress is the possibility of concentrating ways and means in the hands of the state for their purposeful utilization in decisive development areas. In order to become truly socialist, this advantage of centralized management must be based on modern production forces, a widespread and varied system of public production, a stable national market and, above all, on individuals with developed demands and interests. In countries such as Laos, all of this is as yet to be accomplished.

The centralization of the overall added product under the conditions of an economic system still based on an essentially barter economy, although it allows, for a while, to make quite efficient use of this product in the most important areas of social progress and thereby to create some prerequisites for surmounting underdevelopment, invariably reaches internal limits. The point is that extracting a significant amount of added product for public needs turns into an increasing preservation of the barter economy itself, for it does not make it possible to promote even a minimal expanded reproduction even extensively and undermines already weak labor incentives. In turn, this lowers the growth of the overall social added product and reduces the possibility of the state to develop the key economic sectors. This marks the closing of the circle.

Roughly, this was the path followed in the economic development of the Lao People's Democratic Republic until 1986, when the 4th Party Congress made major corrections in economic strategy, aimed at the conversion of the prevalent bartering system to a commodity-oriented economy. However, is such a conversion possible without irreversible social cataclysms? Both the history of development of capitalism and contemporary practical experience in converting the economy to commodity output by a number of third world countries clearly shows the harsh consequences of applying the classical methods of the "age of initial accumulations:" the impoverishment of huge peasant masses, hunger and suffering of millions of people, distorted urbanization with the development of slums, and maximal social stress. We can certify that none of this is found in Laos. Having crisscrossed the country over hundreds of kilometers and seen, in addition to the capital, other cities and villages, we did not encounter beggars, or hungry or homeless people, people mercilessly thrown out of normal social and economic life, such as can be seen in many third world countries.

What are the reasons for such a social result of an essentially identical economic process occurring in Laos, compared with countries with a capitalist orientation?

As we know, historically a barter economy breaks down under the influence of commodity trade which develops from it and which initially is of a purely accidental nature, consisting of an exchange of surplus products but which, subsequently, increasingly becomes natural, subordinating, initially with the help of commercial capital, the production process and determining the social division of labor. This process appears to be directed from turnover to production. It could lead and, as a rule, does leads to the bankruptcy and loss of their land by huge masses of the patriarchal peasantry. At the same time, the possibility of a different result is not excluded: the intensification and qualitative changes in the economic incentive of the direct producers, for trade changes their needs and brings to life new labor incentives. However, in order to prevent the process of reorganizing a barter economy into a higher type of output from leading to an economic breakdown, the worker must remain the owner

of the means of production and gradually, step-by-step, turn into a commodity producer and become part of the market with the development of joint and cooperative activities—procurement and marketing above all.

Our Laotian friends believe that such humane forms and purposeful constructive activities could be ascribed to the process of eliminating the barter economy but only by a people's democratic state which must base its policy on the knowledge of economic laws and anticipate the necessary stages of development.

Briefly, such are the theoretical foundations of the new Laotian economic policy.

The present course of the LPRP toward the reorganization of the barter economy is based on two foundations: the development of cooperatives and a commodity market. As to the production area itself, it is as yet to be organized on the basis of new, collectivistic principles but with major corrections.

The point is that in the first stages, no one realized either theoretically or practically the fact that the self-sufficient peasant farm was poorly receptive to accepting higher forms of cooperativization, involving the socialization of the land and labor tools, and collective forms of work. It soon became clear that the type of socialization which was promoted during the first years of the people's regime was bound to become formal and could not contribute in the necessary extent to the increased output of agricultural commodities. Today both the older cooperatives (accounting for one-half of peasant families) as well as the newly created ones, have converted the work to family contracting, which is a production form considered most efficient under Lao conditions. This system is consistent with the interests of the patriarchal peasantry and, at the same time, accepts quite well the influence of commodity-monetary regulatory agents and economic management methods; it is capable of gradually adopting basic cooperative relations. The land users pay the state, as the owner of the land, nothing but a tax (approximately 5-8 percent of the crop), which remains stable for a period of several years. An artisan or petty-industry structure develops in the countryside in which technologically simple production still prevails. Unquestionably, all of these steps are contributing to upgrading the efficiency of the agrarian sector and the increasing involvement of output in commodity trade.

**Market Functions.** It is precisely this area that currently plays the leading role in the reorganization of the barter into a commodity economy. The importance which the LPDR government ascribes to the creation of an active system of commodity-monetary turnover is confirmed by the fact alone that in the packet of 12 resolutions of the republic's Council of Ministers on organizing the new economic mechanism, passed last March, eight pertain to various aspects of the creation of a market mechanism.

What is the condition of the Lao market today?

The first thing we noticed in Vientiane was the large number of booths, little stores and hawker's trays and, in the city's marketplace, an abundance of consumer goods although, it is true, almost out of reach for the majority of the population. Through middlemen and local merchants, companies from Japan, Thailand, Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea offer fashionable clothing and shoes, radios and video equipment, bicycles, light motorcycles, pocket calculators, and so on. What do the Laotians sell that is made at home? The fruits of the local flora and fauna, modest food surpluses and artisan goods, including some made of precious woods, traditional decorative objects and uncut precious stones. That was all. Such goods become precious in a sea of imported consumer goods and, naturally, there are more sellers than buyers. Two different commodity trends meet in a single market but not unified it. What the customers coming from the countryside need are the simplest possible labor tools, primitive yet extremely necessary household items, inexpensive fabrics, and so on, which are virtually unavailable on the market because of the backwardness of the domestic industry.

The main features and weaknesses of the Lao market as a whole are clearly revealed in the commercial activities in the capital city:

Prevalence of imported consumer goods;

A hopeless pitting of essentially primitive items of natural origin against imported consumer goods;

Lack of organic link between trade and production.

All of these features are inherent in the type of commodity trade which is still alienated from domestic production and exists largely as though by itself, servicing a relatively small percentage of the urban population and nurtured by commodity resources which are essentially imported, not always legally. According to some data, almost 20 percent of all commodity resources are smuggled from the outside in exchange essentially for valuable timber. As to the market which should coordinate the various economic units, sectors and parts of the country within a single economic entity, it is only now being organized. Excluding imported commodities, what are essentially bought and sold are rather monotonous and low quality items which consist of modest surpluses of goods produced by the working people for their own use. The country's national economy (particularly agriculture, its main sector) is, as a whole, still not oriented toward the market.

Nonetheless, the very existence of such a market (considering that no more than a few years ago it did not exist at all) is influencing the production process above all by gradually broadening the narrow range of needs of the patriarchal working person and shaping and intensifying economic incentive. This, on the one hand. On the other, to a certain extent the penetration of capital from commerce to industry and its gradual predominance has already begun.

This can be clearly seen in the strategy of the current development of cooperatives in Laos. The majority of new cooperatives, which were founded 3 to 4 years ago, initially appeared as purchasing and procurement organizations and it was only somewhat later, as funds were accumulated, earned as a result of commercial operations, that they began to go into the production processes as well. As we were told, in 1988 cooperatives, together with the local authorities, participated in the creation of 48 projects, such as rice-drying facilities, warehouses, grain storage areas, and workshops for the repair of agricultural tools. This may seem petty but it is precisely in these initial steps that we can see the important trend of an initiated transfer of commercial capital to production.

**The Way the Cooperatives Work.** Typical in this case is the development of the Dongpalan and Dansang cooperatives, which we visited. Both of them were initially established as purchasing and marketing associations with a few members. It was their contribution that provided a small seed capital. There was an initial trade turnover, followed by a loan from the state at a low interest rate, another purchase of commodities and their sale and, finally, a bigger loan and, at that point, the possibility arose to engage in production in the commodity branches of the cooperatives. For Dongpalan this involved rice growing and animal husbandry branches, garments and furniture workshops, and a food spice production shop; for Dansang, it was a saw mill, a furniture workshop, and a rice growing subdivision of the cooperative, based on leasing and family contracting. Equipment is being purchased. E. Chantunkhen proudly told us that they now have 3 tractors for the use of which the cooperative charges nearly one-third less than state organizations. Naturally, for the time being both cooperatives consider as their main task the expansion of trade which, under the conditions of a still developing market, is their most profitable undertaking.

If we were to sum up the distance covered by the two cooperatives in the past 3 to 4 years, it could best be described in monetary terms: starting with a capital of several dozen thousand kips (500 kips equal one U.S. dollar), today their profits are estimated in the millions. For example, the 1987 profit of the Dongpalan Cooperative was 57 million kips.

**State Instruments.** We were in Laos exactly when a difficult situation developed with the state budget, because of avoidance to pay taxes not only by the state sector but, above all, by private and cooperative enterprises. We already quoted a few figures at the beginning of this article. The developing situation confirms the existence of a transitional condition: the old administrative-command instruments revealed their inefficiency and are being discarded, whereas the new methods for managing economic processes under the conditions of a developing market are still at their organizational stage. Therefore, it is natural for the economic mechanism to have breakdowns. At state enterprises, which were given

substantial autonomy, the growth of wages is dangerously outstripping increases in labor productivity. The indebtedness of both industrial and commercial organizations from loans which are not used very productively, is increasing. The banks lack flexibility and poorly perform their accumulation functions (bank cash turnover is extremely low, not exceeding 20 percent annually).

Today the task, as the Lao friends noted in the course of our talks, is quickly to correct the errors and shortcomings in macromanagement, to concentrate the efforts on upgrading the efficiency of state banks and commercial establishments, particularly in wholesale trade, to strengthen the monopoly of foreign trade and block smuggling channels, and reliably to master the financial instruments for controlling market turnover. For the time being the state enterprises are significantly behind in the competition with private, cooperative and even the mixed state-private sectors. For example, the cash turnover at private and mixed industrial enterprises is faster by a factor of 4.5; it is faster by a factor of 9 in commercial enterprises. This means that the economic power of private capital is, for the time being, growing more dynamically. As our interlocutors emphasized, this is entirely explainable at the starting period of the new economic policy. It is precisely this type of competition that forces the state sector to restructure itself more decisively.

For that reason, the main task in developing the system of state control is the purposeful use of the now developing commodity-monetary relations in order to accelerate the development of the country's production forces. The efficiency with which the state authorities will operate in this area, a fact well understood in Laos, will essentially determine not only the pace at which the country will develop but also the social direction taken by the entire economic process. Starting with commodity production, one could go either to capitalism or socialism. The choice of a socialist way of development presumes public control over the market element and the "private commercial interest" or, as V.I. Lenin said, the organization of "investigation and control by the state and the extent to which it is subordinated to the common interest...." (op. cit., vol 45, p 370).

The lack of coincidence between the interests of the national unit, represented by the state interest, and the developing private enterprise, which is gathering strength, is most clearly manifested, as we pointed out, in the adverse budget situation. Theoretically, this is a specific manifestation of a deeper contradiction between systems, a contradiction which has not matured yet. As long as the main task in economic policy is the restructuring of the barter economy into a higher type of production, said contradiction is set aside. However, it exists and ignoring it is no longer possible. That is precisely why the need to strengthen economic control over the development of the national economy, to upgrade the efficiency of the state banking system, to improve the taxation principles and to accelerate the



development of laws consistent with the tasks of the contemporary socioeconomic stage was emphasized at the 7th LPRP Central Committee Plenum which was held at the beginning of last February.

The conversion to essentially economic management methods and the rejection of administrative-command instruments inevitably triggered a process of democratization in social life as well. The party charted a firm course toward broadening the democratic foundations in the political area and surmounting, as K. Phomvihan said, "bureaucratic centralism." The first general elections for local authorities in Laotian history took place last year, for district and provincial national assemblies. We were able to feel some of the broad enthusiasm triggered by the campaign for the election of provincial councils, which had taken place at the end of 1988. This was not a formal event. The voters had real opportunities to choose: only 651 of 898 candidates became deputies. Elections for the Supreme National Assembly, which were held last March, were also based on a multiple-mandate system.

Under the new conditions, the efficiency of party and state structures depends, above all, on their form of organization and improvements in their work style and methods. In the course of the reform of the political system, the administrative-managerial apparatus was reduced by nearly one-half. Today it is being assigned new functions and is mastering economic management methods. The reorganization of ministries and departments and other governmental institutions, scheduled to be completed by the middle of this year, is continuing.

**Major Factor of Progress.** Recalling Phomvihan's words we cited at the very beginning of this article, one of the two factors which determined the choice of a socialist way of development for Laos was the existence of the global socialist system and the comprehensive aid it has given to the young republic.

From the very beginning of its existence, the LPDR encountered numerous difficulties: an exceptionally low level of economic development, the illiteracy of most of the population, and the need to rebuild the national economy dislocated by the war. Over the past 13 years the GNP and the national income of the country have more than doubled. As the Lao comrades noted, the aid and support of the socialist countries, the USSR and Vietnam above all, played a major role in this.

Technical assistance provided by the Soviet Union was focused mainly on solving essentially economic problems: development of transportation and communications, electric power, strengthening the technical foundations for agriculture, the geological surveying of the country's territory, the training of skilled national cadres and the development of health care and education. In other words, the aid given by the USSR and the other socialist countries was directed above all at the creation of a production and social infrastructure in the republic, without which the successful development of the other

economic sectors and social life are impossible. As we know, the infrastructure requires major capital investments and does not provide quick returns. Its separate development, within a short time, cannot be achieved by an underdeveloped society. In turn, the development of such an infrastructure actively contributed to the growth of domestic accumulations in sectors with a fast capital turnover. As a result, capital investments in the national economy from domestic sources quintupled in the 1980s. The long-term growth of the economic potential of Laos would enable it to become a full producing member of the system of the global division of labor rather than be added to it as a raw material appendage.

Although our economic cooperation has not always been as efficient as we would like it to be, we were told by Yu.Ya. Mikheyev, the Soviet ambassador to Laos, despite some errors, shortcomings and blunders on both parts, which we have always frankly discussed with our friends, as a whole it fulfilled its important role in the first stage of the establishment of a new society in Laos.

Naturally, with progress and with the appearance of new economic opportunities, the forms of cooperation as well must change. As the Laotian comrades and our specialists working in the country emphasized, great opportunities are linked to the gradual turn from the predominant forms of technical assistance based on long-term credits to forms of economically mutually profitable cooperation on a commercial basis, particularly in national economic areas in which Laos could drastically increase its export possibilities (timber processing and procurement, production of tin concentrate, coffee, spices, medicinal herbs and medicines made of them, etc.).

Along with changes in the economic mechanism within the country, the foreign economic activities are being restructured in other directions. Last year Laos passed a law on foreign investments, according to which foreign partners are allowed to invest capital in sectors such as agriculture, forestry, industry, transportation, services and tourism. With the promulgation of this law, which guarantees and protects the property and interest of foreign investors, the number of foreign partners has begun to increase. According to official data, today more than 300 foreign companies are operating or have interests in Laos. They have considerably contributed to increasing exports of Laotian goods (a 14 percent increase in 1988) and reducing the disproportion between exports and imports. The law opened new opportunities for the broadening of economic cooperation, upgrading its efficiency and mutual profit; it was a major step in the reorganization of the Lao economic system and the more active involvement of the country in the international division of labor.

The dynamic foreign economic activities are based on the active foreign policy strategy of the republic which is following a consistent course of improving the situation in Southeast Asia and creating a favorable climate in

relations with all neighbors. In 1988 the LPDR formulated a 7 point initiative, highly rated by the world public, of converting the area into a nuclear-free zone of peace, stability and cooperation. Together with Vietnam and Cambodia, Laos is an active participant in the process of settling the Cambodian problem.

Although short, our acquaintance with the Lao People's Democratic Republic was quite instructive. It helped us to understand the difficult and important stage experienced today by a country which challenged history. We did not see the "insanity of the brave" or rosy prospects of dreamers and fantasizers, but a sober realism in the choice of the ways of development and in assessing the stages for reaching the high social objectives which have been set. This was the impression we took with us.

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## THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD: TRENDS AND CONTRADICTIONS

### Our Digests

#### Draft New Program of the German Social Democratic Party

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[Text] Relations between the CPSU and the German Social Democratic Party have gone a long way. First there were the initial contacts on problems of postwar settlement, followed by problems of exclusively international nature. A noteworthy enhancement of relations between the two parties in recent years legitimately led to the present condition "in which," as M.S. Gorbachev noted in his meeting with the SDPG H.-J. Vogel, "we are already engaged in comparing ideas and can discuss and are discussing any problems in an atmosphere of trust and high degree of reciprocal understanding."

Today it is a question of establishing a new model of cooperation between social democrats and communists, symbolizing the spirit of a transitional historical time, particularly within the context of implementing the concept of a common European home. Both political trends are sovereign and full-fledged participants in the "European team" which must build it.

Of late the Godesberg Program of the SDPG, which was adopted in 1959 and which was its political guideline for 30 years, has been repeatedly corrected; essentially new problems have appeared to which the party had to supply an answer. In this connection, the leadership of the SDPG deemed the drafting of a new program necessary.

Some aspects of the future programmatic stipulations were discussed by the West German social democrats at congresses and in the course of electoral campaigns. A special commission was set up, instructed to sum up the

numerous suggestions submitted by party activists. The commission was headed by H.-J. Vogel, the SDPG chairman; Saar Prime Minister O. Lafontaine, deputy chairman of the SDPG, became its executive chairman. By the end of March 1989 the draft new program was made public. It will be adopted in December of this year at the Bremen SDPG Congress.

KOMMUNIST decided to acquaint the readers with excerpts from the draft program. Familiarity with some parts of the document makes it possible to answer more completely and profoundly the question of the nature of West German social democracy today, the way it views the contemporary world on the eve of the 21st century and the tasks and objectives in its reorganization it sets for itself.

Naturally, our ideological views greatly differ and we hold on to very different viewpoints. Nonetheless, more than ever before something else is important today: we cannot fail to see behind the differences that which brings us closer and unites us, leading us to cooperation and joint efforts in the interest of man and mankind.

#### From the Draft Program of the Social Democratic Party of Germany

We, social democrats, the draft states, want to strengthen the peace and defend nature as the foundations of human existence. We want to make society socially just and worthy of man and to preserve anything of value and prevent any threats which endanger life on earth. We want a future in which the peoples on earth will live in safety, settling their conflicts not through the arms race but through peaceful competition for ensuring a life worthy of man, in which the policy of partnership and the standards of discussions would ease and, in the final account, eliminate the conflict between West and East; a world in which we shall live, together with the peoples of Western Europe, within a single democratic and social federated state, which will be a structural component of the European order of peace and cooperation, in which the peoples of the countries of the south will have favorable opportunities for independent development thanks to a just global economic order. We are aspiring toward the type of global society in which, with the help of new forms of economic management, human life and nature on our planet can be protected for a long time to come. We want to assert the social equality between men and women and create a society without classes, privileges, discrimination and isolation of people.

We want to build the type of society in which all men and women will have the opportunity to engage in a humane type of work and in which all types of occupation will enjoy equal respect. We wish, through the joint efforts of the entire society, to reach a state of well-being for all and its equitable distribution. We want a democracy for the entire society, including in the economy, at enterprises and at work places. We want to limit economic power and exercise democratic control over it. We want

for the basic economic decisions and, above all, decisions on what to increase and what to reduce, to be made democratically. We wish for the citizens to influence the ways of development of the technology in order to improve the quality of labor and life and reduce risks related to the use of new equipment.

We want a modern democratic state, based on the political activeness of the citizens, a state which can struggle for achieving the social objectives, changing in accordance with the new problems and proving its ability to solve them. The progress toward which we aspire is aimed not at quantity but at quality, at a higher quality of life of the people. It requires the reinterpretation and reorientation in the possibility of alternate choices and in the active formulation of a policy above all in the areas of technology and economics.

The more dangerous the world becomes the more necessary progress becomes. Those who wish to preserve the values of our life must take the path of change; we need progress which ensures peace in the country and throughout the world, progress which will protect the life of man and nature, eliminate fear and awaken hope. We need progress which will make our society freer, more equitable and more cohesive. The road to regress opens without such progress. That is why we, social democrats, wish to work together with democratic socialists of all countries for the benefit of such progress.

The bourgeois revolutions in modern times, we read in the section of the draft program which describes the foundations of SDPG policy, brought about historical progress although they rather proclaimed than implemented the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity. The capitalist production method led—despite the state of law and parliamentarianism—to dependence instead of freedom, exploitation instead of equality and aggravation of class contradictions instead of fraternity. Therefore, the labor movement urgently demanded the implementation of the ideals of bourgeois revolutions: a cohesive society with equal rights for all. The foundation of its historical experience is the acknowledgment that simply updating capitalism is not enough. We need a new economic and social order.

The social democrats have always believed that social relations are created by people and could be changed by them. We want self-determination instead of subordination. The triumphs of capital over man, monotonous work rather than live work, profit superior to human needs, classes standing above classes, men standing above women, must yield to the type of system which, on the basis of universal well-being will ensure for every person in society a life based on the principles of freedom, justice and unity.

The social democratic labor movement is continuing the traditions of the popular democratic movement of the 19th century, for which reason it sets itself the objectives of democracy and socialism and self-determination by the people in politics and labor.

From the very beginning we have considered democracy and socialism as inseparable from each other. Freedom and equality can be achieved for all only through the democratization of the economy and the society. The social democrats have always remained loyal to this fundamental idea. However, their history is not free from errors and delusions: in World War I the social democratic labor movement in Europe did not meet the hopes of many people who believed that it could maintain the peace. Split by disputes as to the correlation between national and international tasks of the working class, it broke down, in the final account, into democratic socialists, who aspired toward a better social system through reforms within the framework of a parliamentary democracy, and the communists who, groundlessly claiming that they were acting on behalf of the working class, created a dictatorship within their party. At the end of World War I the German social democrats were the first to assume national responsibility in forming a government. However, subsequently the labor movement was unable to prevent the assumption to power of the national socialists. The experience we acquired in the struggle against dictatorship and terrorism forces us to be particularly vigilant in the face of efforts to present as harmless the crimes committed by national socialism and to revive its ideology. Resistance intensified our knowledge of the fact that people of different religious faiths and professing basically different political convictions could work together in attaining the same political objectives.

In the building of the FRG, the social democrats contributed to the development of a democratic social state, to comprehensive improvements in the living conditions of the working people and the abatement of the old class contradictions. The recreated united trade unions made a substantial contribution to this project.

The correlation among political forces prevented the social democratic policy, oriented toward reform, decisively to change the basic undemocratic structures of the inherited economic and social system. The power of the big industrialists and the advantages of owners of capital and enterprise managers were curtailed but not eliminated. The distribution of income and property remained unfair. In reference to the Godesberg 1959 Program, the present draft notes that the SDPG will remain a leftist people's party. It is proud of the fact that it is preserving the traditions of a movement which has never brought the German people war, enslavement or violence but converted rightless proletarians into self-confident citizens of the state. Ever since the party was founded, the social democrats have been in favor of peace and international cooperation. Since then the internationalism of the social democratic tradition has become the only possible realistic policy.

People of different convictions and with a different attitude toward religion cooperate within the SDPG. The spiritual roots of democratic socialism are Christianity, a humanistic philosophy, enlightenment, Marx's doctrine of history and society, and the experience of the

labor movement. The ideas of the emancipation of women were taken up and developed by the labor movement as early as the 19th century. It took over a century for such ideas to become functional. The SDPG welcomes and respects the principles and the religious beliefs of everyone. They cannot be subordinated to party decisions.

The document further stipulates that not all social democrats share identical concepts about man, his purpose and the meaning of his life. Whatever our understanding of the dignity of man may be, it is the starting point and objective of our work. All of us support the UN stipulation in Article 1 of the "Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man:" "All people are born free and equal in their dignity and rights. They are given reason and conscience and must act in relations with one another in a spirit of fraternity." All of us consider man as part of nature, as an individual and as a social being. As part of nature, he can live only in a natural environment and together with nature. He must manifest his individuality only in his intercourse with other people.

Man is born for neither good nor evil. He can learn a great deal and show reason. That makes democracy possible. Man may err, be mistaken and repeatedly display inhumanity. That makes democracy necessary. Since man is a being open to the world and displays various potential possibilities, everything depends on the circumstances in which he lives. Consequently, a new, more perfect system worthy of man is both possible and necessary.

Human dignity requires that man, while living in human society, have control over his life. Men and women must be equal and united. Everyone is responsible for the creation of living conditions worthy of man. The dignity of man does not depend on his occupation or the usefulness of his contribution.

We must observe the rights of man, the draft program stipulates. The state and the economy exist for the sake of the people and their rights, and not vice versa. Individual and social human rights cannot substitute for each other. However, nor can one be pitted against the other. Collective rights as well serve the development of the individual. It is only where the social rights of man are exercised that all members of society can benefit from such individual rights. It is only where respect for individual human rights allows pluralism of opinions and political activeness that people can make use of their right to proper nutrition, housing, work and education. It is only the sum total of the individual and social human rights that makes the creation of worthwhile living conditions possible.

As understood by the SDPG, politics is a necessary element of social life. Politics is present wherever information is disseminated or concealed, wherever awareness or living conditions are changed and wherever opinion is shaped, a will expressed and interests defended. The exercise of politics has its limits. They

cannot not be exceeded without harming the individual and society. Errors and guilt, disease and misfortune, pain and despair and failures and collapses are characteristic features of human life, including in a society of free and equal people. Politics can only create conditions for giving a meaning to human life. If its objective is for politics independently to promote happiness and ensure the implementation of its ideas, the danger arises of sliding into a system of total regulations.

However, politics must be something different, something greater than simple control of a situation which can no longer be avoided; in order to win and retain the trust of the people, it must ensure freedom of action and react to the new tasks. If excessive reliance is placed on politics in solving problems of improving technology and long-term developments of nothing but economic interests, it would find itself under the pressure of adverse circumstances to which it will become subordinated.

The realm of activities of politics is not limited to governmental institutions. The democratic state draws its meaning from social forces. It is not self-seeking but an instrument in shaping society. By tapping the social impetus and needs and expressing them legislatively and through governmental actions, the political parties act as intermediaries between society and the state. Politics which claims to be something more than a simple subordination to real or fictitious circumstances must rely on the conscientiousness and activeness of the citizens and be exercised with their help. It becomes possible as a result of the free and, in the final account, open civic dialogue which requires the use of social forces and their integration and dialogue, and which provides information, helps to realize problems, contributes to the shaping of opinions and, in the final account, leads to consensus or the establishment of a clear majority. A civic dialogue is a manifestation of democratic standards. It move into the center of politics where, as is the case with the development of technology, decisions are made which affect everyone and which subsequently become very difficult to change. In order to introduce a civil dialogue we must ensure the freedom of opinion and of the mass information media. Furthermore, all citizens must have both the opportunity and the right to develop and disseminate their opinions on matters related to their own life or the life of their descendants. The state and science must create prerequisites for the substantiated formulation of opinions. A civil dialogue means more democracy and not more government.

As the draft SDPG program points out, the main values of democratic socialism are freedom, justice and cohesion. They are a party criterion in assessing political reality and the scale of the new and more advanced social system and, at the same time, a guideline in the activities of every individual social democrat. The social democrats want a society in which every person can freely develop his personality and responsibly participate in political, economic and culture life.

As an individual, man must be free. However, the possibility of such freedom is always determined by society. Freedom in our understanding means the freedom of everyone and, particularly, of anyone who may think differently. A freedom only for the many would mean a privilege. The freedom of someone else defines the boundaries and is a prerequisite for the freedom of every individual. Freedom demands liberation from degrading dependency, poverty and fear. However, it also means the opportunity for developing individual capabilities and the responsibility for participation in social and political life. The opportunity to be free can be used only by people confident of adequate social protection. Not least, it is for the sake of freedom that we strive toward providing equal opportunities and extensive social protection.

Justice is built on equal respect for the dignity of all people. It demands identical freedom for all, equality in the eyes of the law, real opportunities in political and social life and social protection. It demands social equality between men and women. Justice demands great equality in the distribution of income, property and power and equal access to education, vocational training and culture. Equal opportunity does not mean uniformity but scope for the development of the individual capabilities of all people.

Justice and the right to equal opportunity must be ensured through the instruments of the power of the state. However, cohesion and readiness to support one another, which go beyond the limits of legal obligations, cannot be achieved through coercion. Cohesion has been a characteristic feature of the labor movement in the struggle for freedom and equality, and inspired it to engage in this struggle. Human society cannot exist without cohesion. Cohesion is the weapon of the weak in the struggle for their rights and, at the same time, the consequence of the admission that every person needs the support of other people. We can live as free and equal in a humane society only if we are able to stand up for one another and aspire to make everyone free. Those who are in trouble must have the possibility of relying on the support of society.

Cohesion demands of us that the people in the third world be given the opportunity to live a life worthy of man. The future generation, the fate of which is being decided today, also has the right to rely on our cohesion. Cohesion is necessary also in order to broaden the opportunities for individual development. It is only through joint action and not through egotistical individualism that prerequisites for individual self-determination are created and secured.

Our basic values determine and support each other. Their purpose becomes apparent only if they are accepted as equally important and as explaining, supplementing and limiting each other. The implementation of such values and the perfecting of democracy are the permanent task of democratic socialism.

Turning to the description of the contemporary stage in global developments, the authors of the draft note that the industrial revolution and contemporary technology have created in some parts of the world a historically unparalleled well-being which, thanks to the strengthening of the social state and the policy of the trade unions, benefits all citizens. In the industrial areas need and poverty have been pushed into the background and, in some places, they have even been eliminated. Democratic socialism will strive to ensure for everyone in the world his participation in this process.

We paid for the elimination of scarcity in our country by developing a new threat to man and nature. The dynamics of the industrial civilization preserves the old inequity and creates new dangers which are a threat to freedom, justice, health and life. Never before have the people had such tremendous power. With the help of gene technology they can master the evolutionary process. The release of the atom could lead to the destruction of the human species. However, awareness of such a high responsibility is growing. The danger that mankind may put an end to its own life through nuclear, chemical or biological means of mass destruction has not been eliminated. However, opposition to the insanity of the arms race is becoming increasingly strong.

Disarmament is possible in the immediate future. Thinking in categories of "friend-enemy" is vanishing.

Forests, seas, plants and animals are dying from the poisoning of the soil, water and air. We are destroying our own foundations for life. However, ecological thinking is becoming increasingly strong. The new and even the old, rather hastily declared obsolete, equipment and technology make an ecologically justified economic management possible.

No country can exist by itself. National boundaries have no significance whatsoever in changes in the climate or in reducing the protective ozone layer. The wars waged by individual countries affect other nations as well. Economic crises or successes in one part of the earth affect everyone. The global society is a reality. However, we are still very far from the point of reaching a just world social order. Nonetheless, the understanding of its necessity is growing. The common tasks makes it necessary to live in an atmosphere of peace and international cooperation.

The concentration of economic power seems to be impossible to stop and global competition for markets and scarce resources impossible to avoid. It takes capital increasingly less time to spread throughout the world. The huge multinational concerns plan their strategy of profits on a global scale, avoiding democratic control and forcing the making of certain political decisions. Expansion and the desire for profit create tremendous wealth but, at the same time, degrade tremendous numbers of people and entire nations. They restrict our national possibilities. Global circumstantial and structural crises lead to the collapse of entire economic areas.

On the other hand, the countries are successfully uniting in regional communities. The trade unions are beginning to cross national borders.

Dependent on banks, raw materials, concerns and countries of the North, unable to engage in independent development because of the protectionism practiced by industrially developed countries, humiliated and converted into a bridgehead for maneuvers in the conflict between East and West, and frequently exploited by a corrupt elite, the South is fighting for its chance in the future. The more horrible the poverty, and the greater the growth of the population, the faster becomes the destruction of nature and the lesser the opportunity to feed oneself and the more humiliating becomes dependence on decisions made by the North. However, the poor of this world are defending themselves against exploitation and efforts to decide their lives for them. They are uniting and seeking their own ways. The North as well is beginning to realize the threat to all mankind which appears with the impoverishment of the South. An awareness of common responsibility is growing in both East and West.

New technologies, particularly in the information industry and communications, have a particular impact on labor and social relations and, to an increasing extent, on personal relations among people. They are a threat to the quality of labor, jobs and democratic manifestation of the will; wherever their use is unilaterally oriented toward increasing profits and serving the interests of the power of the rich, they strengthen the tendency to manipulate and control. On the other hand, they open new opportunities for a more humane organization of labor, greater openness, better information and more efficient participation in the production process. The state is turning into an overburdened repair shop. With the help of delayed social aid or steps taken too late for the protection of the environment, it is forced to restore that which was destroyed in the course of economic management and an ecologically and socially irresponsible attitude. However, an increasing number of people realize that long-term planning and a sensible influence on occurring processes are necessary.

Relations between the individual and society are changing. The individual person, deprived of steady social contacts and lacking social experience, frequently feels himself alone and pitted against an alien anonymous society which both attracts and repels him with ever new choices. However, the possibility of making a free choice can lead to greater freedom and development of individual qualities only if it is part of the personal concept of life and is implemented together with the other members of society.

So far we continue to live in a society dominated by men. The organization of labor and social life harms women's interests. However, women are being increasingly successful in asserting their rights.

Many people suffer from the gap which separates that which should have been done and that which is being done in politics. They no longer expect anything more of politics, locking themselves within the circle of their personal interests and small groups, or else escape from reality, thus finding themselves in a new state of dependence.

We, social democrats, would like to prove that politics is worth investing energy and strength. We do not avoid the difficult problems of our time. Without letting ourselves be frightened by the powerful groups promoting their own interests, we try to develop a dialogue with the people who, together with us, take the risk of engaging in the redirecting, planning and shaping of society.

Peace is the main task, the draft asserts. Peace is not all but without peace nothing else makes any sense. We shall be able to ensure peace only if we promote it through our combined efforts. Peace means not only a time when weapons are silent. Peace also means the coexistence of nations without violence, exploitation and oppression. Cooperation among nations in matters of economics, ecology, culture and human rights is a structural component of the policy of peace.

A policy of peace would reduce the conflicts which break out in the struggle for power. Its purpose is to balance interests, single out the common interests through regional alliances, counteract the aspiration toward priority by the world powers and solve contradictions between systems in the course of peaceful competition and dignified political debate. A policy of peace should end the rule of military, bureaucratic and military-industrial interests and reorient the defense industry toward the production of civilian goods. A policy of peace must be based on an upbringing in the spirit of peace.

We wish to eliminate the need for the nuclear threat and organize the safety of all countries, regardless of their affiliation with different blocs. To this effect outer space as well must be free from weapons. The FRG must not manufacture, possess or use nuclear weapons.

We want to stop the dynamics of armaments and contribute to the development of the dynamics of disarmament. We want to prevent the export of weapons and other types of military equipment.

Both East and West have paid for efforts to secure their safety through the arms race by increasing the threat to all the peoples of the world. Today no country in Europe can be safer than its potential enemy. Therefore, proceeding from his own interests, everyone must assume responsibility for the security of the other person. The principle of common security is based on this. It requires for each side to grant the other side the right to exist and the ability to live in peace.

Common security contributes to detente and demands detente. Common security can reduce the fear of the

threat of war, eliminate the confrontation between blocs and, in the final account, lead to their elimination.

For the time being, the FRG finds the security it needs within the Atlantic Alliance, as long as it can include within it the concept of the interests of its own security and its interest in general security and achieve their implementation. The principle of equal sovereignty must operate in the Atlantic Alliance. The alliance must be fully defense capable and be of a strictly defensive nature and ready for detente. Political will must prevail over military hardware and not vice versa. The preservation of the peace is a political and not a military-technical problem.

Common security requires a reduction of nuclear and conventional potential down to the level of reciprocal structural inability to attack. The process aimed at achieving this target should be accelerated by taking individual and unilateral limited steps. This includes limiting expenditures for armaments. Zones free from nuclear and chemical weapons serve the cause of general security in Europe. We wish to create such zones and to spread them throughout Europe.

Our objective, the authors of the draft further claim, remains the United States of Europe, the creation of which was demanded by the SDPG in its programmatic documents of the 1920s. Western Europe must unite its forces in order to assert itself and advance toward the establishment of a European peace order.

The European community is part of the regionally divided global society. Its existence provides opportunities for the strengthening of peace and social democracy. All of Europe must become a zone of peace. Through a common foreign policy, the European community must serve the cause of peace, give its member nations a bigger say in international affairs and counter the confrontation between the great powers. Through the means of a policy of safety, shared by all its members, it must encourage the process of detente and cooperate on a partnership basis with the Eastern European countries, and thus reduce and, in the final account, eliminate the division of Europe. Based on the policy of partnership in relations with the countries of the South, the European community must try to reduce the historical guilt of the European colonial powers. It is for that reason that it must support the countries and political forces in the South in their aspiration to gain independence and sovereign development and channel the efforts toward the establishment of a just world economic order.

We would like to convert the European community into a democratic federation of nations in which all citizens will be guaranteed identical freedoms and equal opportunities. To this effect all the necessary rights must be given to the European parliament. We must have an energetic government, accountable to parliament, clearly defined range of competence in the European community and European economic democracy.

Our objective is a European peaceful order which would ensure peace on the basis of common security. All European countries must assume contractual obligations to implement the principles of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Influential forces within the social systems of Eastern Europe are calling for economic reforms and for the creation of rule of law states, democratization and humanizing. We support these forces. They are the hope for all of Europe.

European-wide cooperation must assist us in surmounting contradictions between North and South, ensuring the survival of all nations through comprehensive protection of the environment and the exercise of individual and collective human rights, enhancing economic cooperation to the level of interdependence, preserving our common European heritage and encouraging cultural contacts among nations. To this effect we must create European-wide institutions.

Universal peace is threatened by the impoverishment of third world countries. The South must not become an area where conflicts between East and West are resolved. Furthermore, disarmament in East and West should release funds which would provide new opportunities for the development of two-thirds of mankind who live in poverty. The imposed duplication of developed industrial countries has harmed the majority of peoples in the South. Only a few countries, in Asia mainly, have been able to surmount their industrial backwardness. Refusal to accept foreign models without proper testing could become the beginning of the second stage of decolonization: each country should be given the right to choose its own way. All countries of the South should, finally, have the opportunity to feed themselves, to defend themselves or to restore their natural vital foundations and find suitable forms of agriculture, power supply, education, jobs, industrialization, health care and social security, meet their basic needs through the creation of a properly functioning domestic market, and preserve their cultural autonomy.

Regional associations can facilitate the reaching of this objective, increase the influence of the South on the global economy and, thus, contribute to global cooperation. We favor the forces of liberation wherever reactionary forces are holding back independent development. The apartheid system in South Africa must fall. The possibilities of the South will be increased if we correct the model of development of our own country on the basis of ecological renovation, develop regenerating sources of energy or else support the development of technologies which can be applied in the South as well. Therefore, efforts to help the developing countries must not remain the separate task of a single department. Such aid is an indication of the level of political activities and must become a general political task.



North and South must also find a way of development which would ensure stable progress, limit ecological pollution and be consistent with the requirements of present and future generations. Long-term development requires that the utilization of resources, technical innovations, and the amount, placing and targets of investments be directed precisely toward it. To this effect the international institutions must be restructured and granted proper rights. We are aspiring toward a new and just world economic order which will make the long-term development of all countries possible.

As we advance toward this objective, we must change trade conditions in favor of the South. We must stabilize income from export of raw materials, limit the burden of indebtedness, support the shifting of resources from North to South, increase aid to developing countries from public funds and control the activities of multinational concerns throughout the world. In areas where the developing countries make no use of economic facilities for environmental protection in their own interests and in the interests of the global community, the developed industrial countries must meet the financial costs of such projects. All of this can be achieved only if the developing countries, as they act as equal partners, are able by themselves to accelerate the reform of their respective international organizations. This applies above all to the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development and the GATT.

The global community should develop the type of system with the help of which it would become possible to keep the peace throughout the world, exercise political control over economic power, ensure the just distribution of raw materials, technology and scientific knowledge and reliably protect our natural vital foundations.

The United Nations could lead us closer to this objective. Therefore, its significance should increase. It should become an instrument of nonviolent domestic and global politics. We want to strengthen it both politically and financially. The less the United Nations is paralyzed by the confrontation between East and West, the better it will be able to engage in peacemaking activities, counter global threats and express the interests of economically backward countries. Its organization must be restructured. The UN subdivisions must be given a new structure and be rid of bureaucratism.

Every individual has the right to have his own homeland, folklore, language and culture. The rights of the different ethnic groups inhabiting a single country, as long as they do not conflict with human rights as stipulated by the UN, are equally inviolable rights.

The Socialist International rallies and strengthens the forces of democratic socialism. We must continue to support it in order to open the path to a universal democratic society....

The final section of the draft stipulates that through joint efforts and in competition with other parties we built the Federal Republic of Germany. We feel our responsibility

for it. In that sense it is our republic. It has many shortcomings, for which reason we would like to bring it closer to constitutional standards. We contribute in this republic democratic socialism, so that it could become that which it should be in accordance with the Constitution: a democratic social state. This requires lengthy reforms. We are a party of reforms. Frequently efforts to make a reform involve taking small steps. Furthermore, in the course of progress, we test the accuracy of the ways we have chosen.

Work on the implementation of reforms is difficult, for it requires the surmounting of a powerful opposition of the special interests of individual groups. This work is not solely the job of the governments, parliaments and parties. Major reforms will be successful only with the active support of the majority of the citizens.

Politics is inconceivable without debate. The objectives for the sake of which we are debating must be clear. Even in the struggle for power the end does not justify the means. A dispute without reaching an agreement on basic problems leads to a spiritual civil war. We assert our basic agreement with all social forces which recognize the basic rights and concepts contained in the Constitution. Such a consensus must be present in all forms of debate.

Political standards become powerless without a contrast between reality and a projection for the future. Projections of the future become efficient only when millions of conscious citizens can see in them the embodiment of their hopes.

Wherever people feel themselves not as helpless objects but as responsible and creative subjects of political life, wherever they can objectively contribute to politics, their thoughts and fears, forces needed for maintaining the political standard of a cohesive society are released. Only thus can politics be free from the pressure of circumstances, bring into motion frozen forces and accomplish vitally necessary reforms.

Our program can be implemented only in the course of sharp debates. We call upon anyone who wishes to help in this respect to support and strengthen the SDPG with his cooperation, solidarity, criticism and ideas.

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## CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. INFORMATION

### How the History of the Last War Was Written (A Scientist's Thoughts)

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[Article by N. Pavlenko, Lieutenant General, doctor of historical sciences]

[Text] We are familiar with numerous cases in which works on problems of history remain inside and influence the minds of people for decades and, sometimes,

centuries. However, an even greater number of historical works disappear a short few years after their publication. Unfortunately, this fully applies to most of the studies written on the history of the Great Patriotic War. Over the past 40 years alone, three generations of works on the last war have passed into a state of non-existence, if one could use this term. However, as it were, no truthful history of it was written, and nor has it been written so far, although such a comprehensive publication has been needed for quite some time.

Whereas in the first years after the war ended, the main obstacle to its objective study was the cult of Stalin's personality, in subsequent decades the objective study of many events was obstructed by recurrences of this cult and the remaining and at times even stricter prohibitions concerning the use of archive and other sources and materials, and the unsurmounted support of many researchers of the old systems and dogmas. All of this has triggered in me, a researcher in the area of military history for several decades, pain and bitterness.

In speaking of distortions found in the published works let me immediately emphasize that, naturally, not all events were falsified but only those among them which, as a result of the Stalinist leadership, became failures in the sociopolitical life of the people and catastrophic military defeats at the fronts. In the case of the Patriotic War, the greatest number of such failures and catastrophes occurred on the eve of and during the first 12 to 18 months of military operations. It was precisely these events that, unfortunately, have still not been accurately studied.

The initial Stalinist versions of the reasons for the defeat suffered by the Red Army (lack of mobilization of our forces, the suddenness and treachery of the attack, the overwhelming superiority of the enemy in manpower and armaments, etc.) gradually lost their verisimilitude in the views of the millions of people who had gone through the war.

Through a variety of channels, Stalin had information that the broad population strata were not satisfied with the offered explanations for such a deep retreat on the part of the Soviet forces in 1941-1942. Consequently, in order to justify our retreat to Leningrad, Moscow and the Volga and the foothills of the main Caucasian ridge, in his answer to Colonel Razin, given at the start of 1947, Stalin gave a significant hint to the historians. Essentially, it was that the researchers should pay attention to the "interesting nature" of military operations—the counteroffensive. Some historians "liked" this hint. They raised the concept of "luring" the aggressor and of "counteroffensive as the principle means of military operations in just wars." Efforts were made to consider a significant portion of the Great Patriotic War from the angle of such a "lure."

The fate of military history science took another turn after Stalin's death, and particularly after the 20th Party Congress. Some of the most important historical works

published in the period of the so-called thaw included the six-volume "*History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945*." In writing this work, for the first time the authors used some archival data and materials of research which had been classified, both during the war and immediately after it, "secret" and "for official use only." They included the works of the General Staff, including "Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War" and other "restricted" monographs and collections of materials which contained descriptions of the most important battles and operations. The weak part of these official works, not to mention their conceptual underdevelopment, was that they lacked accurate statistical data (on the correlation of forces, and manpower losses in combats and operations). They also contained major gaps and concealment of facts, dictated by circumstances, in the study of the summer campaigns of 1941 and 1942 and of failed operations in other campaigns.

The authors and editors of the 6-volume work did a great deal of work to surmount many shortcomings and gaps in the official studies. Naturally, they were not entirely successful. Nonetheless, a major step was taken in interpreting the history of the Great Patriotic War, including its first and most difficult period.

The gigantic exploit of the Soviet people at the front and in the rear is convincingly described in the second volume which deals with that period. At the same time, the authors indicate the reasons for our defeats at the start of the war. J.V. Stalin, who single-handedly made decisions on the most important governmental and military problems, the authors say, allowed a major error on the eve of the war in assessing the military-political situation. He believed that Germany would not dare to violate the Nonaggression Pact soon (op. cit., vol 2, p 10). This profoundly mistaken conclusion, the work points out, adversely affected the country's preparations to repel the aggression. Also greatly responsible for our defeats were the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff. They too had a poor idea of the situation and failed to take the type of steps which would have increased the level of readiness for war and repulsing the enemy strikes. Nor does this work circumvent the question of the influence of Stalin's repressions on the country's defense capability. For example, we read in volume 6 that "from May 1937 to September 1938 repressive measures were taken against about one-half of regimental commanders, almost all brigade and division commanders, all commanders of corps and commanders of troops of military districts, members of military councils and chiefs of political administrations of districts, the majority of political workers in corps, divisions and brigades, about one-third of regimental commissars and many teachers in higher and secondary military schools." It is further pointed out that it was precisely the repressions that were one of the "most essential reasons for the failures of the Red Army during the first period of the war" (vol 6, pp 124-125).

Although repressions are mentioned here in very general terms, in the mid-1960s such admissions constituted a major step forward.

Naturally, this work suffered from major shortcomings as well. Let us note some of them: in hastening their preparation and publication of this major work as much as possible, the editors did not make the necessary efforts to eliminate many "blank spots" in the study of the General Staff. Specifically, this includes a number of events at the start of the war, the unsuccessful operations during other periods and many errors in the strategic leadership.

One very enduring legacy of Stalinism, reflected in this publication as well, was that of circumstantial seesawing. This is becomes particularly clear in discussing personalities. In a number of cases this reaches the point of absurdity. For example, in the third volume N.S. Khrushchev, member of the military council of one of the fronts, is mentioned 41 times, while J.V. Stalin, the supreme commander-in-chief, only 27. The editors were particularly wary in describing the role played by G.K. Zhukov. They feared the label of "Bonapartist," which had been stupidly tacked on this military leader at that time. Thus, in the first volume Zhukov, who was then chief of General Staff, is not mentioned a single time. Meanwhile, the chief of the German General Staff F. Halder is mentioned on 12 occasions. Furthermore, a restrained attitude toward Zhukov may be noted in the other volumes as well.

Unfortunately, the beneficial influence which the 20th CPSU Congress exerted on the science of history lasted no more than 1 decade. As early as the mid-1960s the "elimination of exaggerations" in the struggle against the cult of personality had already started. It was believed on the higher levels that most such "exaggerations" were found in the "*History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*."

The last volume of this publication came out in 1965. The very next year a decision was made to prepare a new 12-volume work entitled "*History of World War II 1939-1945*." Naturally, as a whole there was a need for such a fundamental work on World War II as well. However, it was not this need that motivated the leadership when the decision to publish this multiple-volume work was made. L.I. Brezhnev and his retinue wanted to reanimate Stalin as quickly as possible, but surreptitiously, without drawing the attention of the broad public to this "sacrament." They believed that the best way for such rehabilitation could be the publication, under a new title, of a major monograph about the war in which the necessary "surgical operations" could be made, deleting anti-Stalinist scientific concepts.

Following are some examples of the violation of historical truth in this work: as we noted, "Yezhovism" and the lengthy account settling with command cadres had played a decisive role in the defeats suffered by the Red Army in the first stage of the war. The other reasons, and

they were many, merely intensified and widened the consequences of the main reason. Unfortunately, all such events were "delicately" avoided in the new monograph.

What was most amazing, however, was that in this 12-volume work the word "repressions" itself began to be avoided, replacing it with another word—"accusations." Thus, volume 2 clearly states that "in 1937-1938, as a result of groundless accusations, a significant number of commanders and political workers were dismissed from the Armed Forces" (op. cit., vol 2, p 206). It is further stated that allegedly the complaints of those dismissed had been considered and most of the errors had been corrected. There is not even a hint here of the elimination of tens of thousands of commanders and the death of many military leaders. The sense of the prewar events is presented in such a way that even the most severe crimes appear like innocent errors. A great deal of zeal was displayed also in "purging" the new work from other critical topics. Whereas in the preceding work many of the errors and blunders committed by Stalin, the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff had been subjected to a certain amount of criticism, no such critical remarks could be found in the 12-volume edition.

The life of the "*History of World War II*" was short. Its final volume came out in 1982; in 1987 a decision was made to prepare a new 10-volume publication to be named "*History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People*." Naturally, the false versions and topics which turned out to be more than plentiful and which seriously distorted the true history of the war played a major role in the premature "death" of this fundamental work.

The lengthy and large-scale falsifications we mentioned led, in the final account, to a crisis in military-history science, which severely harmed the upbringing of growing generations and the reputation of Soviet scientists abroad. Today's discussions on the most important problems of history, and the declassification of previously secret materials in the archives as well as a drastic increase in innovative publications on past events in the press instill the hope that military history is on its way out of the crisis.

We are pleased that energetic work is being done today to create a so-called fourth generation of works about the war. The very first documentary publications on this topic in the periodical press, particularly orders and statistical data, which were so far considered highly classified, are encouraging. For example, statistical data were published on the size of the troops and on combat ordnance in the border districts before the war, which refute the obsolete legend of the great numerical superiority of the enemy. Other false versions as well are being gradually destroyed. Also worthy of approval are the sharp and principle-minded discussions among scientists on the most important military political problems. All of these trends lend grounds for optimism.

We hope that the result of the developed cleansing and constructive work by military and civilian historians is truly objective, without suppressions and "blank spots," new multiple-volume work on the Great War, which would not be threatened with new circumstantial distortions. It should be, in all respects, a truthful study on the basis of which not only the present generation but the future ones as well would be able to study the Great Patriotic War.

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### **The Truth About the Past, Lessons for the Future**

18020015p Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 9, Jun 89 (signed to press 2 Jun 89) pp 117-121

[Interview with Col Gen D.A. Volkogonov, chief of the Military History Institute]

[Text] The decision to publish a 10-volume work on "The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People," which was made in August 1987, met with the approval of the general public. Of late, however, the editors of KOMMUNIST have been receiving letters in which concern is expressed about the insufficient information provided by the press on the course of the preparations for the new publication, the time of publication and the formulation of its conceptual foundations. Some of the letters express the fear that it may be written by an excessively narrow circle of historians, as has been the case in the past, asking the extent to which the views and criticism of the public on a number of currently extensively discussed problems will be taken into consideration, problems related to the most important moments in the history of the Great Patriotic War. The editors asked Colonel General D.A. Volkogonov, chief of the Military History Institute, to answer these questions.

[Editors] What caused the need for the writing of a new 10-volume work on the history of the Great Patriotic War?

[Volkogonov] One of the main reasons has to do with the need for a qualitatively different level of interpretation of the events of the past war, compared with previous works. On the basis of the new political thinking, we must most profoundly analyze the lessons of the war and make a real breakthrough, and I am not afraid to use this definition, in the development of military historical research. Finally, we must objectively look the past in the eyes. Why conceal it, there was a great deal of dogmatism and, occasionally, there was a prevalence of stereotypes which had existed since the period of Stalinism in interpreting the events of the war in history works. Furthermore, the period of stagnation made its negative "contribution" to the content and nature of history works. There were many events which we did not describe in full or else misrepresented. All of this requires a most profound analytical interpretation from the positions of an uncurtailed historical truth.

An important reason for the need for such a new publication is, in my view, also the fact that the very situation in the world urgently forces us to address ourselves to the lessons of the past. It is exceptionally important today to analyze the reasons for which the mechanisms for the prevention of war did not work in the 1930s, why was a collective security system not created and why did the efforts to prevent the war not yield the necessary results. This international aspect is closely related not only to the past but also to the future.

Here is yet another feature. Historians and philosophers frequently limited themselves to the general statement that history means a change of times and epochs. As a system this was adequate. History, however also means an infinite variety of people, of individuals who have walked the earth. Every person essentially has a place in history. However, if we consider many works written in the past about the Great Patriotic War, what strikes us is that little is being said about the true forgers of the victory. In the majority of works priority is given to the "great leader;" front commanders were also mentioned but all others were presented as a gray impersonal mass. That is why we must describe as fully as possible anyone who deserves to be noted. This will demand tremendous efforts but must be done. This approach would make it possible to see that the course of the war was by no means one of plans which were based on the theory of a leader and "cogs." Scientific criticism and the interpretation of the consequences of the cult of personality must be applied also to the period of the Great Patriotic War, which so far has largely remained Stalin's "preserve."

The main burden of the publication of this new work will be assumed by the USSR Ministry of Defense Military History Institute. Our main "co-performers" will be the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of General History and History of the USSR and many other scientific organizations. Our institute has set up five editorial boards (of four to five members each), each one of which will be in charge of preparing two volumes, such as first and sixth, second and seventh, and so on. The main editorial commission will include major military commanders, noted scientists and war and labor veterans. The work has already started. We are currently working on the first volumes.

[Editors] The letters received by the editors persistently mention the "recreation of the true history of the past war." In particular, war veteran V. Kalinkin writes that the previous editions of the Military History Institute can obviously not claim total truthfulness in interpreting the events of the war period.

[Volkogonov] I believe that the question of restoring the true history of the war is legitimate. Only a few years ago the Soviet people knew little, for example, about the errors made by the leadership and the mass terror in the Army at the end of the 1930s. After the 20th Congress there was some talk about it but it was short and somehow subdued. Then, starting with the mid-1960s, a

"moratorium" was proclaimed about such problems. Naturally, this adversely affected history works, including those of the Military History Institute.

For example, the six-volume work on the Great Patriotic War, which was published nearly a quarter of a century ago, provides a semi-truthful interpretation of the past. It suffers from major conceptual weaknesses and many of those "blank spots" of which there is so much talk today by the public.

[Editors] What is your view on the subsequent, the 12-volume publication on the history of World War II?

[Volkogonov] That work, which took 12 years to write and which was completed in 1982, I consider fundamental. It has been translated in many foreign countries. Unfortunately, it contains even greater suppressions and cover-ups. In the spirit of the official stipulations of that time, the authors did not depict the negative role of Stalinism in prewar times and in the course of the military operations. A number of radical events were assessed in the spirit of the concepts which prevailed during the period of the cult of personality. This includes the 23 August 1939 Pact with Germany, which was interpreted only as an absolute achievement; the version of the treacherous and "sudden" attack by Germany on the USSR dominated in explaining the reasons for the 1941-1942 defeats.

[Editors] Now, please, tell us about some conceptual ideas relative to the new edition.

[Volkogonov] The title of this book will be "*The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People*." It is precisely the people who will be the main power, the main character of our entire narration. It is important to bring up the role of the people to its fullest extent, not only at the front but also in the rear. Naturally, armed struggle is the main form of warfare. Along with it, however, a number of other forms exist: political, economic, diplomatic, and other activities.

The truthful presentation of the significance of various events of the war is very important. Above all, this means a more profound interpretation of the history of the battle for Moscow, and its true significance, without suppressing the question of the tragic price which was paid for our errors and failures. The other campaigns of the war must be considered more objectively as well. In the previous editions, due to the prevailing circumstances, emphasis was given either to Malaya Zemlya or some other theaters of operations. I do not wish in the least to diminish the importance of the events which took place in those areas. To the people who fought there it was as difficult at Malaya Zemlya as it was at the Kursk Arc. The significance of the operations themselves—whether strategic or tactical—bears no comparison between the two.

In my view there is yet another essential conceptual element: war is a confrontation, a two-sided process. We frequently depicted the enemy schematically. It was not

considered mandatory profoundly to identify his concepts, objectives, strategy, policies and specific actions. This approach is faulty because it deviates from the truth. It is important for us to depict the mechanism of the military machinery of the opposite side, the strategic thoughts of its leadership and the high professional training of soldiers, officers and generals of the Wehrmacht, with their tremendous experience, who had captured virtually all of Europe and taken over its potential. This aspect must be brought to light more fully. I believe that we will thus make clearer the significance of the exploits of our people, who are able to crush such an exceptionally dangerous enemy.

Another important aspect is the following: we waged the struggle against Hitlerite Germany as members of a coalition. I believe that we must describe in greater detail this alliance and its significance. The decisive role which our country played in the routing of Hitlerite Germany is universally known, and no one can refute it. Nonetheless, for the sake of truth, we must also describe thoroughly and honestly the contribution which our allies made, the scale of their military operations, the events surrounding the opening of the "second front," and their economic help in the war waged by the Soviet people. For it is no secret, for example, that the importance of the lend-lease to our Army was frequently suppressed in past works.

Our task is to avoid lack of objectivity and to open those pages of history which are unknown to the broad public. We must describe events which have not been fully inscribed in the "historical register" or else which were given a one-sided interpretation.

What features am I referring to? Let us consider, for example, the problems which we have already come across in preparing the first volume, which deals with the period of the eve of the war. One of the most sensitive aspects of that period was Soviet-German relations. This is a rather complex matter. In the first volume we must expose all of these events more completely, on the basis of documents. The Nonaggression Pact of 23 August 1939 was to a large extent forced upon us, for it gave us the only opportunity to delay a war which, under those circumstances, would have been extremely disadvantageous to us, although our agreements included a number of things which did not bring honor to our state. The secret clauses, the existence of which I do not doubt (we have irrefutable proof of their existence), the division into spheres of influence and many others were carried out in the spirit of those same "secret agreements" which, in their time, had been condemned by Lenin. In addition to that pact, however, on 28 September Stalin concluded with Germany a friendship and border treaty. It is obvious today that this was a gross political error, for this treaty disoriented the Soviet people and the antifascist forces, and made Hitler even more impudent. The result was an equivocal situation: we became "non-fighting allies" of a Germany at war. By concluding a treaty of "friendship," Stalin stepped across an ideological and political line inadmissible for a socialist state.

This cannot be justified. Unlike the previous treaty, this one gave us nothing. Actually, the question of said treaties, naturally, requires further intensified study.

In the prewar years there was quite an accelerated development of the war industry. Modern weapons were being developed. However, very grave errors were also made in the preparations for war. Even the breathing spell which the Nonaggression Pact with Germany gave us was not efficiently used by Stalin's fault. On his requirement, a plan for the defense of the country was drafted, which erroneously set the possible direction of the main fascist strike. It was precisely Stalin, ignoring the views of the General Staff, who insisted that the main strike launched by Germany should be expected in the Southern sector of the border. He based this on views on the Civil War, believing that the enemy would try, above all, to seize Ukrainian grain, Donbass coal, and Baku petroleum. We must bear in mind that these were not simply some kind of abstract considerations. They were followed by entirely specific practical steps. On the eve of the war, for example, according to this plan the redeployment of the troops was undertaken; respective groups of forces were created, which largely predetermined Hitler's successes in penetrating deep within our country. Reality proved that G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevskiy, whose notes on the defense plan claimed that the enemy would take the shortest route to Moscow, had been right.

Yet another aspect of the prewar period must be mentioned: it is bitter to recall it but we must. The virtually entire senior command Army personnel had been mowed down on the eve of the war. Problems related to the destruction of cadres in the course of the repressions are quite painful to all of us. However, we must describe what took place frankly, on the basis of the new documents.

All of these problems are included in the first volume. However, "blank spots" must be filled in the subsequent volumes as well. We must provide a full and convincing explanation of the reasons of our failures in 1941 and 1942. We must describe the errors committed by the leadership and its wrong decisions, and the direct culpability of Stalin and those around him, the errors in planning and in the conduct of operations and their actual efficiency.

There are widespread discussions on the subject of the figures pertaining to our losses in the war. Recently a special group was set up with representatives of the General Staff, members of our institute and archive personnel. It will study all known sources and, on their basis, determine the actual size of human and material losses. It will also determine the precise extent of our casualties which, today, on a strictly orientational basis, are estimated at 20 million people. Possibly, we shall be able to introduce quite a number of new data. We must also differentiate between losses in battle and casualties

resulting from punitive operations, in the concentration camps, from bombing, etc. We are currently engaged in such work.

[Editors] How long will it take to complete the work on the 10 volumes?

[Volkogonov] In accordance with the Central Committee resolution, the final tenth volume should come out in 1995, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the victory. The time frame is exceptionally strict. It took 11 years to write the 12-volume history of World War II. Now we must do a no lesser, if not a greater amount of work in 5 or 6 years. I believe that such deadlines are unrealistic. We have repeatedly raised the question of excluding the "anniversary" principle in setting deadlines for the writing of such a work.

[Editors] The first volumes will deal with the period which will include most of the controversial questions: the eve of the war and its initial period. Given the existing situation, will you be able to stick to the schedule? Almost 2 years have passed since the decision to publish this work was made.

[Volkogonov] This precisely is the possibly most complex problem of the present. It is entirely clear to us that questions concerning the history of this period, which have piled up but remain unsolved, must mandatorily be answered. The meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Commission on Problems of International Policy noted, in connection with the situation related to the interpretation of the political and military events of 1939, that a more active scientific use must be made of the pertinent archive documents which shed light on the nature and sources of World War II and the positions of Germany and some Western countries; mention was made of surmounting, in accordance with the new political thinking, one-sidedness and stereotypes in the interpretation of the history of World War II.

Civilian historians working in academic institutions and who, together with us, participate in drafting the 10-volume work, have repeatedly expressed their concern that access to an entire number of archives has been blocked to them, needed to procure the documents they require, above all those dealing with the prewar period. I am able to report that today, albeit slowly, restrictions in the use of archives are being lifted. Naturally, however, the researchers will need time to analyze the necessary data with proper thoroughness. It is true that, as in the past, a number of archives remain closed to us. This is one of reasons for the delay in submitting the first volume to the main editorial collegium in December 1989. A number of remarks were received also in the course of the repeated discussions of the summary of the first volume. We must take such remarks into consideration. The publication of this volume as, in fact, the subsequent ones, while leaving unanswered a number of sensitive questions means following a formal path. I fear that the broad public will simply fail to understand us, to put it mildly. Therefore, perhaps it may be worthwhile

once again to raise the question of revising the schedule for the publication of this work. The main thing is to produce a high-quality work.

[Editors] You have organized a collective in the institute. Are you considering the recruitment of fresh forces? Or will the project be carried out by those same historians who wrote the previous multiple-volume works?

[Volkogonov] New fresh forces have already been recruited. For many years the personnel of the institute was not renovated. The renovation process is taking place painfully and with difficulty. Having obtained the permission to hire junior scientific assistants, we have the possibility of recruiting young and promising officers who have shown an inclination for serious creative work.

[Editors] What kind of new sources will be used in the writing of this work?

[Volkogonov] We are currently developing our own institute files on the basis of the documents we have been able to "obtain." This includes, above all, materials from Supreme Command Headquarters, the General Staff, the fronts, and so on. For the first time, we shall borrow extensively from captured files. To this effect a special group of skilled translators has been set up. A tremendous volume of archival documents are still virtually untouched. So far we have studied no more than 5-6 percent of such material. All the rest has been left untouched since the end of the war. This includes documents of Hitler's headquarters, materials of the Wehrmacht Supreme Command and of the groups of armies and individual formations and units as well as diplomatic correspondence.

We hope to obtain greater access also to our domestic archives and, above all, the documents of the Central Party Archives. Without this it would be difficult to hope for any qualitative intensification of research. As to documents of the USSR Ministry of Defense they have always been and remain at our disposal. The situation is more difficult with materials related above all to Stalin's activities. They were withdrawn after the 20th Party Congress. For the time being we cannot obtain them from the party's files. I believe that all the materials which were taken from the files of headquarters and from the repositories of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff should be returned to them. Judge for yourselves: How can we assess the activities of headquarters without the most important documents on the decisions made by the supreme commander-in-chief? I believe that anything relative to Stalin's military activities should be included in the military archives.

[Editors] The readers of our journal are interested in the following: Will the new publication be written in an atmosphere of glasnost and broad exchange of views among scientists? A. Kurnosov, candidate of historical sciences, reports, for example, that the concept of the 10-volume work was seriously criticized at a meeting of the USSR Academy of Sciences History Department. "I believe," he writes, "that after completing the summary

and the concept, they must be discussed at a much broader forum, not only by military and civilian historians but also by members of the public such as, for example, writers, war and labor veterans, and newspapers and journals. The same should apply to the discussion of the galleys. I believe that a certain loss of time and expenditures for their publication would be entirely justified, for the new edition must be given the opportunity of having a long and active life."

[Volkogonov] I understand the concern of the author of this letter. Naturally, had the time limitation been different, it would have been a good idea to publish in a historical journal a summary of the work and then sponsor its discussion. However, all scientific organizations engaged in the work have the summaries of the first volumes and the concept of the overall publication. There have been repeated discussions at the institute involving the participation of the scientific and creative public. We are receiving many letters and suggestions. Let me point out that so far we have taken extensively into consideration the views of the members of the history institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences, with whom we are in contact on the subject of the new work. The most difficult, sensitive and complex problems and concepts are also being discussed with specialists from the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism. We shall take into consideration, to a maximal extent, the views of the scientific public and, naturally, the letters we are receiving and will continue to receive.

[Editors] It is very regrettable that possibilities for a preliminary extensive discussion have been narrowed. What about involving in the work itself historians from "other departments?" Including those who argue against you?

[Volkogonov] Approximately one-third of the historians who will work on the 10-volume publication are nonmilitary people. We are inviting experienced specialists and, unquestionably, we must involve in this joint project also historians who criticize our summary and disagree with some conceptual aspects. In particular, Academician A.M. Samsonov frequently engages in a debate with military historians in the press. I believe that such major scientists must be mandatorily asked to participate in the writing of this work. The project can only benefit from this.

[Editors] Nonetheless, could there be a discussion if not of the galleys at least the form, some sections of the work, outside the Military History Institute?

[Volkogonov] Naturally. One way or another, we will mandatorily discuss what was written. We intend to do this in a variety of ways. Some sections of the volumes will be published in scientific journals. For the past few months we have regularly held broad discussions. Interest in such meetings is quite extensive. A number of people are interested. We shall organize some kind of conferences for each separate volume, as we did last



February on the summary of the first volume, and will send manuscript copies to historians, military commanders, and writers. We shall hold a discussion before the final signing of the volume to press, so that we can take their remarks and wishes into consideration.

Our objective is to continue to study the view of the public on the most important conceptual and specific problems. We also intend to establish contacts with specialists in the socialist countries, who will also participate in our discussions and in writing some sections of the work. In short, the circle of our "community" will be broadened substantially.

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### **Under the Sign of Socialist Renovation (Survey of the Journal QIUSHI)**

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[Review by V. Burov, doctor of philosophical sciences]

[Text] The first issue of QIUSHI ("Striving Toward Truth"), an all-party theoretical journal, came out in China on 1 July 1988. It is a publication of the Central Party School, based on the instructions of the CPC Central Committee. At the same time, the publication of the journal HONGQI, which had been published since 1958, was stopped.

The 30 May 1988 CPC Central Committee resolution notes that the publication of QIUSHI is undertaken in connection with the requirements of the new situation which is characterized by a spirit of reform and openness, for purposes of developing research and investigation in the fields of theory, and stimulating the further development of Marxist thinking on the basis of the essential concepts of Marxism and in accordance with the specific situation in contemporary China. The tasks of the journal were defined as follows: "Strictly observing the principle that 'practice is the only criterion of truth' and directing the efforts toward a study of the spirit of the 13th CPC Congress and practical experience acquired after the 3rd CPC Plenum, 11th Convocation, to achieve a close tie between the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism and the ideas of Mao Zedong, and the practices of the initial stage of Chinese socialism; thoroughly to study problems of the theory and practice of the initial stage of socialism in China and particularly the specific problems related to the reform, openness and constructive processes as well as problems of party building under the new conditions; to pursue a course of strengthening the ties between theory and practice and to aspire toward the profound study of the laws governing the development of objective phenomena; to defend a course of 'let 100 flowers bloom and let 100 scientists compete,' and to promote the live discussion of theoretical problems and prevent one-sidedness; to change the style of the publication and to make the journal lively and interesting to the readers...."

The issues which have come out so far provide a good idea of the trend followed in the work of this new publication. The journal concentrates on problems of the economic and political reform, party building, and CPC ideological work. Articles by party leaders on topical problems of the domestic political situation are published regularly.

Articles on economic topics dealing with socialist commodity economy, its category apparatus, the law of value and price reform, agricultural production, the use of economic management methods at industrial enterprises, foreign economic relations, the development of the economy of the various parts of the country, including the special economic zones, problems of inflation, Western economic theories and the possibility of their application in China, the material status of individual population strata, forms of ownership, analytical considerations of the theoretical and practical problems of the economic reform, and others are published.

The reform in the political system, currently taking place in the PRC, is not reduced merely to demarcating between the functions of party and government authorities. One of its major features is the restructuring of the cadre system. To begin with, the principle of elections and competitiveness in the selection of cadre workers for corresponding positions is being practiced; second, democratic and open control is being exercised over their activities on the part of the masses. A number of articles also draw attention to the need for developing a decisive struggle against phenomena presenting great social danger, such as corruption, bribery, extortion and blackmail. At the same time, particularly in recent issues, some articles deal with problems of strengthening the ties between cadre workers and the people and their incorruptibility, disinterestedness and loyalty to revolutionary ideals.

The article by Se Fe, one of the heads of Kwangtung Province, states that the question of the incorruptibility of cadre personnel assumed prime significance when the Communist Party became ruling. The moral qualities of its members determines the successful implementation of socialist changes and the economic and political reform. Se Fe believes that the reasons for the corruption of some workers are the inconsistent implementation of the reform and the conversion from the old to the new economic system.

An interesting formulation is given in the journal to the problem of socialist democracy. Thus, Qin Xiaoying, member of the CPSU Central Committee Propaganda Department, writes that inherent in socialist democracy are two principles: that of the majority and the minority. In his view, the minority should reserve the right to present and defend its views and ideas. As proof of his thought, the author quotes V.I. Lenin: "Finally, as to the legal status of the minority (whatever type of minority it may be) in our party, we should consider the entire experience of the post-congress struggle. This experience teaches us that, we believe, it is necessary to secure

within the party statutes the right of any minority in order to deflect the constant and inevitable sources of discontent, irritation and struggle away from the usual philistine channels of scandal and quarrels into the as yet unusual channels of a formatted and worthwhile struggle for one's convictions" (*"Poln. Sobr. Soch."* [Complete Collected Works], vol 9, p 10).

The difficult and conflicting process of the study of social phenomena, Xiaoying goes on to say, leads to the fact that the view of the minority has, in frequent cases, realistic grounds: that which today is approved only by a minority could become the majority's viewpoint tomorrow.

Socialist renovation inevitably raises the question of the need to review many moral imperatives and to create a new system of moral values and requirements. Some articles indicate the importance and relevance of profound research of the nature of value orientations in human communications at the present stage in the development of Chinese society. It is no accident that a philosophical debate also includes the matter of the correlation between the traditions of Chinese culture and the Chinese way of thinking and the present stage in the country's development. It is pointed out, in particular, that the implementation of the reforms is impossible without abandoning many traditional concepts.

In the PRC the moral renovation of society is inseparably linked to changes in the concept of man himself, who is now considered the subject of socialist building, as an active, thinking and free individual. The transformation of the awareness, and freeing man from many remaining dogmas and concepts which hinder the development of his intellectual and spiritual possibilities, are becoming an inseparable part of the process of shaping a socialist spiritual civilization.

The role of Marxism as the theoretical foundation of the policy of the Communist Party grows immeasurably at the present stage in building socialism. In his article, Wu Jiang, the noted Chinese philosopher, states that in the recent past many serious problems existed, caused by dogmatism, the cult of personality and arbitrariness, introduced by Stalin. "Naturally," he adds, "we must not deny our own guilt as well." In appealing for the free discussion of theoretical problems, the scientist expresses the conviction that the truth does not depend on the status of man within the party-state hierarchy. "No leader should believe that the concepts he formulates are 100 percent consistent with Marxism." The party, he emphasizes, should guide theoretical life but must not interfere in it.

Currently there is a revival in China of the course of "let 100 flowers bloom and let 100 scientists compete." Its new interpretation is the topic of an article by Tao Deling, prorector of the university in Wuchang. In supporting the concept of free criticism in scientific debates, he emphasizes that every participant, and not only the leading personality or the leading organization,

as is sometimes the case, has the right to a free expression of opinion and the formulation of arguments and counterarguments. In order to determine whether a theoretical concept is correct or not, it must be freely discussed and tried in practice. Deling further writes: "According to some, such an approach belongs to the past, and after the appearance of Marxism things became easier, for anything consistent with Marxism is correct and anything that is not is incorrect. I believe that such a view is precisely one which is not consistent with Marxism, for it means a betrayal of its basic concept, to the effect that practice is the only criterion of truth."

In conclusion, the author formulates two basic theoretical concepts on which the party should structure its cultural policy. The first is acknowledging the inalienable right of every citizen to free speech within the framework of the laws, on any subject, including politics. The second pertains to the very nature of the study of the development of society and culture. In no case, he emphasizes, should this process be considered an "appendage" to the laws of the class struggle.

The materials published in QIUSHI give a clear idea of the dominant trends in the various areas of the social sciences. They confirm that a reinterpretation of many of the former concepts on the nature of social progress, the features of the contemporary stage in the development of global socialism and capitalism, and of philosophical and economic doctrines, both those which existed in the past and those newly created, is taking place.

Interesting in this respect is the article by Xu Jiadong "Reacquaintance With Capitalism and Conscious Building of Socialism." The author, who emphasizes the importance of the use of the experience of capitalism in implementing reform and modernization in the PRC, studies the more common problems related to capitalism and socialism. The theme of the article is the assertion of the need to review concepts concerning contemporary capitalism, for they have become obsolete. It is necessary to take into consideration, he writes, that the founders of Marxism, including Lenin, were limited by a specific historical framework in their understanding of capitalism and, naturally, could not predict its entire future development. Furthermore, contemporary capitalism is significantly different from the capitalism which existed during their lifetime. The researcher refers, in this connection, to state control of the economy, the relatively major share of medium-sized and small enterprises, the improved living standard of the working people, and the changed nature of ownership, as confirmed by the increased number of stockholders, and a certain softening in the foreign policy of the capitalist countries. Nonetheless, a significant gap remains between the practical results and ideals of socialism. In the contemporary world we must not deny the existence of "many interconnections and common features" shared by the two sociopolitical systems. Therefore, the main differences between them should not block the borrowing of anything valuable gained by capitalism, for this could help in the building of Chinese-style socialism.

The talk between this correspondent and Xu Chongwen, head of the history of Marxist philosophy at the PRC Academy of Social Sciences Institute of Philosophy, presents the Chinese viewpoint concerning so-called "Western Marxism" (Lukach, Korsch, Gramsci, Althusser and others). Xu Chongwen believes that we must abandon our negative attitude toward this philosophical trend. To begin with, "Western Marxism" has provided many valuable materials and drawn important conclusions concerning contemporary capitalism; second, there were positive aspects in its criticism of the Soviet model of socialism; in particular, it pointed out that after the socialist revolution the "corresponding full liberation" of the individual did not take place in the Soviet Union; third, its criticism of the Stalinist philosophical model of dialectical and historical materialism is worthy of attention. It is a question of distorting the philosophical tradition of Marx himself, who emphasized the active role of man and his practical activities, as is specified, in particular, in the "*Theses on Feuerbach*."

In another article, the same author repeats the idea of the need for proper interpretation of Marx's ideas on the role of practical experience and freeing Marxist philosophical outlook from latter Stalinist accretions in the course of which reality was considered only in the form of an object, something characteristic of all pre-Marxian materialism.

The journal discusses the sensitive areas of contemporary Chinese reality. Thus, articles on the material situation of the Chinese intelligentsia were published in two issues. In recent years this question has become particularly pressing in connection with the worsening living standard of the intelligentsia, the young generation in particular. As a result, there has been a decline in the interest to acquire higher training and the frequency of trainees and postgraduate students sent to study abroad and not returning has increased.

In reference to the experience of the developed capitalist countries, in his article Wu Kaiqing points out the importance of properly controlling the income of individuals engaged in mental and physical labor. "It is necessary," the author writes, "to respect science and knowledge and fully to develop the role of the intelligentsia and persistently strive to create for the intelligentsia the necessary living and working conditions and for the income of intellectual workers to be respectively higher than that of workers engaged in physical labor and for a reasonable disparity to exist between the two."

The journal includes information on the discussion of theoretical problems, new scientific developments, views of the readers on books read and on literary-artistic works, and so on.

Four of the 12 journal issues for 1988 included authored articles on the publication in the USSR of new textbooks on philosophy and political economy, and a discussion by Soviet social scientists of the basic contradiction within socialism, the "blank spots" in the history of

Soviet society and the reassessment of many facts of the past and of individual political personalities. One of the articles described the new approaches taken by the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe in the radical reorganization of socialist society.

The journal has already established a number of individual topic sections. It has a general section, a section on reform and openness, party life, 10 years of theoretical work, research and rivalry, reports on investigations, study of international problems, book reviews, theoretical information, short notes, letters to the editors, etc.

In recent years the covers of many Chinese publications, including those of the party, have been extensively used to provide various types of information and advertising. This is the case with QIUSHI as well. On the cover of each issue (except for the front cover which carries the title and the consecutive number) one always finds either a photograph or a reproduction of a painting, occasionally a drawing, a cartoon or advertising the goods of industrial enterprises, reports on subscription to QIUSHI and other journals, etc.

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### Short Book Reviews

18020015r Moscow *KOMMUNIST in Russian* No 9, Jun 89 (signed to press 2 Jun 89) pp 125-127

[Text] "*Sovetskiy Soyuz—Revolyutsiya Prodolzhaetsya*" [The Soviet Union—The Revolution Goes On] (On perestroika, glasnost and democratization). Articles, interviews, exchange of opinions and personal impressions. Peace and Socialism International Publishing House, Prague, 1988, 383 pp. Reviewed by G. Chernikov, doctor of economic sciences.

The entire world is speaking of our perestroika and glasnost. Now, when the first stage in the perestroika process has been completed and the land of the soviets is extensively solving problems of the practical implementation of its broad objectives, it is particularly important to try to analyze the way the changes in the USSR influence the international revolutionary movement and the development of global society as a whole.

These are the specific questions discussed in this book which was recently published in both Russian and foreign languages. It includes a section with materials on perestroika presented as though "first-hand"—the views of Soviet party and state leaders and representatives of the working class, science and culture. Second, it contains a large number of articles by heads of the communist movement, describing perestroika "from the outside," indicating its influence on the revolutionary movement. Finally, the third section provides a study of the reforms in the USSR by representatives of other political forces in the West.

A characterization of the revolutionary essence of perestroika and the main content of its first stage may be found in the article by Ye. Ligachev, with which the collection opens, and in other materials in the first part of the book (articles by V. Kamentsev, M. Ulyanov, A. Aganbegyan, L. Abalkin and others). As a whole, the first part of the book provides rich information although today, after the 19th Party Conference, the study of a number of problems could, naturally, be substantially developed.

It is natural that particularly interesting to the Soviet reader would be parts of the book which include works by foreign authors. The section on "Processes of Change in the USSR and the International Communist Movement," includes articles by the heads of the communist parties of Greece, Peru, Portugal, Argentina, Belgium, the FRG and other countries. Their general thought is well expressed by X. Vieira, Colombian Communist Party Central Committee secretary general, who emphasizes that the changes in the USSR are helping the struggle waged by the communists (see p 158). Muhammed Harmel, Tunisian Communist Party secretary general, writes about the "fresh wind of change," which is triggering the "live sympathy of the broadest possible circles of the democratic public." In his words, "the image of socialism is beginning to become more attractive to the broad circles.... The present course of the CPSU is inspiring us to pursue this innovative quest" (pp 171-173).

At the same time, the book provides a comprehensive discussion of the complex nature of the processes occurring in the revolutionary movement under the influence of perestroika and, let us say openly, the by no means simple nature of the reaction to it on the part of the foreign communists. Thus, P. Gomez, member of the Mexican Socialist Party National Executive Committee, believes that today as well "dogmatism has not been surmounted" entirely within the communist movement (p 180). Without starting a debate on the policies of fraternal parties, I believe that we could agree with Gomez's view on the variety within our movement and major differences in the objective conditions in which the individual parties function. The reaction of the communists to perestroika could not fail to reflect this variety. The policy of renovation, glasnost and self-criticism in the socialist countries occasionally triggers some fears, and doubts in some members of fraternal parties, reflecting the complexity of the process of surmounting customary patterns and established stereotypes. As the authors of the book—leaders of the communist movement—note, some revolutionaries do not always adequately and quite profoundly realize the nature of the new political system and the question of the priority of universal human values as the main imperative of our age.

Debatable problems arise as well. Thus, in an interesting article Semou Pate Gay, member of the Politburo and Central Committee secretary of the Senegal Independence and Labor Party, formulates, in connection with

the perestroika processes in the Soviet Union and changes in the world, the concept of the "crisis of Marxism." The author sees its manifestations in the lagging in theoretical work (at least in some of its essential aspects) behind contemporary political and socioeconomic realities and the not always adequately efficient policy pursued in matters of the struggle for socialism and the management of the new society, and the weakened attractiveness and mobilizing force of the Marxist ideal. The "crisis of Marxism," in the aspect in which it is described, "Gay writes, 'opens new opportunities rather than passes a death sentence'" (p 238). Unfortunately, this constructive conclusion remains insufficiently developed in the article and in the book as a whole. This collection clearly lacks specialized materials on the new thinking as a form of surmounting the contradictions which have appeared in the development of contemporary Marxism.

Interesting thoughts are expressed by Italian researcher Umberto Cierroni on the development of Marxist thinking, triggered by perestroika. He warmly supports the processes of democratization of Soviet society, considering them as the only possible way for achieving socialism. The author points out that the creation of a socialist rule of law state is important in this connection. Francis Cohen, one of the heads of the French Institute of Marxist Research, describes perestroika as a higher phase of development of the new society. The decisive turn which is taking place currently in the history of socialism, he emphasizes, will have major consequences. Cohen notes the inseparably interrelated basic aspects of perestroika: democratization, economic reform, and development of new political thinking (see p 293).

Unfortunately, the third part of the book, "Is the Ice of Mistrust Breaking?," which deals with the reaction on the part of other political trends in the West to the policy of reform in the USSR and the influence of perestroika on the global community, is inferior to the first two in terms of the extent of the treatment of the problems and the depth of analysis, although here as well we find quite interesting materials. One of them is an interview with Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland; another is an article by FRG Foreign Affairs Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. "We have become a society of survival," Genscher says in describing the present situation in the world. He calls for enhancing cooperation with the Soviet Union in order for the disarmament process to become irreversible.

Although the compilers of this book have not been fully successful in achieving their purpose, this book provides a great deal of food for thought. It is distinguished by its openness, tendency not to avoid sensitive problems and broad coverage of the most complex phenomena during the present sharp historical turn taken by socialism in developing its new face.

L.A. Gordon and E.V. Klopov. "Chto Eto Bylo?" [What Was That?]. Thoughts on the prerequisites and results of

what happened to us in the 1930s and 1940s. Politizdat, Moscow, 1989, 319 pp. Reviewed by G. Sobolev, doctor of historical sciences.

Today it has become most clear that the attitude toward revolutionary perestroika in our society is directly related to assessments of the historical processes of the 1930s and 1940s. The tragic nature of this period and the inevitably resulting increased emotional perception by us of the events of that time not only do not exclude but, even more so, require a considered scientific approach. "One must not bemoan historical events," F. Engels wrote: "Conversely, one must try to understand their reasons and, along with them, their results, **which are by no means complete as yet**" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 21, p 210).

From that viewpoint, the recently published book by L.A. Gordon and E.V. Klopov, which offers to the court of public opinion an entire set of crucial problems of the 1930s and 1940s, will be of unquestionable interest. To begin with, were there real alternatives to the course of comprehensive acceleration of industrial development of the USSR and socialist changes as a whole, which did not stop at any sacrifices? Second, what were the real results of the implementation of this course, what were we able to achieve and what was the price which the people had to pay for it? Third, what interconnection was there between the accelerated economic and social processes and the processes of conversion to an authoritarian management of society and, subsequently, to Stalin's despotic autocracy? Finally, how did all of this influence the further development of socialism?

Having formulated these questions, which are of key importance in understanding the 1930s and 1940s, the authors proceed in their study from the need to realize the integral nature of the socioeconomic processes which were taking place at that time, their interconnection and general reaction to the sharp turn which occurred in 1929. In answering the question of why the choice was made in favor of the plan for accelerated forced industrialization, they tried to encompass the sum total of factors which determined the "great change" by the turn of the 1930s and, with it, the entire nature of the subsequent development of the country. As the authors note, the growing threat of war, industrial backwardness, low cultural standards of the popular masses and the weakness of democratic political traditions created an atmosphere which favored the choice of accelerated economic and social change and administrative-command methods as means of solving the problems facing the society. The authors make the substantial stipulation here that despite their importance, the objective circumstances of this kind confirm more than anything else the greater likelihood of the adoption of a strategy of accelerated development rather than the fact that such a strategy would guarantee the best possible results. Actually, it is high time to file away the Stalinist thesis that the unquestionably optimal variant was chosen by the turn of the 1930s.

The authors caution against the hasty judgment to the effect that the variant of development, which was presented by N.I. Bukharin and his supporters, was not adopted above all because it was unattainable. The supporters of this viewpoint proceed from the fact that at that time primitive "gross-communist" views of socialism predominated in the party and the masses. Indeed, the predominance of such concepts, which were used as the theoretical and ideological foundation of Stalinism, contributed to its relatively easy victory over strategies based on the Leninist ideas of the NEP. Nonetheless, could one believe that the Stalinist plan of accelerated industrialization and coercive "urging on" of socialist changes, in the spirit of a "barracks communism" had a clearly ensured victory? The authors believe that such was not the case for, in their view, the primitive understanding of the movement toward socialism was already countered by the Leninist ideas, formulated in Lenin's last works, which marked the beginning of a new concept of ways of socialist restructuring. However, the authors' claim that at that time there were many supporters of this concept within the party, including in its leading circles (see p 43), clearly requires more substantive proof.

In criticizing the one-sided and essentially emotional assessments of the socioeconomic system which developed in our country in the 1930s, on the basis of the study of the results of its functioning the authors bring to light both its achievements and negative consequences. In their view, "the decisive accomplishment of the administrative-command system, which was created as a result of the restructuring of the political and economic mechanism by the turn of the 1930s, was that it was able to ensure the growth of production forces sufficient to surmount the lagging of the Soviet national economy..." (pp 49-50). As to assessing the changes in agriculture, the views of the authors here are to a certain extent conflicting. On the one hand, they believe that the specific forms of noncapitalist relations which were established in the course of comprehensive collectivization could be considered, although by stretching the concept, as the barracks variant of relations of the early socialist type which, however, adequately met the economic needs of accelerated industrialization (see p 69). Analyzing the results of agricultural production in the 1930s, the authors then reach the conclusion that "the comprehensive forced collectivization... should be considered an economic and social catastrophe" (p 77). Clearly, to a certain extent this view reflects the internal contradiction of collectivization itself, the comprehensive study of which is still into the future.

Quite disparate, as the book shows, were the results of the turn to noneconomic administrative-command methods in the social area (pertaining to the social status of the working people, welfare and culture). Preserving their sense of balance in assessing the changes which took place at that time in the social area and in the culture of the people's masses, the authors prove that a certain progress achieved in education and health care essentially among the urban population was combined, at the same time, with a stagnation in the material living standard of the people, a lowering of the purchasing

power of wages, worsened nutrition and a sharp and protracted housing crisis (see pp 98-115).

Whereas stagnation and a decline in the living standard were organically related to accelerated industrialization, the processes of conversion to an authoritarian regime were based on a broader range of reasons. Without attempting to provide a complete answer to this problem, the authors try to take into consideration the socioeconomic and political circumstances and the objective and subjective factors which led to the rule of the authoritarian political system in our country (see pp 119-154). Naturally, we shall have to "dig" at length and persistently until we expose the entire roots of Stalinism. However, the study of this complex problem in the book is characterized not only with a rather broad coverage of the various layers of sociopolitical life of Soviet society in the 1930s and 1940s but also the wish objectively to understand their nature. As the authors justly emphasize, the forms of tyrannical and repressive power exerted by Stalin were never consistent with the needs of the new society: from their very appearance they were a distortion and deformation of the socialist political system. Nonetheless, despite all of their stipulations, the authors formulate the rather controversial concept that "from the viewpoint of the key aspects of the socioeconomic development, the command-directive-based system (naturally, in its streamlined and nonextreme forms) was, as was the command-directive based economy, if not optimal, at least an admissible means of organizing social life" (p 259).

Naturally, the radical problems of our history of the 1930s and 1940s, considered in this book, require further intensified study. Their solution is related to the critical study of what has already been developed and the introduction in scientific circulation of new sources and breakthroughs in the methodology and philosophy of history. That is precisely why a number of the concepts expressed by the authors remain hypothetical. We believe that this book will stimulate the search for answers to the complex problems of that time and help to destroy the old stereotypes while, at the same time, prevent the appearance of new ones.

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#### Chronicle

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[Text] A roundtable was held in Tashkent on 17-18 May on topical problems of socioeconomic development of the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. It was sponsored by *KOMMUNIST* and the republic party publications *KOMMUNIST UZBEKISTANA*, *KOMMUNIST KAZAKHSTANA*, *KOMMUNIST KIRGIZSTANA*, *KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA* and *TURKMENISTAN KOMMUNISTI*.

The meeting was opened by R.N. Nishanov, Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee first secretary. The discussion dealt with pressing problems in the economic and social area, demography and labor resources, ecology and internationality relations, requiring immediate solutions. The exchange of views took place in an atmosphere of open and interested dialogue, well-wishing discussion of various viewpoints, and a collective search for constructive solutions. The meeting was attended by representatives of state, party and planning and economic authorities and public organizations, and scientists, journalists, and workers in industry and agriculture from all republics in the area and from Moscow. The participants in the meeting visited the kolkhoz imeni Kim Pen Khvan in Srednechirchikskiy Rayon, Tashkent Oblast, where they studied the use of the leasing contract system based on self-financing principles and internal economic cooperation.

A report on the meetings of the roundtable will be published in one of the forthcoming issues of *KOMMUNIST* and in the republic party journals which participated in its organization.

The editors were visited by a group of U.S. jurists—activists of the Committee of Lawyers for the Defense of Human Rights. In the course of the talk results of the elections of USSR people's deputies were discussed as well as the prospects and features of the forthcoming stages in the political and legal reform, the state of criminality in the country and the steps taken to protect the constitutional rights and legitimate interests of Soviet citizens.

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